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ABSTRACT
An abstract o f the dissertation o f Jeffrey Alan Fletcher for the Doctor o f Philosophy in 
Systems Science presented M ay 6, 2004.
Title: Fundamental Conditions for the Evolution o f Altruism:
Towards a Unification o f Theories
In evolutionary theory the existence o f self-sacrificing cooperative traits poses a 
problem that has engendered decades o f debate. The principal theories o f  the evolution 
o f altruism are inclusive fitness, reciprocal altruism, and multilevel selection. To 
provide a framework for the unification o f  these apparently disparate theories, this 
dissertation identifies two fundamental conditions required for the evolution o f 
altruism: 1) non-zero-sum fitness benefits for cooperation and 2) positive assortment 
among altruistic behaviors. I demonstrate the underlying similarities in these three 
theories in the following two ways.
First, I show that the game-theoretic model o f the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is 
inherent to all three theories. While the PD has been used extensively to model 
reciprocal altruism, I demonstrate that the n-player PD captures fundamental aspects 
o f multilevel selection and inclusive fitness in that NPD model parameters relate 
simply to Simpson’s paradox, the Price covariance equation, and Ham ilton’s rule. The 
tension between hierarchical levels that defines a PD reflects the tension between
Abstract
levels o f  selection that is explicit in multilevel selection theory, and implicit in the 
other two theories.
Second, Hamilton’s rule from inclusive fitness theory applies to the other 
theories. As mentioned, I demonstrate that this rule relates to multilevel selection via 
the NPD. I also show that Queller’s generalization o f Ham ilton’s rule applies to the 
conditional strategies o f reciprocal altmism. This challenges the selfish-gene 
viewpoint by highlighting the fact that it is the phenotypes o f others, not their 
genotypes, that is critical to the evolution o f altruism.
I integrate the PD and H am ilton’s rule as follows: the evolution o f altruism in 
general involves PD situations in which Hamilton’s rule specifies the necessary 
relationship between 1) the degree o f non-zero-sumness within the PD and 2) the 
degree o f positive assortment among altruistic behaviors.
Additional contributions o f  this research include a demonstration that randomly 
formed associations can provide the necessary positive assortment for strong altruism 
to evolve, the development o f a new selection decomposition that is symmetrical to 
the Price equation, and a game-theoretic analysis showing the essential similarity o f 
weak and strong altruism under selection.
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Preface
Before I became interested in the evolution o f altruism, my research focused on a 
different topic. I was doing investigations in a relatively new discipline called 
Artificial Life, which uses computer simulations to study life-like processes. 
Specifically, this research (Fletcher, Zwick, and Bedau 1996; Fletcher, Bedau, and 
Zwick 1998) focused on developing information-theoretic measures o f  the match 
between the complexity o f challenges posed by an environment and the repertoire of 
evolvable responses to these environmental inputs within organisms. I planned to 
build on this work for a Ph.D. thesis, but then I happened to read a Scientific American 
article by Richard Dawkins (1995) that ultimately set me on a different path.
Dawkins is both a popular science writer and one o f the most eloquent and 
staunchest proponents o f reductionism in evolutionary biology. His books, such as The 
Selfish Gene (1976) and The Extended Phenotype (1982), are classics that have 
influenced the thinking o f both evolutionary biologists and the general public about 
what drives evolutionary change. Dawkins argues that much o f what we see in the 
natural world can be explained in terms o f the self-interest o f genes. In this view the 
plethora o f  elaborate mechanisms for accomplishing tasks such as securing nutrition 
and shelter, and handling competitive and cooperative social interactions are just 
manifestations o f  genes endeavoring to increase their representation in future
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generations. What I found troublesome about Dawkins’ arguments was that there 
seemed to be a limited role for the influence o f processes or properties that emerge at 
higher levels o f organization than that o f the gene.
I was convinced that there should be some way to use evolutionary computer 
models to show that emergent phenomena that affect the outcome o f natural selection 
could not be attributed to their genetic basis alone. Although many other arguments 
have been made against Dawkins’ reductionism (e.g. Wade 1977b; Sober and 
Lewontin 1982; Sober and Wilson 1998; Lewontin 2000; Gould 2002), I thought these 
new computer tools for modeling evolutionary processes might be useful in 
illustrating the limitations o f this viewpoint. Fortunately, at around this same time my 
advisor Martin Zwick heard David Wilson and Leticia Aviles give talks on the role 
multiple levels o f selection play in the evolution o f altruism. This led me to read Sober 
and W ilson’s book Unto Others (1998) that chronicles the debate in evolutionary 
theory about altruism and group selection.
It was clear after reading Unto Others that the evolution o f altruism was a perfect 
example o f  higher-level emergent phenomena that could not be explained only in 
terms o f  lower-level interactions among competing genes. Additionally, the tension 
between individual- and group-level selection described in the multilevel selection 
process for altruistic traits seemed to map naturally onto the tension between  
individual and collective rationality described by the tragedy o f the commons or the 
prisoner’s dilemma (PD) o f game theory. Yet while the PD was being used to model
reciprocal altruism, its usefulness in modeling the evolution o f  altruism in general was 
not appreciated. Thus this dissertation topic was conceived.
While this has been a very productive research area (and it feels like there is still 
much more to be done), it has also taken a long time to get to this point. For seven 
years after completing a M aster’s in Computer Science in 1995 I worked as a software 
development engineer for a startup company. During that time, completing course 
work and doing research was an ever-demanding “hobby” which I mostly did during 
evenings and weekends. At first my job was more than fulltime, then eventually part- 
time, and finally for almost two years now I have been able to focus prim arily on the 
research for this dissertation. Over the last four years I have written several papers (all 
in collaboration with my advisor Martin Zwick) that form the basis o f this dissertation. 
Five papers have been accepted for publication (Fletcher and Zwick 2000a; 2000b; 
2001; 2004c; 2004b), four in conference proceedings, one in the Journal o f  
Theoretical Biology, and two more manuscripts for journal publication are essentially 
complete. In addition, I collaborated on a paper with Leticia Aviles and Asher Cutter 
that has just been accepted to The American Naturalist (Aviles, Fletcher, and Cutter 
2004), but is not part o f this dissertation.
Chapters 3-5 form the heart o f the dissertation and below I give some o f the 
history o f their development. Chapter 3 is the culmination o f  work that was ultimately 
presented in three proceedings papers, as well as a manuscript submitted to Science 
magazine. The first o f these papers was presented in July o f 2000 at The World 
Congress o f the Systems Sciences and ISSS Conference in Toronto, Canada (Fletcher
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and Zwick 2000b). Later that summer I co-coordinated a workshop on “ALife’s Role 
in the Group Selection Debate” at the ALife YII conference in Portland, Oregon 
where I also presented a paper (Fletcher and Zwick 2000a). This was a very successful 
workshop and other presenters and contributors included Athena Aktipis (2000), 
Leticia Aviles (2000), Joshua M itteldorf (Mitteldorf and Wilson 2000b), John Pepper 
(2000a), and Michael W ade (2000) as well as Richard Michod (M ichod and Roze 
2000a) who contributed a paper but was unable to attend.
In 2001 I was invited to a special 2-day workshop on the “Evolution o f Sociality” 
at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Berlin Institute for Advanced Study) in Germany 
where I presented preliminary findings on the relationship between the n-player PD 
(NPD) and the Price covariance equation as well as an alternative selection 
decomposition. This work comprised the last o f these proceedings papers which I 
presented in October o f 2001 at the IEEE, Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Conference 
in Tucson, Arizona and in an invited talk to the Ecology and Evolutionary Biology 
Department at the University o f  Arizona. The Science submission received a very 
strong review from David W ilson (who wrote to me directly after being asked to 
review our paper by the Science editors), but was ultimately not selected for 
publication. I plan to resubmit this paper to another journal soon, supported by new 
findings detailed below as well as new work done on showing the equivalence 
between weak and strong altruism, which I first presented at an invited talk to the 
Evolution, Ecology, and Biodiversity Seminar, Department o f Zoology, University o f 
British Columbia in November, 2003.
Preface xx
Chapter 4 grew out o f a main criticisms o f the Science manuscript from one o f the 
other reviewers. This reviewer stated that what we had shown about maintaining 
altruism through random group formation must only apply to weak altruism. While 
this assessment was based on a long-standing consensus in the literature that strong 
altruism could not evolve in randomly formed groups, ultimately I found it was based 
on single-generation models by Hamilton (1975) and independently by Wilson 
(1975a). It was clear from our NPD model that an intermediate number o f generations 
could be most favorable to the evolution o f altruism and I knew from our experimental 
results that this was true o f both weak and strong altruism.
In order to address these claims directly, I decided to use the original strong 
altruism models o f Hamilton and Wilson to show that this nearly 30-year-old general 
consensus was incorrect. This research was first presented at the Evolution 2003 
conference in Chico, California. In a fuller form it has just been published as a paper 
entitled “Strong Altruism Can Evolve in Randomly Formed Groups” in the Journal o f  
Theoretical Biology  (Fletcher and Zwick 2004c). This paper forms the basis o f 
Chapter 4. This research also led me to think more about the relationship between 
strong and weak altruism and to develop a game theoretic argument showing their 
equivalence when under natural selection (Chapter 3).
Chapter 5 grew out o f  initial difficulties I encountered in applying Hamilton’s 
rule to a reciprocal altruism model. While I was convinced that the association 
between behaviors rather than genotypes was key, my attempts to use phenotype 
frequencies in Ham ilton’s rule had all failed until I came across Queller’s versions
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(1985; 1992b; 1992a). Although the example o f applying Ham ilton’s rule to 
conditional strategies in Chapter 5 is quite simple, as far as I know, it is the first time 
someone has demonstrated how these equations apply to reciprocal altruism. The 
paper representing these findings (Fletcher and Zwick 2004b) forms the basis o f 
Chapter 5 and has just been accepted into the proceedings o f the IEEE Congress on 
Evolutionary Computation to be held in Portland, Oregon in June o f this year. The 
major theme o f this conference is a celebration o f the 20th anniversary o f  Robert 
A xelrod’s book The Evolution o f  Cooperation (1984). The conference includes an 
iterated PD competition similar to those used as a basis o f this seminal book and 
Axelrod will be giving the keynote address.
Fittingly, Chapter 5 also returns me to Dawkins’ selfish gene theory and other 
narrow interpretations o f Hamilton’s rule in which altruistic behaviors are seen as 
being encoded by genes that help other related copies o f themselves. Unlike 
Hamilton’s versions o f his equations (on which Dawkins’ viewpoint depends), in 
Queller’s more general versions there are no terms for the genotypes o f  others, only 
their phenotypic behaviors. These most general interpretations o f Ham ilton’s Rule 
shows how genetically based altruistic traits can increase via interactions with 
completely unrelated individuals or even individuals o f different species in symbiotic 
relationships. Phenotype is an emergent property that depends on the interaction o f 
genes and environmental conditions (including the behaviors o f others). It is others’ 
phenotypic behaviors that determine the fitness consequences o f  social interactions to 
individual’s and their genes.
Preface xxii
In summary, although the original motivation for the research behind this 
dissertation began with a negative reaction to Dawkins’ reductionist stance (and I was 
ultimately able to point out some o f the limitations in the selfish gene perspective), my 
research has focused more broadly on the fundamental conditions for altruism to 
evolve across all theories. The evolution o f altruism is a rich and still controversial 
area o f evolutionary theory, which continues to fascinate me and I am sure to continue 
thinking about for many years to come.
In short, the units o f  competitive self-interest that make up a genome are 
utterly interdependent. How did the competitive process o f  natural selection 
shape so intricate a mutualism?
Egbert Giles Leigh, Jr, in Levels o f  Selection in Evolution  (1999)
Chapter 1 
Introduction
Nature is replete with examples o f highly cooperative behaviors. From the very 
effective cooperative hunting and food sharing in human tribes (even among non­
relatives) (e.g. Boehm 1993; Hawkes 1993), to worker bees and ants giving up their 
own reproduction (e.g. Wilson 1975b), to the marvel o f the highly specialized and 
diverse set o f individual cells that go into making up an individual organism such as a 
bee or a person. Yet for every cooperative interaction it is also easy to imagine a way 
in which one party could take advantage o f others to get a little bit more in the 
cooperative exchange and thereby ultimately make more copies o f themselves relative 
to their more egalitarian cohorts. A hunter who risked a little less danger in the hunt or 
took a little more than his share o f the food would have such an advantage, as would a 
bee who had her own offspring, or a cell that made more copies o f itself at the expense 
o f a well-functioning individual. These less cooperative people, bees, or cells we label 
selfish or defectors while the less selfish are altruistic or cooperators. Flere altruism is 
defined in a strictly evolutionary biology sense in that the fitness o f others is enhanced
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by being a cooperative hunter, bee, or cell at a fitness cost to the cooperator— that is 
they could have made more copies o f themselves by being selfish.
This question is central to this dissertation: How can such cooperative or altruistic 
behaviors evolve and be maintained in the face of natural selection which should favor 
the more selfish? While defections are known to occur in each o f these examples (lazy 
or greedy hunters (Wilson 1998), cheating bees (Oldroyd et al. 1994), or cancerous 
cells (Nowell 1976; Paulovich, Toczyski, and Hartwell 1997)), they are exceptions to 
the rule. The three major theories on the evolution o f altruism each answer this central 
question differently and there is thus heated debate as to which theories are correct 
and which apply in different situations (see Chapter 2). One o f  the major contributions 
o f  this dissertation is to show that the three major theories all share fundamental 
conditions and rely on the same basic mechanisms to explain the evolution o f 
altruism. Identifying these basic requirements in each theory helps move us towards a 
more unified understanding o f how altruism evolves. Fundamental aspects o f the 
evolution o f altruism are embodied in both Hamilton’s rule from inclusive fitness 
theory and the prisoner’s dilemma from game theory, and I show how both apply to 
all three theories. Below I provide a preview o f each o f the following chapters 
followed by a summary o f this dissertation’s contributions to our understanding o f 
how altruism evolves.
Chapter 2 provides a literature review and background information on several o f 
the theories and concepts that are pertinent to this dissertation. I start with some 
examples o f natural phenomena where cooperation or altruistic traits are well
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documented and then discuss the major evolutionary explanations o f how such 
behaviors can arise under the process o f natural selection. These theories are inclusive 
fitness theory (which is closely associated with kin selection and selfish gene 
theories), multilevel selection (an update o f group selection) theory, and reciprocal 
altruism theory. I also discuss several concepts relevant to the evolution o f altruism 
that are related to these theories and used in later chapters. These include Ham ilton’s 
rule, the prisoner’s dilemma (including iterated and n-player versions), the tragedy o f 
the commons, Simpson’s paradox, and the Price covariance equation. Note that 
because each o f the chapters 3-5 is in the form o f a standalone paper, some o f this 
background information is repeated in the introductions or discussions o f  those 
chapters. In general Chapter 2 covers these topics in more depth.
Chapter 3 is based on an original insight that the tension between within-group 
and between-group selection described in multilevel selection theory is analogous to 
the tension between individual and collective rationality described by a tragedy o f the 
commons or n-player prisoner’s dilemma (NPD). Although the prisoner’s dilemma 
(PD) has been used to investigate reciprocal altruism, it has not been used explicitly to 
model multilevel selection. Here I show that an NPD model in multiple groups is a 
simple yet powerful model o f the evolution o f altruism. It captures essential factors in 
model parameters that relate simply to Hamilton’s Rule, the Price covariance 
equation, and a useful alternative selection decomposition I present here. Contrasting 
this alternative decomposition with the Price equation demonstrates interaction effects
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between within- and between-group selection which are not captured in either 
decomposition alone.
This game theoretic model also allows me to demonstrate essential similarities 
between strong and weak altruism undergoing natural selection. Lastly, using periodic 
random groupings o f non-conditional strategies I show that, in contrast to 
conventional wisdom, strong altruism can be selected for and maintained without 
reciprocity. This model suggests a framework for unifying different approaches to the 
evolution o f altruism. Chapter 3 is based on a manuscript (Fletcher and Zwick 2004a) 
prepared for submission and draws on three previous proceedings papers (Fletcher and 
Zwick 2000a; 2000b; 2001).
Chapter 4 provides a more thorough treatment o f the claim (mentioned above) 
that strong altruism can indeed evolve in randomly formed groups. Currently there is 
general agreement that altruistic traits involving an absolute cost to altruists (strong 
altruism) cannot evolve when populations are structured with randomly formed 
groups (Hamilton 1975; Wilson 1975a; Nunney 1985a; Wilson 1990; Nunney 2000; 
Sober and Wilson 2000). This conclusion implies that the evolution o f such traits 
depends upon special environmental conditions or additional organismic capabilities 
that enable altruists to interact with each other more than would be expected with 
random grouping. Here I show, using both analytic and simulation results, that the 
positive assortment necessary for strong altruism to evolve does not require these 
additional mechanisms, but merely that randomly formed groups exist for more than 
one generation. Conditions favoring the selection o f  altruists, which are absent when
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random groups initially form, can naturally arise even after a single generation within 
groups— and even as the proportion o f altruists simultaneously decreases. The gains 
made by altruists in a second generation within groups can more than compensate for 
the losses suffered in the first and in this way altruism can ratchet up to high levels. 
This is true even if  altruism is initially rare, migration between groups allowed, 
homogeneous altruist groups prohibited, population growth restricted, or kin selection 
precluded.
Until now random group formation models have neglected the significance of 
multigenerational groups— even though such groups are a central feature o f classic 
“haystack” models (Maynard Smith 1964; Wilson 1987) of the evolution o f altruism. I 
also explore the important role that stochasticity (effectively absent in the original 
infinite models) plays in the evolution o f altruism. The fact that strong altruism can 
increase when groups are periodically and randomly formed suggests that altruism 
may evolve more readily and in simpler organisms than is generally appreciated. This 
chapter is based on a paper recently accepted to the Journal o f  Theoretical Biology 
(Fletcher and Zwick 2004c).
Chapter 5 shows that very general versions o f Hamilton’s inclusive fitness rule 
(developed by Queller (1985; 1992b; 1992a)) can be applied to traditional reciprocal 
altruism models such as the iterated PD. W hile several theorists have shown that 
multilevel selection and inclusive fitness models are alternative ways o f  analyzing the 
same basic mechanism (e.g. Wade 1980; Queller 1985; 1992b; Frank 1998; Sober and 
Wilson 1998; Fletcher and Zwick 2004a), reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness are
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generally considered different mechanisms (e.g. Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Dawkins 
1982) by which cooperative, altruistic traits may evolve. By demonstrating how to 
apply Ham ilton’s rule to a reciprocal altruism model with conditional strategies, I 
challenge the view that these are different mechanisms and show that both inclusive 
fitness (multilevel selection) models and reciprocal altruism models rely on the same 
fundamental conditions: 1) sufficiently non-zero-sum helping behaviors being 2) 
sufficiently positively assorted. I also discuss obstacles to this unified view, including 
phenotype/genotype differences and non-additive fitness (or utility) functions that are 
typical o f reciprocal altruism models. I then demonstrate how Queller’s versions o f 
Hamilton’s rule remove these obstacles. Finally, the fact that Queller’s m ost general 
version o f Ham ilton’s rule focuses on the assortment o f phenotypes (behaviors) rather 
than the traditional genotypes poses a challenge to the selfish gene perspective and 
shows that inclusive fitness theory can even apply to cooperation across species in 
symbiotic relationship. This chapter is based on a paper (Fletcher and Zwick 2004b) 
just accepted to the proceedings o f the 2004 Congress on Evolutionary Computation 
to be held in Portland this summer.
Figure 1-1 illustrates areas within evolutionary theory on altruism where this 
dissertation makes contributions and how these contributions fit into the larger context 
o f current theory. It also indicates which o f the core chapters (3-5) addresses each 
area.
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Figure 1-1. Schematic o f  Dissertation Core Findings in Chapters 3 to 5.
Solid lines show established relationships between the three major theories, 
the N PD , Hamilton’s rule and associated phenomena. The dashed lines show  
relationships newly developed or substantially strengthened by this 
dissertation along with the associated chapter numbers.
Chapter 6 provides a conclusion and discusses some o f the implications o f this 
work for unifying our understanding o f how altruism evolves. I also discuss how some 
o f the paradoxes surrounding the evolution o f altruism fit into a larger framework o f 
needing to explain causation at appropriate hierarchical levels. In addition, a better 
appreciation o f the role both cooperation and  competition play in the evolution and 
maintenance o f  hierarchical biological systems may influence our understanding o f 
human evolution as well as provide a richer basis for societal metaphors drawn from
Chapter 1—Introduction 8
biology. This final chapter also discusses possible future extensions to the research 
presented here.
In summary, the major contributions o f this dissertation include:
• Identifying the fundamental conditions necessary for the evolution o f 
altruism inherent in all three major theories o f how altruism evolves.
• Demonstrating that the n-player prisoner’s dilemma (NPD) in multiple 
groups can be used as a fundamental model o f the evolution o f  altruism in 
that the paradox o f the PD captures the tension between different levels of 
selection and the parameters o f the NPD have simple and intuitive 
relationships to Hamilton’s rule, the Simpson’s paradox effect, and the 
Price covariance equation.
• Providing an integrated framework that can help social science researchers 
who emphasize game-theoretic models to see their results in the context o f 
H am ilton’s rule and multilevel selection, while also enabling biology 
researchers who focus on relatedness to recognize the inherent game- 
theoretic character o f their models.
• Developing an alternative selection decomposition that is symmetric, but 
different than the Price covariance equation and helps reveal its 
underlying assumptions and limitations.
• Showing that the distinction between strong and weak altruism relies on 
absolute fitness values, whereas selection relies on relative fitness, and
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therefore that the dynamics o f both types are similar under natural 
selection.
• Overturning a nearly three decade old consensus among evolutionary 
biologists that strong altruism could not evolve in randomly formed 
groups.
• Investigating the role that stochasticity can play in enhancing or 
dampening selection for altruistic traits.
• Showing how the most general version o f Ham ilton’s rule can be 
successfully applied to reciprocal altruism models, even when fitness 
functions are non-additive.
• Demonstrating that in its most general interpretation, the evolution of 
altruistic traits need not involve selfish genes helping other copies o f 
themselves. This more general interpretation can be used to understand the 
evolution o f cooperation between species— symbiotic relationships for 
which the selfish gene interpretation has no direct role.
Finally, this dissertation allows me to discuss (in Chapter 6) broader implications 
o f this research including how causal explanations and hierarchy interact in this 
paradoxical and controversial arena o f theories on the evolution o f altruism, how both 
competition and cooperation affect natural selection across different hierarchical 
levels, how ideas from general systems theory apply to evolving biological systems, 
and how our understanding o f competition and cooperation in biological systems may 
both influence and be influenced by our understanding o f human social systems.
For biologists, I  think that the moral is that it pays to be eclectic in our 
choices o f  theories. O f course, we have to avoid believing simultaneously in 
two contradictory theories, or in any one theory that is contradicted by 
observations that we think are correct. But this leaves plenty o f  room to be 
reductionists in one context and holist in another.
John Maynard Smith, in conclusion to Shaping Life  (1998b)
This possibility o f  group selection has been regarded as anathema by nearly 
all evolutionary biologists, although entirely without empirical evidence.
Richard C. Lewontin, in review o f Unto Others (1998)
Chapter 2 
Background
The mechanisms by which self-sacrificing, cooperative, or altruistic behavior may 
evolve in biological systems have been vigorously debated over the last several 
decades (e.g. Wynne-Edwards 1962; Maynard Smith 1964; Williams 1966; Wilson 
1975a; Dawkins 1976; Wade 1977b; 1985; Queller 1992b; W ilson 1997a; Lewontin 
1998; Sober and Wilson 1998; Reeve 1999; Smuts 1999; Katz 2000). Proposed 
explanations include reciprocal altruism where the self-interest o f  individuals is served 
by the exchange o f cooperation with others (Trivers 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton 
1981; Axelrod 1984), inclusive fitness where the self-interest o f genes is served by 
encoding actions benefiting copies o f themselves in other organisms (usually 
relatives) (Hamilton 1964; 1970; 1972; 1975; 1987), and multilevel selection (often
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called group selection) where the self-interest o f groups is served by the inclusion of 
altruistic members and selection at other levels (e.g. gene or individual) is also 
acknowledged (Wilson 1975a; 1976; 1977; 1990; 1997a; 1997b; Sober and Wilson 
1998; W ilson 2004). Although these explanations have mathematically equivalent 
aspects (Wade 1980; Queller 1985; 1992b; Frank 1998; Sober and W ilson 1998; 
Fletcher and Zwick 2004b) they clearly differ in their conception o f the causal level at 
which self-interest drives selection for self-sacrifice.
The use o f different terms (e.g. altruism vs. cooperation) has also complicated 
this debate (Sober and Wilson 1998). Here I use the term altruism  to describe self- 
sacrificing behavior where an actor causes others to receive fitness benefits (have 
more offspring) at an immediate net fitness cost to itself. By immediate cost I mean 
that there was another potential action in a particular social interaction that would have 
resulted in the actor having more offspring relative to others (this assumes that the 
actions o f others around the actor remained the same for that interaction). In many 
cooperative interactions there is a potential to take advantage o f  other cooperators as 
defection is more advantageous. In such situations cooperation is altruistic and the 
terms m ay be used synonymously.
M any different types o f such self-sacrificing, cooperative behaviors have been 
observed. Well defined examples from nature (som e o f  which have been investigated 
in computer and mathematical models) include reproductive altruism— from female- 
biased sex ratios (Colwell 1981; Wilson and Colwell 1981; Herre 1985; Nunney 
1985a; Aviles 1993) and slower parasite reproduction in the evolution o f
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virulence (Bull 1994; Lenski and May 1994; Frank 1996; Miralles, Moya, and Elena 
1997) to the extreme forms o f reproductive sacrifice found in eusocial insects (Rissing 
and Pollock 1987; Rissing et al. 1989; Bemasconi and Strassmann 1999) and in slime 
molds (Matapurkar and Watve 1997; Ennis et al. 2000; Strassmann 2000; Strassmann, 
Zhu, and Queller 2000; Velicer, Rroos, and Lenski 2000). Examples o f altruism also 
include social forms o f cooperation such as alarm calling (Sherman 1977; Hoogland 
1983; Pepper and Smuts 2000), feeding restraint (Hart, Kohler, and Carlton 1991; 
Hemptinne and Dixon 1997; Pepper and Smuts 2000; 2002), cooperative colonization 
o f new territory (M itteldorf and Wilson 2000a; Giraud, Pedersen, and Keller 2002; 
Rainey and Rainey 2003), and cooperative hunting (Packer and Ruttan 1988; Packer et 
al. 1991). Genomic coordination and integration is another example o f altruism where 
the normal— and under appreciated— fact o f cooperation is revealed when it is 
undermined by the reemergence o f lower-level selfish genetic structures (Cosmides 
and Tooby 1981; Eberhard 1990; Turner and Perkins 1991; Hickey 1992; Nunney and 
M iller Baker 1993; Werren and Beukeboom 1993; Albert et al. 1996; Camacho et al. 
1997; Smith 1998). Finally, altruistic cooperation is involved in the origin o f new 
levels o f organization such as multicellularity (Maynard Smith and Szathmary 1995; 
Michod and Roze 2000b; 2001) and in symbiosis (Maynard Smith 1991; Margulis 
1993; Frank 1997). There are also o f course many examples o f selfish behavior, but 
the paradox for evolutionary biology is: why should there be self-sacrificing behaviors 
in systems evolved via natural selection— why haven’t exclusively selfish strategies 
won the competition o f survival o f  the fitte st?
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In addition to the examples o f cooperation listed above, there are also many such 
behaviors among humans including well studied examples such as food sharing, risk 
sharing in peasant farming (Scott 1976), and sharing o f limited w ater resources 
(Lansing 1994) in less modem societies, as well as more modem examples such as the 
tons o f food quietly donated to the Oregon Food Bank each day or more celebrated 
sacrifices such as those o f firefighters in New York’s World Trade Center or soldiers 
on the battlefield.
In this dissertation I focus on abstract theoretical models o f the evolution of 
altruism that contain no explicit analog o f human society or psychology. I am 
interested in the most fundam ental mechanisms by which cooperation can arise and be 
maintained. Thus my findings may be better suited for helping us understand the 
origins o f cooperative interactions in the primordial soup (such as the cooperation 
among cells in multicellular organisms) than for addressing w hy a person would 
volunteer in a soup kitchen. Nevertheless, human evolution has also been subject to 
these fundamental processes and in the concluding chapter I will touch on how this 
research may influence our understanding o f human behavior as well as how the 
emphasis on competition in evolutionary theory may provide an incomplete picture for 
those who justify competitive human behavior in terms o f what is “natural.”
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The Group Selection Controversy
One explanation for how altruistic behaviors might evolve through the process o f
natural selection (in both humans and other organisms) is the one given by Charles
Darwin: groups o f organisms whose members make sacrifices for each other might be
more fit as groups and out compete other groups with less cooperative members. As
Darwin put it (in somewhat antiquated terms):
It must not be forgotten that although a high standard o f  morality gives but 
slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over the other 
men o f  the same tribe, ye t that an increase in the number o f  well-endowed 
men and advancement in the standard o f  morality will certainly give an 
immense advantage to one tribe over another. There can be no doubt that a 
tribe including many members who, from  possessing in a high degree the 
spirit o f  patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always 
ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves fo r  the common good, 
would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural 
selection. A t all times throughout the world tribes have supplanted other 
tribes; and as morality is one important element in their success, the 
standard o f  morality and the number o f  well-endowed men will thus 
everywhere tend to rise and increase. (Darwin 1871 p. 166)
Yet it is also true that within a group (tribe) individuals would show variation in their
levels o f competitiveness and the more selfish o f these would be at a selective
advantage compared to other members within their group. In this quote Darwin is not
addressing the emphasis he placed in his earlier work (1859) on individual variation in
traits leading to disproportionate individual reproductive success. This opposition o f
forces contributes to the confusion in analyzing the evolution o f altruistic behavior.
Natural selection among groups may favor groups with altruistic individuals whereas
natural selection within a group favors selfish individuals. W hat actually evolves is a
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net result that depends on the relative strengths o f the selective forces occurring at 
different levels.
There is also considerable debate about what constitutes altruism. David Wilson 
(1979; 1990) distinguishes “strong” altruism where there is a net absolute cost to an 
altmist and “weak” altruism where there is just a relative cost compared to other group 
members. Others have ignored or disagreed with this distinction preferring to reserve 
the word altruism only for the strong category (Nunney 1985b; M aynard Smith 1998a; 
Nunney 2000). This debate continues 25 years later (Nunney 2000; Sober and Wilson 
2000) and rests on whether one measures fitness in absolute or relative terms. For 
instance, David W ilson has just published a paper entitled “W hat’s wrong with 
absolute individual fitness?” (2004). I weigh in on this debate in chapter 3 using a 
game theoretic analysis to clarify the issues.
John Pepper (2000b) has made a similar distinction o f “whole-group” altruism 
where altruists contribute to a common good that has some marginal benefit to 
themselves and “other-only” altruism where altruists give only to others and receive 
nothing back. This distinction may be more useful than the strong vs. weak distinction 
because the way in which one calculates assortment (the r term in H am ilton’s rule— 
discussed further on) is different for each type. Other-only altruism is always strong, 
but whole-group altruism can be strong or weak depending on whether the altruist’s 
share o f the benefit it provides to the group exceeds its cost. The reason weak altruism 
may still be considered altruism is that relative to others the altruist receives less 
benefit than it provides others.
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Despite the complicated nature o f this issue, one might expect that more than 130 
years after Darwin’s explanation the notion o f multilevel selection would be well 
developed in evolutionary biology. In fact this is far from true. The very existence o f 
group-level selection as a significant natural process is highly controversial, 
passionately argued, and not generally supported by such prominent evolutionary 
thinkers as John Maynard Smith (1964; Maynard Smith and Szathmary 1995; 1998a) 
and Richard Dawkins. Dawkins goes so far as to compare the appeal o f  group 
selection to amateur inventors’ fascination with perpetual motion machines (1982).
However, the disfavor with group selection is not due to any definitive proof 
against it or lack o f evidence for it (e.g. see Goodnight and Stevens 1997 for a review 
o f experimental evidence). In Unto Others Elliot Sober and David W ilson (1998) 
chronicle the history o f the group selection controversy. As they point out, this history 
is hardly what the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn (1970) would call “normal 
science” in which competing theories and hypotheses are tested and then augmented, 
rejected, or accepted. Rather group selection theory was discredited without actually 
being disproved. Sober and Wilson (1998) present a strong case for multilevel 
selection theory, but the mixed reaction among the reviews speaks to the ongoing 
passion in this debate (Lewontin 1998; Maynard Smith 1998a; Nunney 1998; Reeve 
1999; Smuts 1999; Sansom 2000).
While group selection arguments can be traced back to Darwin (see quote above), 
the publication of Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior by V.C. Wynne- 
Edwards (1962) who promoted group selection wholeheartedly kindled the modem
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debate. Wynnne-Edwards saw limiting the exploitation o f resources as beneficial to 
groups at the expense o f individuals that restrain themselves. He then argued that 
many group behaviors such as the flocking o f birds or the vertical movement of 
plankton were mechanisms by which groups could assess their density and act 
accordingly. Arguments explaining behaviors in terms o f the group or species level 
were common, but not well formulated. At the same time W illiam Hamilton was 
developing his formal theory o f  inclusive fitness focused on selection at the level o f 
genes (1963; 1964). Wynne-Edwards seems to have overstated the case for group 
selection. In his words: “Evolution at this level can be ascribed, therefore, to what is 
here termed group-selection— still an intraspecific process, and, for everything 
concerning population dynamics, much more important than selection at the individual 
level.” Wynne-Edwards realized that individual selection must also play a role, but 
claimed that where the two were in conflict “ ...group selection is bound to win, 
because the race will suffer and decline, and be supplanted by another in which 
antisocial advancement o f  the individual is more rigidly inhibited” (1962 p. 20). In this 
way he explained many adaptations as being for the good o f  the species.
This book provoked a strong reaction among evolutionary biologists, none so 
effective as that o f George W illiams in Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966). 
W illiam s’ book addressed the kinds o f  behaviors that Wynne-Edwards had claimed 
were group selected. W illiams argued that when both individual and group selection 
scenarios could explain a behavior, individual selection was the more parsimonious 
and should therefore be preferred. However, Stephen Gould (Gould 2002) has argued
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that Williams incorrectly applies the idea o f parsimony in logical arguments (Occam’s 
razor) to argue that simpler mechanistic explanations about how nature works should 
be preferred over more complicated ones. Thus, Gould argues that Williams is making 
a case for reductionism  rather that parsimony. In addition, Sober and Wilson point out 
that arguments based on parsimony “certainly do not substitute for a critical test of 
hypotheses that make different and mutually exclusive predictions” (1998 p. 38). Yet 
Williams also offered such a verifiable test concerning sex ratios. He was aware of 
Fisher’s (1930) analysis showing even sex ratios are individually selected and 
concluded that skewed sex ratios would be evidence o f a group adaptation. 
Unfortunately, he lacked adequate data about real examples in nature o f biased sex 
ratios: “I conclude that there is no evidence from data on sex ratios to support the 
concept o f biotic adaptation” (1966 p. 152). (Williams used biotic adaptation to mean 
group adaptation.)
Ironically, only a year later Hamilton published a paper in Science entitled 
“Extraordinary Sex Ratios” (1967) in which he discussed several examples from 
nature o f biased sex ratios. Although he did not emphasize group selection which 
already had a bad name, in a footnote Hamilton did acknowledge that what actually 
evolved was a balance between individual selection and group selection.
Unfortunately, most biologists m issed the connection between W illiam s’ verifiable 
test o f group selection and Hamilton’s paper. Instead the latter was interpreted as 
furthering W illiams’ work o f explaining apparent group adaptations as truly 
individual. As Sober and Wilson (1998 p. 42) put it, “At the very time that group
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selection theory was entering its dark age, the empirical evidence that should have 
counted as evidence fo r  group selection was accepted as a triumph o f individual 
selection theory!” It wasn’t until 1981 that the connection was made between 
W illiams’ test and the accumulating evidence o f biased sex ratios in nature (Colwell 
1981; Wilson and Colwell 1981). Even then many biologists “couldn’t believe that an 
adaptation as well-documented as female-biased sex ratios might count as evidence for 
a theory as heretical as group selection. Even now the dust has not entirely settled.” 
(Sober and Wilson 1998 p. 43)
Group selection still carries a significant stigma in evolutionary biology. In The 
M ajor Transitions in Evolution John Maynard Smith and Eors Szathmary (1995 p. 12) 
state that: “The idea o f levels o f organization, and hence o f levels o f selection, is 
central to this book.” Yet only a few pages earlier they claim (1995 p. 8): “The 
transitions must be explained in terms of immediate selective advantage to individual 
replicators: we are committed to the gene-centered approach outlined by Williams 
(1966), and made still more explicit by Dawkins (1976).” When discussing the origin 
o f life and molecular hypercycles they state, “Molecules that ‘sacrifice’ themselves by 
producing replicases that serve the good o f the hypercycle are ‘altruists’ in a 
sociobiological sense. To stabilize the hypercycle, one needs conditions in which 
altruists can spread, or at least coexist with ‘cheaters’” (1995 p. 53). Then on the same 
page they assume molecules compartmentalized into groups will automatically cease 
to compete among themselves, and further they invoke kin selection in the case where 
molecules are not compartmentalized. It is very surprising that the kinship o f
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molecules would be appealed to without offering any plausible mechanism for such an
unlikely claim! After all, these molecules do not have genes or heritable genetic traits.
Here are their words:
To p u t hypercycles in compartments is, in effect, to create individuals with 
vertical transmission o f  genetic information, from  parent to offspring. Given 
vertical transmission, the evolution o f  cooperation between the parts o f  an 
individual is to be expected. But i f  as we have argued, early chemical 
reactions occurred on surfaces, we can ask whether cooperation could evolve 
without compartments, because neighboring molecules would be genetically 
related. (Maynard Smith and Szathmary 1995 p. 53)
W hen discussing aggregates o f slime mold cells that form fruiting bodies with
stalks, the authors note that individual selection would not favor the formation o f non-
reproductive parts such as the stalk. As with many such cases in this book, kin
selection is appealed to, but Maynard Smith and Szathmary also add:
But this cannot be the whole story, since cheaters will inevitably arise: when 
that happens, they are presumably eliminated because aggregates containing 
cheaters are less efficient in dispersing spores. This explanation is at present 
speculative, and should be checked by genetic studies on natural populations. 
(Maynard Smith and Szathmary 1995 p. 214)
The authors’ tentativeness concerning multilevel selection is evident in this last 
quote, as is their ambiguity about it throughout the book. In a more recent and less 
technical version o f this work they note, “We have to explain how complex entities 
evolved, despite selection between their components favoring selfish behavior” 
(Maynard Smith and Szathmary 1999 p. 20). Yet multilevel selection is conspicuously 
absent from their list o f possible explanations. In fact they state that, “An adequate 
account requires that we explain the origin o f the higher-level entity in terms o f
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selection acting on the lower-level entities” (Maynard Smith and Szathmary 1999 p. 
19-20). I f  one o f our most prominent evolutionary biologists has trouble being clear 
about multiple levels o f selection in these recent and important works, it is no wonder 
biologists in general are confused and divided on the subject. Below I discuss each o f 
the three main theories o f how such altruistic or cooperative behaviors arise in the face 
o f natural selection.
Multilevel Selection Theory
In its modem form multilevel selection theory was initiated in the 1970’s by David 
Wilson (1975a; 1976; 1977) and supported by the empirical experiments and analyses 
o f Michael Wade (1977a; 1978; 1979). It differs significantly from the idea o f species 
adaptations that ignited the group-selection controversy (Wynne-Edwards 1962) 
discussed above in that it is focused on elucidating (with both mathematical and 
empirical foundations) the more complicated mechanisms o f simultaneously acting 
selective forces. Multilevel selection theory (a generalization o f group selection 
theory) is a straightforward extension o f Darwin’s (1859) theory o f natural selection. 
Natural selection o f a trait requires three basic ingredients: phenotypic variation in the 
trait, fitness consequences associated with these variations, and reproduction with 
heritability o f the trait. Multilevel selection theory says that if  these three ingredients 
are present at any level in a hierarchy, then natural selection will take place at that 
level. I f  traits experience selective pressure at multiple levels, then what actually
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evolves will be the result o f the relative strength and directions o f these multiple 
forces.
In some cases these selective pressures may act in the same direction. For 
example, individuals who are fast runners m ay be selected for within a group. In 
addition, groups that contain fast runners may be selected for at the group level. For 
instance, groups o f  fast runners might out compete groups o f  slower runners in 
hunting ability or warfare. This assumes that the necessary ingredients for natural 
selection are present at the group level— namely, variation in aggregate running ability 
among groups, competition between groups where running speed affects group 
success (fitness consequences), and new groups reflect the running abilities o f their 
parent groups (heritability). Although it may be more common for selective forces at 
different levels to be complementary, group selection has been most clearly argued in 
cases where the selective forces are in opposition. Altruistic behavior, by definition, is 
such a case.
Several researchers have related multilevel selection to ecological considerations 
and population dynamics. For instance, several studies have shown that altruism can 
evolve even when group structure is ill-defined. Wilson coined the term “trait-group” 
(1979) to describe interactions that may be structured with regard to some traits, but 
not others— and not necessarily due to physically defined groups. For instance even in 
populations that are well mixed physically, conditional strategies (Trivers 1971; 
Wilson 1975a; Sober and Wilson 1998) may lead behavioral interactions to be 
grouped. In uniform environments groups can emerge due to restricted mobility
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(viscous populations). While it has been shown that in viscous populations in uniform 
environments only weak altruism can evolve (Wilson, Pollock, and Dugatkin 1992), 
more recently, modeling o f non-uniform dynamic environments has shown that the 
strong form o f altmism can also evolve in viscous populations due to the ability o f 
groups o f  altruists to disproportionately expand into areas o f environmental 
disturbance (Harms 2000; M itteldorf and Wilson 2000a).
In contrast to these external influences on population structure (e.g. 
environmental disturbances) populations can experience their own internal dynamics 
based on the effects o f non-zero sum interactions and variation in cooperation. Leticia 
Aviles (1999) has shown that under harsh conditions populations may depend on the 
synergistic effects o f group living to survive, but cooperation in established social 
groups may lead to disruptive population dynamics, i.e. boom and bust. Over multiple 
generations periodic or chaotic dynamics can arise. Whereas the above studies showed 
the positive effect o f environmental disturbances on maintaining altruism, here 
internal population dynamics, due to cooperation itself, may play a role in providing 
increased opportunities for the formation o f groups and the success o f altruism.
Groups o f non-similar individuals may also experience multilevel selection. This 
is especially noteworthy because selection among groups o f symbiotic mutalists shows 
that gene-level selection is not fundamental since symbiots are unrelated. Steven 
Frank (1997) reviews several models o f  selection for symbiotic groupings. In addition, 
selection has been experimentally demonstrated at the level o f communities 
(Goodnight 1990a; 1990b; 2000) and even at the ecosystems level (Swenson, Wilson,
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and Elias 2000). Steven Gould has argued that selection may take place even at the 
species level over geologic time (2002). The eukaryotic cell itself may be the result o f 
selection among groups o f non-similar individuals, i.e. groups o f  organelles that form 
the eukaryotic cell (Margulis 1970; 1993; Margulis and Sagan 2002).
Finally, multilevel selection when applied to levels at and below that o f the 
individual may be critical to our understanding o f the origins o f life and the formation 
o f more complex and hierarchical living systems. As previously mentioned it is 
striking that two works dealing explicitly with these issues (Maynard Smith and 
Szathmary 1995; 1999) rely so little on levels o f selection arguments, even if  
multilevel selection is implicit in the mechanisms described. Some investigations o f 
the origins o f living cells depend on competition between compartmentalized 
protocells (Grey, Hutson, and Szathmary 1995; Szathmary and M aynard Smith 1997). 
Richard Michod and Dennis Roze (Michod 1997; Michod and Roze 2000b; 2000a; 
2001; Roze and Michod 2001) have modeled the transition from single cell to 
multicellular life. Applying multilevel selection ideas they have examined methods by 
which individuals must reduce within-organism variance in order to benefit 
themselves by discouraging lower level selection among the individual’s constituent 
parts. They argue that such mechanisms are critical to the evolution o f higher level 
entities such as multicellular organisms.
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Simpson’s Paradox
The evolution o f an altruistic trait involves a fundamental paradox that must be dealt 
with by all theories on the evolution o f altruism— how does a trait that causes others 
to have more offspring actually end up with more copies o f  itself? From the group (or 
multilevel) selection viewpoint the trait must be decreasing within each group, but 
increasing overall. This is an example o f Simpson’s paradox (1951) and Sober and 
Wilson (1998) have shown it to be key in understanding multilevel selection theory— 
groups must vary in their composition and those with a higher proportion o f altruists 
must contribute more to the overall population than those with a lower proportion.
A non-biological example helps illustrate the phenomena o f Sim pson’s paradox. 
At the University o f California at Berkeley in the 1970s, the percentage o f women 
graduate school applicants accepted was significantly lower than the percentage of 
men accepted (Cartwright 1978). Yet, when the University looked at each department 
they found none were accepting a smaller percentage o f women. Again the answer to 
this paradox lies in the fact that different departments varied in their contribution to 
the whole. In this case, the cause for this varied contribution was that women were 
applying in greater numbers to departments that accepted a lower percentage o f 
applicants.
Imagine 70 women and 30 men apply to department A which has 20 positions. If 
there is no bias with regard to sex, 14 woman and 6 men are accepted. Department B 
receives 30 applications from women and 70 from men and has 50 positions. Here, if
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there is no bias, 15 women and 35 men are accepted. Yet if we aggregate these results, 
41 o f 100 men are accepted, whereas only 29 o f 100 women are accepted. These 
results are summarized in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1. Example of Simpson’s Paradox
Apply 
to A
Accepted 
to A (%)
Apply 
to B
Accepted 
to B (%)
Apply to 
A + B
Accepted to 
A + B (%)
Women 70 14 (20%) 30 15(50%) 100 29 (29%)
Men 30 6 (20%) 70 35 (50%) 100 41 (41%)
Total 100 20 (20%) 100 50 (50%) 200 70 (35%)
To return to multilevel selection, groups dominated by cooperators may grow 
much faster than other groups due to the benefits o f mutual cooperation and therefore 
contribute more to the total, even though within these faster growing groups the 
proportion o f cooperators is declining. One o f the contributions o f this dissertation is 
to show how Simpson’s paradox naturally emerges out o f the n-player PD model o f 
multilevel selection that I present in chapter 3.
The Price Equation
George Price, an eclectic and troubled American chemist, game theorist, and science 
journalist traveled to England in 1967 at the age o f 44 to work (without any formal 
training in biology) on the problem o f the evolution o f altruism. In a brief period 
between 1970 and 1973 he made three very significant contributions to evolutionary 
theory (Frank 1995a). The first was a revolutionary hierarchical model o f selection 
based on covariance that formalized the tension between within-group and between-
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group selection (Price 1970; 1995) and helped launch the resurgence o f the group 
selection viewpoint as multilevel selection theory:
where w, is a measure o f group fitness, here the growth rate o f each group («,'/«,), E  is 
the expectation, and AQb and AQw are the Price between- and within-group 
components o f change in overall cooperator frequency, respectively. (The Price 
equation is covered in more detail in the next chapter.) This equation (Eq. 2.1) had an 
important influence on Hamilton that led him to modify his inclusive fitness theory 
(discussed in the next section). As Hamilton wrote, “Price had not like the rest o f us 
looked up the work o f the pioneers when he first became interested in selection; 
instead he had worked out everything for h im self’ (1996 p. 172). Hamilton goes on to 
relate the result o f his interactions with Price: “ ... I now had a far better understanding 
of group selection and was possessed o f a far better tool for all forms o f selection 
acting at one level or at many than I had ever had before” (1996 p. 173). In chapter 3 I 
explore the relationship between the Price equation and our model o f multilevel 
selection. I also develop an alternative selection decomposition that highlights the 
underlying assumptions o f the Price equation as well as its limitations when there are 
interaction effects between within-group and between-group selection.
Price’s second major contribution was in launching Evolutionary Game Theory 
(Maynard Smith and Price 1973). Maynard Smith read Price’s initial paper on the
_  cov(w,,g,) | E(w iAqi) 
E(w ,) E( wf) ’
or equivalently (2 .1)
AQ = AQb +AQb, (2 .2)
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subject and tried to interest him in further development, but as he put it: 
“Unfortunately, Dr. Price is better at having ideas than publishing them ” (1972 p. viii). 
Maynard Smith went on to develop Evolutionary Game Theory (1982) with little input 
from Price. Price’s final major contribution was to prove that F isher’s Fundamental 
Theorem o f Natural Selection (Price 1972; Frank 1995a) applied as broadly as Fisher 
had claimed— something that most evolutionary theorists had come to doubt. Shortly 
after this burst o f amazing contributions to evolutionary theory, Price drifted away 
from his academic pursuits. He gave away the bulk o f his possessions and spent the 
last couple o f years o f his life ministering to the less fortunate on the streets o f London 
until his death by suicide in 1975.
Inclusive Fitness and the Progressive Generalization 
of Hamilton’s Rule
George W illiams, an initial and formidable critic o f group selection is very clear in his 
position that the only reasonable mechanism for the development o f group adaptations 
is group selection:
...group-related adaptations must be attributed to the natural selection o f  
alternative groups o f  individuals and that the natural selection o f  alternative 
alleles within populations will be opposed to this development. I  am in entire 
agreem en t w ith  the reasoning beh ind this conclusion. O nly b y  a theory o f  
between-group selection could we achieve a scientific explanation o f  group- 
related adaptations. (Williams 1966 pp. 92-93)
His criticism o f group selection was that many traits that looked to some observers
like group adaptations were really individual adaptations with advantages to
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individuals, i.e. bird’s morning songs and zoo plankton’s migration to surface waters 
at night (W ynne-Edwards 1962). Group selection was theoretically possible, but he 
believed it was “impotent and not an appreciable factor in the production and 
maintenance o f  adaptation” (1966 p. 8). O f course altruistic behavior poses an 
especially difficult challenge to his line o f reasoning because by definition altruistic 
acts are not individually advantageous. He proposed two mechanisms by which 
altmistic behavior could be explained by individual selection. The first relied on 
Ham ilton’s (1963; 1964) idea o f inclusive fitness to explain altruism between 
relatives. The second claim supposed that general mechanisms for parental care were 
sometimes mistakenly focused on non-relatives.
Kin Selection
In kin selection Hamilton developed a gene-level explanation o f how altruism among 
relatives could evolve. In its simplest form, a single gene can have allele X which 
causes an altruistic behavior at cost c to its own fitness and benefit h to recipients o f 
the altruistic act. If  the benefit is received by relatives that also contain the allele X, 
then the fitness o f allele X can be calculated in terms o f copies o f itself in future 
generations directly descended from X and copies o f X due to the benefit it gave 
relatives. For instance, if  at cost c to its own fitness there is a 1/8 chance that benefit b 
on average falls to an organism with the X allele, then b = 8c is the balance point. If  b 
> 8c then the altruistic behavior would tend to increase the copies o f  X in future 
generations; if  b < 8c then the altruistic behavior would tend to decrease copies o f X
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and be selected against. Here the 1/8 ratio corresponds to a cousin because cousins 
share 1/8 o f their alleles. More generally Hamilton “imagined that an individual might 
try to maximize a quantity that includes its own fitness plus the fitness o f others, 
weighted by the degree to which they were genetically related. This became the notion 
o f inclusive fitness.” (Sober and Wilson 1998 p. 66) In this case the inclusive fitness 
o f  an altruistic trait is given by Hamilton’s Rule (1964) which specifies in deceptively 
simple terms the conditions for the trait to increase:
r b > c t (2.3)
where r  is the “coefficient o f relationship”, b is benefit to recipients, and c is the cost 
to the altruist.
In this general form, where the inclusive fitness is calculated in terms o f the 
percentage o f genes shared (not just the altruistic gene), synergistic and epistatic 
effects between genes are ignored. For instance, is having 8 times the chance of 
passing on 1/8 o f your genes really equivalent to passing on all o f your genes as a 
whole? In addition, this raises the issue o f what it means for genes to be the same— the
same base pairs (same allele) or the same phenotypic consequence? Gradually the
meaning o f r has moved away from the strict idea o f relatedness by descent as 
inclusive fitness theory has matured.
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Positive Assortment
Hamilton’s r  term is a measure o f  assortment and there is positive assortment (r > 0) 
when altruistic types (or more accurately behaviors1) are clumped or grouped. For 
other-only traits r = 0 for a random binomial distribution and can range from r - - 1 
for a uniform distribution (all group have the same proportional composition as the 
overall population) t o r  = 1 when all groups are homogeneous with respect to types (or 
behaviors). For whole-group traits r = l/n  for a random binomial distribution into 
groups o f uniform size n and can range from r  = 0 for a uniform distribution to r  = 1 
when there is complete grouping (all groups are homogeneous). Because in whole- 
group altruism some o f the behavior o f an individual comes back to itself there is 
always some positive assortment except in a uniform distribution.
As mentioned above, Hamilton’s interactions with Price were an important step in 
the progressive generalization o f Hamilton’s rule. Using Price’s model, Hamilton 
(1970; 1972; 1975) showed that for selective forces favoring altruism to be stronger 
than individual selection favoring selfishness, there must be a positive assortment 
among altruists. In keeping with the focus on the gene level, Hamilton expressed this 
association at the genetic level, but switched to using the phrase “coefficient o f 
related ness” to describe his r  term— the positive regression between genes regardless 
o f relationship by descent:
1 This distinction between genetic types and phenotypic behaviors is covered in the next section.
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r  _  cov(Ga ,G 0 ) 
v a r(G J
(2.4)
where Ga is the genotype o f the potential actor, Go is the genotype o f others the actor 
interacts with, cov is covariance, and var is variance. Here r is the measure o f  the 
positive regression or assortment among genes for altruism, and can be interpreted as 
measuring how likely it is that the benefit offered by altruists fall to other altruists. As 
Hamilton put it, “the existence o f the positive correlation r could be interpreted as 
implying in this case that there is a chance r that the b units o f fitness are definitely 
given to a fellow altruist, while with chance (1-r) they are given ... to a random 
member o f the population.” 1 (1975 p. 140). The higher this chance o f genes for 
altruism benefiting other genes for altruism (r), the lower the margin o f benefit over 
the sacrifice (b/c) needed in order for altruism to evolve. Groups are implicit in both o f 
Hamilton’s formulations, but the first concerns benefit to relatives in implied kin 
groups (kin selection), whereas here benefit goes to fellow altruists (those with the 
altruist gene) regardless o f lineage.
Richard Dawkins misses the revision that Hamilton (1975) makes to his inclusive­
fitness concept and sees this 1975 paper as being supportive in the battle against group 
selection which he colorfully characterizes thus:
We painfully struggle back, harassed by sniping from  a Jesuitically 
sophisticated and dedicated neo-group-selectionist rearguard, until we 
fina lly  regained D arw in’s ground, the position that I  am characterizing by 
the label ‘the selfish organism ’, the position which, in its modern form , is 
dominated by the concept o f  inclusive fitness. (Dawkins 1982 p. 6)
1 The variable names have been changed in this quote to match the notation used in this dissertation.
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Yet, here are Hamilton’s own words from his paper:
Because o f  the way it was firs t explained, the approach using inclusive 
fitness has often been identified with ‘kin selection ’ and presented strictly as 
an alternative to ‘group selection ’ as a way o f  establishing altruistic social 
behavior by natural selection (e.g. M aynard Smith 1964; Lewontin 1970).
But the foregoing discussion shows that kinship should be considered ju s t one 
way o f  getting positive regression o f  genotype in the recipient, and that it is 
this positive regression that is vitally necessary fo r  altruism. Thus the 
inclusive-fitness concept is more general than ‘kin selection ’. (Hamilton 
1975, p p .140-141)
In a later work, Hamilton (1987) was even more direct: “it obviously makes no 
difference if  altruists settle with altruists because they are rela ted ... or because they 
recognize fellow altruists as such, or settle together because o f some pleiotropic1 effect 
o f the gene on habitat preference.” In other words, the interactions among members of 
a population must be clumped (or grouped) with respect to altruistic traits in order for 
altruism to evolve— they must be disproportionately concentrated within some groups 
and not others, but grouping o f related individuals is just one (if the most common) 
way to generate differences between these groupings.
This is much different than Hamilton’s original notion o f inclusive fitness. 
Originally, inclusive fitness (kin selection) was seen as bringing seemingly group 
adaptations back under the more parsimonious umbrella o f individual selection. In 
contrast, here kin selection is being brought under the broader umbrella o f group 
effects. It is the positive assortment o f  altruists within groups that gives altruistic traits 
their “inclusive fitness.” Sober and Wilson (1998 p. 78) point out that in a survey o f
1 Pleiotropic means producing many effects or multiple effects from a single gene. So in other words, if  
an altruistic gene also causes a certain habitat to be preferred this would result in a positive assortment 
among those with the gene regardless of genealogical kinship.
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Science Citation Index during 1994, the original version of Ham ilton’s theory from
two papers in 1964 was cited 115 times, but the updated 1975 version was cited only
four times.1 As they put it:
For much o f  the evolutionary community, the theory o f  kin selection was set 
in stone during the 1960s and thereafter lost its capacity fo r  fundam ental 
change— even at the hands o f  its own creator! I f  this is the situation inside 
the fie ld  o f  evolutionary biology, then it should come as no surprise that 
scholars from  other disciplines who are interested in evolution see group 
selection prim arily as a theory that died many years ago, along with the 
prospects fo r  genuine altruism in nature. (Sober and Wilson 1998 p. 78-79)
As we have seen, the original arguments developed for inclusive fitness took a
gene-level view o f selection rather than the more traditional individual level (Darwin
1859). Richard Dawkins (1976; 1982; 1994; 1995) has taken these beginnings to an
extreme reductionism in which genes are the only true level o f selection. Yet in order
to account for the fact that genes cannot go it alone, Dawkins invokes the concept of
“vehicles o f selection” in which genes must travel together and be selected together.
He uses the metaphor o f a rowing team in which none o f the rowers can reach the
finish line ahead o f the vehicle in which they all travel. This argument is used to
account for why selfish genes would need to cooperate with each other.
If  genes were truly free to compete with each other within an individual, we
would expect more fecund genes to be more selfishly fit than others. Yet suppression
o f  gene-level selection has been suggested as a necessary step in the evolution o f
coordinated, cooperative genes within individual organisms (Michod 1996; 1997;
1 To be fair, Hamilton seems to have not promoted his updated views on group selection very forcefully 
and this may have been due to its general disfavor among biologists.
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Michod and Roze 2000b; 2000a; 2001). The fair process o f meiosis itself, in which 
each allele has an equal chance o f making it into a sex cell, is typical o f the 
multicellular colonies we generally call individual organisms and may be one 
mechanism by which the expected competition between genes is suppressed (Michod
1996). In an article by Leticia Aviles, myself, and Asher Cutter recently accepted to 
The American Naturalist, we support this general idea by showing that a lottery 
mechanism where helping behaviors are assigned at random can allow much higher 
levels o f cooperation to evolve among non-relatives than in the absence o f such a 
mechanism (Aviles, Fletcher, and Cutter 2004). If  vehicles o f selection can rein in 
genes so they restrict their own selfish fitness for the good o f the individual, then the 
selection o f larger vehicles composed o f individuals, i.e. social groups, could lead to 
cooperation and self-sacrifice by individuals for the good o f the group.
The concept o f the vehicle is an admission of multiple levels o f selection by 
reductionism’s strongest advocate in evolutionary biology. D awkins’ (1976; 1982; 
1994; 1995) insistence on the primacy o f genes as replicators is irrefutable, but also 
not useful for describing higher level phenomena. Explaining, for instance, the 
cooperation o f human parents in raising a child only in terms o f gene competition 
ignores many other emergent levels o f interaction and causation. It is like trying to 
explain the G ulf Stream current only in terms o f electrons, protons, and neutrons. 
Although it is true that all the molecules that make up the water, air, ocean floor, sun, 
and other factors that influence the current are composed entirely o f these elementary 
particles, like the gene-only replicator view, it is not useful for understanding many
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real world phenomena taking place at levels higher than that o f the electron. As I show 
in the next section and also in Chapter 5, one o f the biggest challenges to the selfish 
gene viewpoint comes from advances in inclusive fitness theory itself—the ability to 
use the positive assortment among emergent phenotypes rather than genotypes in 
Hamilton’s rule.
Phenotype vs. Genotype
Over the years there had been various reports o f Hamilton’s rule failing to make 
accurate predictions (e.g. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1978; Boorman and Levitt 
1980; Karlin and Matessi 1983). David Queller noticed that in these models, one o f 
two things was true: 1) there was a difference between phenotype and genotype 
frequencies or 2) the fitness functions for the benefits o f altruism were non-additive. 
Hamilton’s rule assumes both a one-to-one mapping between phenotype and genotype 
and additive fitness effects and fails when these assumptions are not met. Queller’s 
insight was to see that altruism would evolve if  there were a positive assortment 
among helping behaviors even in the absence o f any positive assortment among selfish 
genes. Queller developed a version o f Hamilton’s rule in which the r term is a measure 
o f the assortment between an altruist’s genes and the helping behaviors (phenotypes) 
o f  itself and those it interacts with:
r = cov(GA1PQ) 
COv(Ga,Pa) ’
(2.5)
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where GA is the genotype o f the actor, P 0 is the average phenotype o f others, and PA is 
the average phenotype o f the actor. This is regardless o f how the behaviors are 
genetically encoded in others (notice no Go term) and whether or not these phenotypes 
emerge via environmental interactions (including the behavior o f  others) or have a 
one-to-one mapping to their genetic basis. In other words, an altruistic gene can 
increase in the population if  the organism it resides in receives fitness benefits from 
others more often than average population members— even if  these others share no 
genes with the altruist. This allows Hamilton’s rule to be used to understand the 
evolution o f conditional strategies (discussed in the next section) as well as 
cooperation between members o f different species in symbiotic relationships. Table
2-2 summarizes the historical changes in the meaning o f r in Ham ilton’s rule.
Although several other versions o f r  have been suggested (see Pepper 2000b for 
review), these represent the most significant advances in generalizing inclusive fitness 
theory.
Table 2-2. Historical Advances in Generalizing the r term of Hamilton’s Rule.
Contribution
Reference
Meaning Calculated with
Hamilton
1964
Relationship by descent to kin Genealogical relationship 
values
Hamilton 
1970, 1972, 
1975
Positive regression (assortment) 
between genetic type o f actor 
and genetic type o f others
r -  cov(Ga ,Gq) 
va r(GA)
(Eq. 2.4)
Queller 1985, 
1992a, 1992b
Positive regression (assortment) 
between genetic type o f actor 
and phenotypic type (behaviors) 
o f others
r _ c o  v(Ga ,P0) 
CO v (Ga ,Pa)
(Eq. 2.5)
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Notice that each o f the advances in the meaning o f r  is more general, but does not 
loose anything when applied under more restrictive conditions. I f  one takes Eq. 2.5 
and assumes phenotypic frequency equals genotypic frequency, then this becomes Eq. 
2.4 (note that cov(X, X) = var(X)). If  one further assumes that any positive assortment 
in genetic frequency is due to relationship by decent then r as the “coefficient o f 
relatedness” in Eq. 2.4 becomes r as the “coefficient o f relationship” used in the 
original Ham ilton’s rule, Eq. 2.3. In Chapter 5 I use the most general form o f 
H amilton’s rule to show the fundamental similarities between reciprocal altruism 
theory (discussed next) and inclusive fitness theory.
Reciprocal Altruism and 
Evolutionary Game Theory
While game theory was first established in the field o f economics as a framework for 
studying conflict and cooperation in social systems (von Neumann and Morgenstem 
1947), it also provides an important tool for reasoning about the evolutionary 
consequences o f social situations as well as particular interactions between organisms. 
For instance, Hamilton used it to describe an “unbeatable strategy” in the evolution of 
female-biased sex ratios (1967; 1971) and Price first used it to reason about ritualized 
fighting in animals (Frank 1995a). Starting with Price’s work John Maynard Smith 
developed evolutionary game theory including the notion o f an evolutionary stable 
strategy (ESS) that aids in reasoning about long term evolutionary outcomes when
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different behavioral strategies interact (Maynard Smith and Price 1973; Maynard
Smith 1982). Robert Trivers (1971) used game-theoretic ideas to explain how
seemingly altruistic behaviors among non-relatives could evolve through an exchange
o f benefits, e.g., “I’ll scratch your back if  you scratch mine.” He was well aware o f the
potential for cheating in such situations and explored mechanisms that might
overcome the temptation to defect, including repeated interactions. The political
scientist Robert Axelrod and Hamilton expressed game theory’s usefulness in
capturing the tensions involved in the evolution o f altruism this way:
M any o f  the benefits sought by living things are disproportionably available 
to cooperating groups. While there are considerable differences in what is 
meant by the terms "benefits” and "sought," this statement, insofar as it is 
true, lays down the fundam ental basic fo r  all social life. The problem is that 
while an individual can benefit from  mutual cooperation, each one can also
do even better by exploiting the cooperative efforts o f  others Game theory
in general, and the Prisoner's Dilemma game in particular, allow a 
form ulation o f  the strategic possibilities inherent in such situations. (Axelrod 
and Hamilton 1981 p. 1391)
Note that the different levels (groups vs. individuals) are explicit in this quote, yet 
Axelrod and Hamilton propose that reciprocal altruism (which they then go on to 
model w ith the PD) is a distinct process from inclusive fitness theory (1981). In 
Chapter 5 I show that inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism are not fundamentally  
distinct processes. That is, the fundamentals o f the evolution o f altruism captured in 
the most general form o f  Hamilton’s rule (i.e., the balance among costs, benefits, and 
the assortment o f  altruistic behaviors) allow it to be applied to reciprocal altruism as 
well. In addition, although Axelrod and Hamilton used the PD as a model o f reciprocal
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altruism, in Chapter 3 I show that the PD (in an n-player version) is also a model o f 
multilevel selection and inclusive fitness.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
The prisoner’s dilemma is the most famous and widely used game o f game theory. In 
this imaginary situation two prisoners have been arrested for a serious crime and are 
being interrogated separately by the police. The prisoners cannot communicate and 
neither knows what the other will do. I f  they cooperate with each other and keep quiet 
there is only enough evidence to convict them of a lesser crime and they will both do 
minimal jail time. If  however one o f them turns State’s evidence and rats on (defects 
from) the other who remains silent, then the defector does no jail time, but the 
cooperator receives a very harsh sentence. In the case where both confess (defect), 
they both receive an intermediate amount o f jail time.
An example o f the PD is represented by the payoff matrix in Figure 2-1 below 
where the numbers represent a positive measure o f utility. It is simpler to think in 
terms o f  positive payoffs rather than the negative payoff of jail time, but the essential 
features are the same.
Player 2
C D
c 3 / 3 0 / 5
D 5 / 0 1 / 1
Figure 2-1. Payoff Matrix for a 2-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma.
C represents cooperation and D  represents defection. The strategies for player 
1 are represented as rows and for player 2 as columns. The p ayoff values for 
each pair o f  strategies that m eet are listed as p la yer  1 payoff/p layer 2 payoff.
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The PD is a non-zero sum game— the sum of the two players’ scores varies for 
different strategy combinations. An essential feature o f this game is that there is no 
opportunity for the players to coordinate their actions and, more critically, there is no 
higher-level mechanism to enforce any agreements. The players must individually 
decide which strategy to play without any guarantees about the actions o f the other 
player. To understand the paradox at the heart o f the PD, imagine player one trying to 
decide what to do and using the payoff matrix to reason with as follows: Regardless o f 
what player 2 does, I should defect— I will get 5 instead of 3 if  player 2 cooperates, or 
1 instead o f  0 if  player 2 defects (remember these are positive utility values, not jail 
time). Player 2 is in symmetrical situation and rationally also chooses to defect. So 
each player follows this dominant strategy and gets a payoff o f 1, but if  they had both 
cooperated they would have each gotten a payoff o f 3. The essential feature o f the PD 
is that the dominant individually-rational strategy for each player leads to a collective 
sub-optimal or irrational outcome. This outcome (1/1) is “non-Pareto-optimal” 
because there is another outcome (3/3) to the game that increases the utility o f one 
player without cost to the other. In fact in this case, both players can do better.
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
The simulation experiments o f Axelrod (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1984) 
addressed the question o f whether individual rationality would still favor defection if  
instead o f playing just once or at random, players were forced to play a series o f 
iterated PD games with a probabilistic (rather than fixed) number o f iterations. This
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work extended and modeled the original idea o f reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971). 
Axelrod sponsored a tournament in which various strategies implemented in computer 
programs were played against each other pair-wise in a round robin so that each 
program played every other program including itself. Each pair-wise iterated game 
consisted o f 200 interactions and the payoff matrix was the one illustrated above in 
Figure 2-1. Therefore two always-defect (ALLD) strategies playing each other would 
get a score o f 200 each, two always-cooperate (ALLC) strategies playing each other 
would get a score o f 600, and an ALLD playing an ALLC would get respective scores 
o f 1000 and 0. For a summary o f subsequent studies o f the evolution o f cooperation 
and altruism based on the iterated PD see Dugatkin (1997).
Surprisingly the simplest strategy in the Axelrod tournament turned out to also be 
the best. Proposed by Anatol Rapoport, it is called Tit-for-Tat (TFT). This strategy 
cooperates in the first interaction and then always plays the strategy its opponent used 
in the last encounter. Consistent with the theory o f reciprocal altruism, TFT players 
need the ability to remember previous actions by competitors. The TFT strategy is 
willing to cooperate, swift to punish a defection, yet forgiving in that it will return to 
cooperation if  its opponent makes the sacrifice o f cooperating while TFT is defecting.
Axelrod also explored the iterated PD in an evolutionary context. Here 
generations o f tournaments were held in which the number of players o f a particular 
type (strategy) in the new generation was based proportionately on its tournament 
scores from the last round. Interestingly, Axelrod wrote to M aynard Smith in England 
for advice about making evolutionary versions o f his iterated PD models. Maynard
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Smith informed him that one o f the preeminent evolutionary theorists, William 
Hamilton, was on his own campus at the University o f Michigan. Axelrod wrote a 
seminal paper co-authored with Hamilton entitled “The Evolution o f Cooperation” 
(1981).
Unfortunately, the reason that TFT came out on top in both the tournaments and 
evolutionary models has been widely misunderstood as being due to its individual 
fitness or “unbeatability.” As Sober and Wilson (1998), and even Rapoport (1991) 
have pointed out, TFT can never beat an opponent in any pair-wise iterated interaction 
because it never defects unless it has already been on the short end o f  a defection from 
its opponent. As Rapoport put it, “in every paired encounter, Tit-for-Tat must either 
draw or lose. It can never win a paired encounter” (Rapoport 1991 p. 93). In this sense 
TFT is altruistic at the individual level because it often gives more utility than it gets 
and it never gains more than its opponent does.
The reason TFT won (or was selected for) hinges on the fact that it was often able 
to play other TFT or similar altruistic strategies where it could run up its accumulated 
score. Even though in individual competition TFT is inferior, for example to ALLD 
which is the most fit un-exploitable individual strategy, pairs (groups) o f  TFT 
accumulate higher scores than pairs (groups) o f ALLD. In the analysis o f why TFT 
was a successful strategy, Axelrod (1984) does note that it tended to score especially 
well (close to 600) when it played similar strategies, but he does not recognize this as 
a group effect. Maynard Smith comments that, “the programs were ranked according 
to the total payoff accumulated (not, it should be noted, according to the number o f
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opponents defeated in the individual matches)” (1982 p. 168).Yet neither he nor 
Axelrod distinguish the individual and group levels o f competition present in this 
tournament which is obscured by the cumulative method o f scoring. Sober and Wilson 
(1998) emphasize the importance o f identifying and separating out the selective forces 
at different hierarchical levels. They argue that much o f the controversy surrounding 
group selection is due to a failure to do so.
More complicated versions o f the iterated PD and their effects on the success o f 
TFT strategies have also been studied. In one investigation the degree o f cooperation 
(not just cooperate or defect) was allowed to evolve (Frean 1996). In another the 
amount o f sacrifice and payoff evolved (Doebeli and Knowlton 1998). Ecological 
extensions similar to those discussed under multilevel selection have also been applied 
to iterated PD models. For instance Ferriere and Michod (1995; 1996) have shown the 
increased fitness o f TFT over ALLD in spatial models with player mobility. The effect 
o f population dynamics on the fitness o f TFT has revealed that boom and bust 
dynamics can favor the less individually fit TFT when in direct competition with 
ALLD (Doebeli, Blarer, and Ackermann 1997). There have also been other studies 
showing that under different circumstances other (but related) strategies can do better 
than TFT (see Brembs 1996; Dugatkin 1997 for reviews).
Up until now the notion that TFT (or similar strategies) does well because o f  high 
scores received when grouped (paired) with other TFT or cooperating behaviors has 
not been well formalized. One o f the innovations o f this dissertation is to demonstrate 
how to make this argument precise by using Queller’s general versions o f Hamilton’s
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rule discussed above. Interestingly, Queller (1985) in his original paper developing his 
equations notes that they should apply to reciprocal altruism, but he says this without 
offering a demonstration or example. In two later papers (Queller 1992b; 1992a) that 
expand this original work no mention is made o f its relationship to reciprocal altruism.
There is also no indication that Hamilton ever tried to apply his inclusive fitness 
techniques to Axelrod’s models even though, as mentioned, they worked together on a 
paper (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981) which became a chapter in Axelrod’s book 
(1984). Also in Hamilton’s collected papers (Hamilton 1996; 2001), the significance 
o f Queller’s generalization is never noted. Another contribution o f this dissertation is 
to draw attention to Queller’s fundamental advance in moving from the assortment 
among genes to the assortment among behaviors in inclusive fitness theory. This 
allows Hamilton’s rule to be applied much more broadly— specifically to situations 
where genotype and phenotype differ, as in conditional behaviors. As far as I know, 
until now no one has actually demonstrated how to apply Queller’s equations to 
reciprocal altruism, as I do in Chapter 5.
N-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(The Tragedy of the Commons)
The n-player, as opposed to 2-player, PD offers a straightforward w ay o f thinking 
about the tension between the individual and group levels. In real-world biological and 
social systems the effects o f cooperation or defection are often distributed diffusely to 
other members o f a group, i.e., they do not necessarily arise via pair-wise interactions.
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When there is a common and finite resource, each individual benefits by using more 
than its share o f  that resource, but when all players apply this individual rationality it 
can lead to collective irrationality. For example, each country that fishes international 
waters can increase its utility by taking more o f the fish in this common resource, but 
as more and more countries overfish, the common stock is depleted beyond where it 
can quickly replenish (Roberts 1997; Tierney 2000). In subsequent years all have less 
and this leads to decreased utility for both countries that over fish (defectors) and 
those that don’t (cooperators).
Another example is the tension between the common good that we fund through 
taxation and the individual advantage o f paying fewer taxes. The benefit to an 
individual tax cheat is paid for by either marginal increases in tax rates or marginal 
decreases in services such as roads, schools, courts, parks, police, etc. There is an 
incentive to pay less taxes because the gain is more than the loss due to a slight 
increase in the rate or the marginal lessening o f services, but again if  the collective 
consensus is to pay less and less taxes then all may be worse o ff in the absence o f the 
public services mentioned above.
The fishing example is commonly known as a “tragedy o f  the commons,” (Hardin 
1968) whereas the taxation example is called the “free rider problem” (McMillan 
1979; Aviles 2002), yet both are examples o f an n-player PD. (Sometimes “tragedy of 
the commons” is used more generally to refer to both types o f  situations.)
Interestingly, even though the equivalence (Hardin 1971; Hamburger 1973) between 
the game-theoretic framework and the less formal notion o f a tragedy o f the commons
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was shown in the early 1970’s (not long after Garret Hardin's seminal paper in 1968) it 
is still not widely appreciated. For instance, a recent entire issue o f Science magazine 
was dedicated to discussing the tragedy o f the commons “25 years after” Hardin’s 
paper, but nowhere is the prisoner’s dilemma mentioned.
George Price was the first to recognize the connection between social dilemmas 
and levels o f selection as demonstrated in the quote at the start o f the next chapter. 
Wilson (1977) in an early graphical illustration o f multilevel selection presented a 
figure and a model satisfying the conditions for an n-player PD, but did not note their 
game-theoretic interpretation. Surprisingly, despite these hints in the literature, as far 
as I know the n-player PD has not previously been used explicitly to model multilevel 
selection as I do in the next chapter.
In the next three chapters I delve more deeply into a few o f these issues by 
presenting a n-player PD model o f the evolution o f  altruism (Chapter 3), 
demonstrating that altruism (even strongly defined) can evolve in randomly formed 
groups (Chapter 4), and showing how Hamilton’s rule can be applied to reciprocal 
altruism (Chapter 5).
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
... the cases discussed where individual selection decreases group fitness are 
closely and deeply analogous to economic effects recently discussed by 
Hardin in a paper entitled “The Tragedy o f  the Commons ” (Hardin 1968).
George Price, in 1969 grant proposal (quoted in Frank 1995a)
Chapter 3
The Evolution of Altruism:
Game Theory, Multilevel Selection, and 
Inclusive Fitness1
Introduction
The evolutionary mechanisms by which altruistic behaviors may evolve have been 
vigorously debated over the last several decades. The most prominent explanations are 
reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1984), 
inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964; 1970; 1975), and multilevel selection (Wilson 1977; 
Wade 1978; W ilson 1997a; Sober and W ilson 1998). The iterated prisoner’s dilemma 
(PD) naturally lends itself to the study o f reciprocal altruism (Axelrod 1984; Dugatkin
’ This chapter is based on a completed manuscript to be sent for publication and which is coauthored by 
Martin Zwick, my advisor.
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1997), yet real-world biological and social systems often do not involve pair-wise 
interactions or knowledge o f past actions, and consequences o f cooperation and 
defection may be distributed diffusely. The n-player prisoner’s dilemma (NPD) is a 
model that captures the diffuse harm to the common good that self-interested 
behaviors m ay cause. The NPD encompasses both (Hardin 1971) problems o f 
exploitation o f  a common resource (“tragedy o f the commons” (Hardin 1968)), and 
problems o f inequitable contributions towards a common good (“free-rider problem” 
(McMillan 1979; Aviles 2002)). Using an NPD model in multiple groups I 
demonstrate that altruism can evolve, despite the higher within-group fitness o f non­
altruists, in the absence o f reciprocity, cognition, or memory.
The minimal conditions for the evolution o f altruism are captured in this model 
and are: 1) non-zero-sum fitness functions for altruistic behavior, and 2) sufficient 
non-uniform population structure with respect to altruistic behaviors. Heritability is 
also assumed in this evolutionary model. The simplicity of this model allows us to 
connect explicitly the NPD to the other two related theories (Wade 1980; Queller 
1985; 1992b; Frank 1998; Sober and Wilson 1998) o f altruism evolution: inclusive 
fitness and multilevel selection, a connection which has not previously been made 
explicitly, despite hints in the literature. Others (Price in Frank 1995a; Frank 1998; 
Leigh 1999; Michod 1999; Hauert et al. 2002; Bowles, Choi, and Hopfensitz 2003) 
have commented on the similarities between social dilemmas and multilevel selection 
without addressing them explicitly, as I do here.
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The NPD model here captures essential factors in the evolution o f altruism in 
model parameters that relate simply to Hamilton’s Rule, the Price covariance equation, 
and a useful alternative selection decomposition I present here. Contrasting this 
alternative decomposition with the Price equation, I demonstrate interaction effects 
between within- and between-group selection which are not captured in either 
decomposition alone. This game theoretic model also allows me to clarify essential 
similarities between strong and weak altruism undergoing natural selection and 
suggests a framework for unifying different approaches to the evolution o f altruism. 
Lastly, in contrast to conventional wisdom, I demonstrate that even strong altruism 
can be selected for and maintained using periodic random groupings o f  non­
conditional strategies.
Methods
The N-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma Model
In the simplest form o f the model there are only two groups with no dispersal (I relax 
both these assumptions below). Groups vary initially only in their sizes, and in the 
fraction o f cooperators, in each group i. There are no strategies besides always- 
cooperate (ALLC) and always-defect (ALLD). I follow the frequency o f cooperators 
in each group and across the whole population. Figure 3-1 illustrates a simple NPD 
with parallel linear fitness functions, wa and ws, that gives the fitness p er  individual 
cooperator (altruist) or defector (selfish) in the vertical axis and where qi is the
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horizontal axis. There are two parameters to this NPD: the slope, b, o f the fitness 
functions and, c, their difference in intercept. (For simplicity I set the cooperator’s 
intercept to 0 so the difference is the defector’s intercept value.) The parallel lines 
used in this model are the simplest fitness curves that satisfy the NPD. The cost of 
being a cooperator vs. a defector is the intercept difference c. The benefit provided by 
each cooperator to the group is b. To see this note that the added benefit to each group 
member (including the focal player) in having one additional cooperator in the group 
(vs. a defector) is &/«,• (the change in q, is 1 In,) and therefore the total benefit produced 
by a cooperator for all group members is n^b/n,) = b.
av
W
C
0 0.5
Qi
Figure 3-1. Simple N-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Fitness functions for individual cooperators (wa) and defectors (vrs) given as a 
function o f  the frequency o f  cooperators in a group (qi). The two solid lines 
have slope b. The dashed line indicates the average fitness (wav), which has a 
positive slope. The intercept difference o f  the two functions is given by c.
The defector’s fitness line dominates the cooperator’s at all q, and therefore 
cooperation always involves an altruistic sacrifice relative to defection. The deficient 
outcome o f the NPD here is the fact that the fitness to defectors when all players in a
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group defect (qt = 0.0) is lower than the fitness to cooperators when all group members 
cooperate {qt = 1.0), that is , b >  c and this is the minimum parameter condition for a 
NPD. This is also the condition for beneficial non-zero-sumness, i.e., the benefit 
created by a cooperator exceeds the cost to the cooperator and the average fitness line 
(wav) has a positive slope. Since defection dominates cooperation, this deficient 
outcome is an attractor o f the dynamics. Thus in a PD situation within-group selection 
does not maximize individual fitness.
At each generation the number o f cooperators (and defectors) within each group is 
increased by the number o f individuals utilizing this strategy multiplied by its fitness 
payoff per individual:
a /  = a,{ 1 + wa{qf] and (3.1)
si' = s/[l + ws(qi)l (3.2)
where at and s, are the number o f cooperators and defectors respectively in group i and 
primed terms represent values after reproduction. These fitness functions can be 
interpreted as overlapping generations or as discrete generations where the fitness 
independent o f the altruistic trait is one offspring per individual. Here fitness is 
fecundity and offspring counts (including fractional components) are determined by 
the fitness functions from Figure 3-1:
wa(qd = bqt and (3.3)
ws(ql)  = bqi + c. (3.4)
To aid in comparisons among runs, each generation the total population size is 
proportionally scaled to its original size, preserving each group’s qi value. For
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convenience we define total population variables A = Ea,, S  = Z.v,-, TV = H + S  and Q = 
A/N.
Hamilton’s Rule
In this simple model the condition for an increase in the overall frequency o f 
cooperators from one generation to the next, Q '>  Q, can be derived starting with the 
NPD Eqs. 3.3 and 3.4. Appendix A  gives this derivation which results in a form o f 
Hamilton’s rule (1964; 1970; 1975):
rb>  c. (3.5)1
Here we find that the r  value in this derivation can be expressed as the between-group 
over total variance in the cooperate trait,
P -6 )var\{Q)
where v a r ^ , )  is the weighted between-group variance and var,(Q) the total variance 
among individuals in the cooperator trait. (I will refer to the expression in Eq. 3.6 as 
the variance ratio.) This is consistent with previous work showing that for altruists that 
benefit the whole group (Pepper 2000b) as in the model above, r can indeed be 
expressed in terms o f the variance ratio (Breden 1990; Queller 1992b; Frank 1998).
For altruism to evolve, the benefit b must not only be greater than the cost c (the 
minimum NPD condition), but the benefit must be greater than the cost even when the 
benefit is discounted by the variance ratio. The more structured the population with
1 Equations will sometimes be repeated for convenience. For instance, Eq. 3.5 is also Eq. 2.1 from 
Chapter 2.
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regard to cooperative interactions (i.e. the closer the variance ratio is to 1), the less 
non-zero-sum synergy (i.e. b > c) is required.
The meaning o f r has changed over the years from a simple measure o f 
relationship via descent (Hamilton 1964) to various statistical measures o f  similarity 
(Hamilton 1970; 1975; W ade 1980; Queller 1985; 1992b; Frank 1998). When the 
benefits provided by an altruist are divided among only others in the altruist’s group, 
then r is calculated differently using the covariance between the frequency o f  the trait 
in each population member and the average frequency in the others each member 
interacts with in its group (Hamilton 1972; Pepper 2000b). In either case r  specifies 
the assortment between potential actors and their recipients. As we will see in Chapter 
5, a more general form o f Hamilton’s rule shows that it is actually the assortment 
among altruistic behaviors that is most fundamental to the evolution o f altruism.
Results and Discussion 
Simpson’s Paradox
Even though Q can increase, i.e. Q  > Q, when Hamilton’s rule is satisfied, the 
frequency o f cooperators decreases in every group, i.e. qt <qi for all groups. This is 
an example o f Simpson’s paradox (1951), which is key to understanding the role o f 
population structure in the evolution o f altruism (Sober and W ilson 1998). Figure 3-2 
shows a run (Run 1) in this model where Simpson’s paradox is evident. All runs used 
in Figure 3-2 to Figure 3-4 have a total population o f 1,000 divided into two groups
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with varying NPD parameters and initial population structures. In Run 1 the overall 
cooperator frequency Q is initially 0.5 and the group sizes are equal, but the group 
cooperator frequencies are qj = 0.1 and q2 = 0.9. This population structure gives a 
variance ratio o f 0.64, well above the c!b ratio o f 0.2 for this run, and therefore Q 
increases in accord with Hamilton’s rule, even though qi and q2 both decrease 
monotonically. Figure 3-2(a) demonstrates Simpson’s paradox in this model by 
showing the fraction o f  cooperators in the two groups and in the total population for 
Run 1. Note that the fraction o f cooperators monotonically decreases in both groups 
while initially increasing overall. This Simpson’s paradox effect is due to group 2 
(cooperator dominated) rapidly expanding, while group 1 (defector dominated) is 
shrinking, which is shown in Figure 3-2(c). At the peak o f total cooperation in Run 1, 
group 2 comprises over 95% o f the total population.
The Simpson’s effect is transient without mechanisms for reestablishing variation 
among groups, which I demonstrate later. The changes in group size and composition 
affect the variance ratio (r)— in the case o f Run 1, the ratio decreases steadily (Figure
3-2(b)). The generation when the ratio variance drops below c/b is precisely the point 
when the overall cooperator frequency begins to decline. A vertical dashed lines with 
arrows indicate this corresponding point for Run 1 in Figure 3-2.
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run 1 total 
group 1 
group 2
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.8 
0.6 
r  0.4
0.2
 run 1
—  c /b
1000
— size of group 1
- -size of group 2500
40 5010 20 300
generation
Figure 3-2. Dynamics in q, r, and n for a Typical NPD Run with 2 Groups. 
Results for Run 1 with a total and constant population of 1,000 and initial 
groups sizes of 500 in each group. Parameter values are shown in Table 3-1. 
(a) Frequency of cooperators vs. generation for the total population (Q) and 
for each group (qj and q2). (b) The between-group over total variance ratio in 
cooperation frequency (r) vs. generation. The c/b value is also shown. A 
vertical dashed line with arrows indicates the critical point in Run 1—when r 
drops below clb in (b), Q begins to decline in (a). Panel (c) shows how the 
size of each group changes over the run.
Figure 3-3(a) and (b) are similar to Figures 3-2(a) and (b), but four additional runs 
with a variety o f NPD parameters are compared. The parameters from all five runs are 
given in Table 3-1. Again, Figure 3-3(a) shows the overall cooperation frequency Q,
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while Figure 3-3(b) gives the variance ratio for each o f these runs. The ratio c!b 
chosen arbitrarily to be the same for all runs and is shown by a thick unadorned 
horizontal line in both Figure 3-2(b) and Figure 3-3(b).
Table 3-1. Parameter Values for Runs 1-5 used in Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3.
Run a i S l a2 S2 c b d b
1 50 450 450 50 0.20 1.00 0.2
2 50 450 450 50 1.00 5.00 0.2
3 50 450 450 50 0.03 0.15 0.2
4 9 1 1 989 0.10 0.50 0.2
5 50 670 250 30 0.10 0.50 0.2
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0.8 
0.6 
r ' 0.4 
0.2 
(b) 0
-■ -run  2 
-e -ru n  3 
-♦ -ru n  4 
-A -run 5
0 10 20 30 40 50
generation
Figure 3-3. Results for 4 Runs with Various Parameters (see Table 3-1).
All runs done with 2 groups and total populations of 1,000. (a) Frequency of 
cooperators (Q) vs. generation, (b) The between-group over total variance 
ratio in cooperation frequency (r) vs. generation. The clb value is also shown. 
Vertical dashed lines with arrows indicate corresponding points in runs— 
when r drops below d b  in (b), Q begins to decline in (a).
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Runs 2 and 3 show the effects o f varying the magnitude o f b and c, while keeping 
c!b and initial population structure (variance ratio) the same as in Run 1. In Run 2 with 
higher magnitudes the increase and subsequent decrease in Q happens more quickly; 
in Run 3 with lower magnitudes, the pattern is stretched out over many more 
generations. Run 4 demonstrates that even with low initial Q values (Q -  0.01), a 
sufficiently high variance ratio can lead to a dramatic increase in cooperators. Run 4 
also shows that the variance ratio need not always decrease (Figure 3-3(b)). Changes 
in group size and composition can in some cases cause the variance ratio to increase 
transiently without external causes or m ixing1. Finally, Run 5 makes the point that 
even with an initial high frequency o f cooperators, Q = 0.9, cooperators will not 
increase without a sufficient variance ratio. Here the variance ratio is less than c/b and 
therefore Q decreases monotonically.
The Price Equation
In the runs discussed so far, the transient increase and subsequent decrease in 
cooperator frequency highlights competing forces— the overall frequency o f 
cooperators, Q, increases while the between-group selective force dominates and 
decreases when the within-group force is stronger. Price introduced a covariance 
equation (1970) which allows us to partition the change in overall cooperator 
frequency, AQ = Q '- Q ,  into within- and between-group components:
1 The fact that r can increase from its initial value is critical for strong altruism to evolve in randomly 
formed groups. This is discussed later in this chapter and more extensively in Chapter 4.
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A Q  = cov(wl’cl >) +  ^or eqUivaientiy (3.7)
E (w t) E(w t)
AQ = AQb +AQb, (3.8)
where w, is a measure of group fitness, here the growth rate o f each group («,'/«,), E  is 
the expectation, and AQt and AQw are the Price between- and within-group 
components o f  change in overall cooperator frequency, respectively.
As shown in Appendix B, these Price equation components o f  change can be 
rewritten as:
AQb = Q * - Q a n d  (3.9)
&Qw = Q' -  Q* where (3.10)
(3.11)
N '
The Q* term in AQb plays the role o f an idealized Q' in which the before-selection qt 
values are applied to the after-selection group sizes, n f  The corresponding within- 
group expression corrects for the ignored changes in cooperator frequency within 
groups. This Price equation idealization, as also shown in the Appendix B, can be 
expressed in terms that highlight its connection to our linear NPD model,
(3.12)
where wavqi gives values for the average fitness line shown in Figure 3-1. The slope o f
this average fitness line is b -  c (see Figure 3-1) or the degree o f  non-zero-sumness in
the NPD model. As a kind o f control, if  we do a run o f this model where both
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cooperators and defectors receive the average fitness (in this case there is no within- 
group selection), the change in Q  over generations matches the Price between-group 
component, A Qb, exactly. Thus the average slope o f the fitness functions (degree o f 
non-zero-sumness) is a measure o f  the between-group selection force predicted by the 
Price equation. That is, groups with higher fractions o f cooperators get proportionally 
more o f the non-zero-sum advantage and out produce groups that with less 
cooperators.
Alternative Selection Decomposition
This presentation o f the Price between-group idealization suggests an alternative 
decomposition where the within-group component contains the Q' idealization and the 
between-group component is the correction term. This idealization assumes the 
frequency o f  cooperators within each group changes, but that the relative size (fitness) 
o f groups does not— I use the after-selection qi' values and the before-selection group 
sizes, This alternative Q' idealization I denote as:
Q # _ Eft'”. 
N
(3.13)
and the alternative components o f selection can be labeled:
altAQw = Q# -  Q and (3.14)
altAQh = Q  -  Q#. (3.15)
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Now we can do a symmetrical control to the one above by setting the slope b to 
zero. Here there is a difference c between cooperator and defector fitness within 
groups but no difference between what these types get in different groups (in this case 
there is no between-group selection), and the resulting actual AQ for this run exactly 
matches the altAQw component given by this decomposition. So again the degree o f 
non-zero-sumness (average fitness line) in this model gives the between-group 
selective force predicted by the Price decomposition, and the cost c o f being a 
cooperator (intercept difference), gives the within-group selective force predicted by 
the alternative decomposition. The Price within term and the alternative between term 
act, respectively, as correction terms for these idealizations.
Figure 3-4 shows the change from the initial Q value for Run 1 o f Figure 3-2 
(parameters given in Table 3-1). Also shown are the selection components o f Run 1 
given by the Price decomposition and the alternative. Notice that the two 
decompositions give quite different results. In the Price decomposition the equilibrium 
state (Q = 0.0) consists o f a balance between a strong between-group force, 0.4, even 
though group 1 has disappeared (see Figure 3-2 (c )), and a strong within-group force, 
-0 .9 , even though cooperators have disappeared. In contrast, the alternative 
decomposition more intuitively says that the between-group selection force rises as 
group 2 initially increases over group 1, but that this force goes to zero as the first 
group disappears. The alternative within-group component steadily decreases to -0 .5  
to balance the initial Q  o f 0.5 as Q  goes to zero. Which o f these two decompositions is 
more appropriate will depend on the situation being studied. In the runs illustrated
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here where the within-group selection force eventually dominates, the alternative 
decomposition provides more insight.
0.4
0.2
0.0
- 0.2
A Q-0.4
- 0.6
- 0.8
- 1.0
5010 20 30 400
generation
Figure 3-4. Price Equation and Alternative Decom positions for Run 1.
Change in cooperator frequency (AQt) vs. generation for Run 1 o f  Figure 3-2 
along with the between- and within-group components o f  selection for this 
run given by the Price decomposition (AQb and AQw respectively) and the 
alternative decomposition (altAQb and altAQw).
Note that neither decomposition is necessarily accurate when there is a mixture o f 
between- and within-group selective forces acting simultaneously. While both 
decompositions assume the forces can be decoupled, in reality the selective forces 
affect each other. The Price decomposition posits in its between-group term  that all 
change is due to between-group selection and then assumes the difference between 
this assumption and the actual change in cooperator frequency is due to the 
counterbalancing force o f  within-group selection. The alternative decomposition takes 
the opposite tack. When the two approaches give roughly the same answer (as in the
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first few generations o f Figure 3-4), then the forces are roughly decomposable. But as 
change over longer periods is compared the values given by the two approaches 
diverge (e.g. compare values at generation 30 in Figure 3-4). This is an indication that 
over this time period the degree o f between-group selection has been affected by 
changes in group compositions (caused by within-group selection); and that the degree 
o f within-group selection has been affected by group size changes (caused by 
between-group selection). In addition to offering a symmetric decomposition that may 
give more intuitive results in some situations, this alternative decomposition is useful 
in highlighting when the Price equation’s assumption o f independent effects is 
inaccurate.
Selection and Game Theory
In addition to the debate over levels o f selection and how altruism evolves, there is 
also disagreement about what behaviors constitute altruism. In a standard game- 
theoretic analysis rational self-interest is defined by the behavioral choice that 
produces the highest absolute payoff (utility) to a player—regardless o f the effect this 
behavior has on the payoffs o f other players (i.e. positive or negative externalities). 
Individuals maximizing their own utility dictate the expected dynamics in this 
situation. On the other hand, the engine o f natural selection is differences in offspring 
representation in subsequent generations and the dynamics are driven by relative 
fitness (Wilson 2004). Applying the standard game-theoretic (or absolute fitness)
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viewpoint to systems under selection leads to contradictory results, as illustrated 
below.
I stated earlier that the minimum conditions for an NPD in our model require that 
the average fitness line have a positive slope, i.e. b > c, but from the standard game- 
theoretic viewpoint there is an additional constraint: c > b/nt. That is, the cost o f being 
a cooperator must be greater than the cooperator’s share o f the benefit it creates for the 
group. This second condition marks the boundary between an NPD and a No-Conflict 
(NC) game, or equivalently the difference between what Wilson (1979; 1990) has 
termed strong  and weak altruism, respectively. Note that the same behavioral trait 
(with the same values o f b and c) can change between strong and weak altruism 
depending on changes in group size (Pepper 2000b).
The expected dynamics (from an absolute fitness perspective) in the NC game 
defined by weak altruism is towards mutual cooperation (as cooperation is the 
dominant strategy), but under selection the dynamics o f weak altruism move towards 
mutual defection. Again, this is because under selection differences in fitness values 
drive the dynamics— not just the maximization o f absolute fitness amounts (Wilson 
2004). Several studies have reported “surprising” results when animal or human 
subjects choose cooperative or altruistic behaviors that do not maximize absolute 
fitness or utility, but instead seem more concerned with relative fitness or fairness (e.g. 
Fehr and Gachter 2002; Boyd et al. 2003; Brosnan and de Waal 2003). Yet these 
results are not surprising from the perspective o f selection. Hamilton in discussing PD 
situations wrote in 1969:
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But natural selection, the process which has made us almost all that we are, 
seems to give one clear warning about situations o f  this general kind. When 
payoffs are connected with fitness, the animal part o f  our nature is expected 
to be more concerned with getting “more than the average ” than with getting  
“the maximum possib le” (Hamilton 1971 p. 83)
Still some have ignored or disagreed with this distinction preferring to reserve the
word “altruism” only for the strong category (Nunney 1985b; Maynard Smith 1998a;
Nunney 2000). For instance Nunney has argued that “benevolence” should be used
instead o f “weak altruism.” He offers the following example:
Suppose that you are offered two financial options. Under the selfish option 
you receive 10 dollars and keep it all. Under the benevolent option you  
receive 10 million dollars, but 6 million must be given to a neighbor. Given 
that neighbors are random samples o f  a large population, the choice is 
clearly the benevolent option, a choice based purely on individual greed and 
not on the general benefit o f  the neighborhood. Replacing money by fitness, it 
can be seen that benevolence spreads by individual selection because a net 
gain o f  4 million units o f  fitness is superior to a net gain o f  10 units o f  fitness. 
(Nunney 1985b p. 226)
Although it sounds very self-serving to give oneself 4 million dollars, the problem 
with this example is that it ignores selection among neighbors. If  you have a 
behavioral trait that helps your neighbor have 6 million offspring while it only helps 
you have 4 million offspring, then only in an infinite world could this trait avoid being 
weeded out (assuming as Nunney does that only individual selection is operating). In 
every paired interaction this trait looses ground to its neighbor. On the other hand, 
such a trait can evolve if  the benefits bestowed by altruists fall more to other altruists 
than to average population members— but this need for positive assortment o f 
altruistic behaviors is the same condition for strong altruism to evolve— and in both
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cases Ham ilton’s rule specifies the degree o f positive assortment necessary given the 
fitness costs and benefits.
Returning to our model, in Run 1 (Figure 3-2 and Table 3-1) the first group’s size 
shrinks below = 5 between generation 15 and 16, and thus crosses the boundary 
from strong to weak altruism (b=  1, c -  0.2, and altruism is weak when n ,■ < blc or nt < 
5). Under the standard view (focused on absolute fitness), cooperation should now be 
favored (by individual within-group selection) because this is now an NC game in 
which cooperation is the dominant strategy (highest absolute payoff). Therefore 
cooperation should increase when «,• < 5 and decrease when n-, > 5 for these model 
parameters. Yet, in reality, cooperation (now weak altruism) continues to be steadily 
selected against and we observe that the equilibrium for this group is mutual defection. 
This is because even a weak altruist helps every other group member to have more 
offspring than itself.
Note that under selection in a finite population the essential nature o f  the PD is 
retained even for weak altruism— the dynamics lead to mutual defection even though 
collective cooperation would result in higher average absolute fitness for group 
members. In this sense selection converts an NC game into a PD (or equivalently weak 
altruism to strong) by making the relative amount o f  externalities (i.e. what others get 
from an altruist compared to what it gives itself) relevant to the resulting absolute 
fitness values. These relative fitness effects are ignored in the strong/weak or PD/NC 
classifications, but are central to natural selection. Note that in the NPD model used 
here the population is finite as it is proportionally scaled to its original size each
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generation, but even in an infinite population the percentage o f  altruists (whether 
strong or weak) decreases within groups every generation.
To illustrate the conversion from weak to strong altruism under selection, I start 
with a 2-player NC game with a dominant strategy to cooperate. I then convert it by 
asking what the payoff values would be in the case that differences in absolute values 
represented the actual utilities. This idea is similar to “social motives” in game theory 
(Davis 1989)where the given utility values do not represent the actual utilities o f the 
players who may have other motives than absolute payoff maximization, such as 
“fairness” or in this case “difference maximization.” I illustrate this conversion in 
Figure 3-5. When two strategies combinations result in the same difference calculation 
I add an amount 8 to the one that has the higher absolute fitness. This implements the 
idea that when there is no difference between opponents it is preferable to get the 
higher absolute amount o f utility (fitness).
Note that when we start with a NC (No-Conflict) game (first row Figure 3-5), 
difference maximization (selection) converts the game to a PD. On the other hand, 
when we start with a PD game (second row Figure 3-5), difference maximization 
(selection) still results in a PD. So strong altruism remains strong under selection, but 
altruism designated as weak with regard to absolute fitness values is converted to 
strong altruism under selection. Whereas cooperation is the dominant strategy when 
only absolute fitness values are considered in a NC game, selection converts this 
situation into a PD where defection is the dominant strategy— and to cooperate is to 
make an altruistic sacrifice.
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C
>er 2 
D
PD Play
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D
Player 1 ^ 5 / 5 1 /3
taking 0 + 8 / 
0 + 6 - 2 / 2
D
PD
3 /1 0 / 0 utilitydifferences 2 1 - 2 0 / 0
Player
C
2
D
PD Player 2 
C D
Player 1 ^ 3 / 3 0 / 5
taking C 0 + 8 / 
0 + 8 - 5 / 5
D 5 / 0 1 / 1 utility D differences 5 1 -5 0 / 0
Figure 3-5. Applying Difference Maximization to NC and PD Games. 
Illustrates effect of converting a game using the differences in original utility 
values (left-hand games) to calculate converted utility values (right-hand 
games). When two different strategy combinations result in equal differences, 
a value 5 is added to the one with the highest original (absolute) utility. The 
game-theoretic classification of each game is indicated in the upper left corner 
of each payoff matrix—Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) or No-Conflict (NC). The 
strategies for player 1 are represented as rows and for player 2 as columns. 
The payoff values for each pair of strategies that meet are listed as player 1 
payoff/player 2 payoff.
Altruism via Randomly Formed Groups
So far I have explored the simplest case o f multilevel selection where the within-group 
level is represented by only two alternative strategies and the between-group level is 
represented by only two distinct groups. As we have seen, in this case the increase in 
cooperators is transient because once one group dominates there is no longer a 
between-group selection force (the variance ratio goes to zero) and the within-group 
more fit defect strategy takes over this single group. In order to illustrate that 
mechanisms which reestablish variance among groups can maintain altruism
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indefinitely, I have modified our model to include periodic random redistributions o f 
the population among multiple groups. Between redistribution events reproduction 
takes place and group sizes vary with cooperator and defector fitness as previously 
explained. This modification shares features o f Maynard Smith’s haystack model 
(1964; W ilson 1987) including that groups exist for multiple generations and there is a 
global mixing phase followed by random distribution into many groups.
Interestingly, even among those that debate whether weak altruism should be 
considered altruism, there is consensus that strong altruism cannot evolve in randomly 
formed groups (Hamilton 1975; Wilson 1975a; Nunney 1985a; W ilson 1990; Maynard 
Smith 1998a; Nunney 2000; Sober and Wilson 2000). This conclusion is based on 
single-generation models. In Chapter 4 I address this conclusion directly using the 
original models upon which this conclusion is based (Fletcher and Zwick 2004c). Here 
I will compare weak and strong altruism in randomly formed groups that exist for 
multiple generations in our NPD model. To guarantee that only strong altruism is 
operating (regardless o f changes in group size) I use other-only altruism in which 
altruists give nothing to themselves and their benefit is divided evenly among the 
others in the group. In the other-only case the v-axis in Figure 3-1 would be the 
fraction o f others cooperating in a group and the qi value for calculating a /  in Eq. 3.3 
is (a, — 1 )/(«,■ —1) and for calculating s? in Eq. 3.4 is a Jin, -1); that is, the fraction o f 
cooperators in others. By definition, the other-only runs are guaranteed to involve 
strong altruism whereas the whole-group runs begin with weak altruism conditions for 
comparison.
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I contrast this other-only (strong) altruism with the whole-group altruism we have 
used thus far. As mentioned earlier, the value o f r from Hamilton’s rule differs for 
these two types (Pepper 2000b). For other-only altruism the expected value o f r when 
groups o f size «,■ are formed at random is 0 (Pepper 2000b) so on average no positive 
values o f b and c will satisfy Hamilton’s rule (rb > c). For whole-group altruism, 
randomly formed groups produce an average r value o f 1 /«,- (Pepper 2000b) so the 
condition becomes blnt > c which is the definition o f weak altruism. Thus the 
consensus that strong altruism cannot evolve via randomly formed groups. Below I 
show this conclusion is not correct when groups exist for multiple generations (as they 
do in haystack models (Maynard Smith 1964; Wilson 1987)). I first contrast the 
dynamics o f other-only (strong) and whole-group (weak) altruism for individual runs 
in Figure 3-6 and then give aggregate results in Table 3-2.
Figure 3-6 shows that the Q values for both other-only and whole-group altruism 
follow the same familiar hump-shaped pattern seen in Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3 
except that in the other-only runs Q decreases initially. The similar general dynamics 
o f the other-only (strong altruism) and whole-group (weak altruism) runs is another 
indication o f the similarities between strong and weak altruism under selection—  
effectively they are both PDs. The initial decrease in Q for other-only runs is expected 
because on average r = 0 after groups are formed and therefore Ham ilton’s rule cannot 
be satisfied. Surprisingly however, within a couple o f generations Q begins to increase 
and then follows the familiar hump-shaped pattern until another group reformation 
event. As I will show in Chapter 4, this is due to the r  value increasing from its initial
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value o f 0 over multiple generations within groups. Note the corresponding points for 
whole-group and other-only runs where groups are reformed every 40 generations 
(indicated with a vertical dashed line with arrows in Figure 3-6). In runs where groups 
are reformed close to when Q is peaking (e.g. every 20 generations runs), cooperation 
can ratchet up to saturation, whereas in runs where groups are reformed long after the 
peak in Q  (e.g. every 40 generations runs), cooperation tends to be eliminated. This is 
true for both types o f runs in each pair.
0.8
0.6
Q -B-every 20 WG 
every 20 OO 
-O- every 30 WG 
every 30 OO 
-©- every 40 WG 
-♦-eve ry40 OO
0.4
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Figure 3-6. Dynamic Change in Q for Periodically Randomly-formed Groups. 
Frequency of cooperators ( 0  vs. generation for 6 runs where an initial 
population of 500 cooperators and 500 defectors is randomly assigned to 100 
groups and periodically randomly redistributed into groups. Three runs each 
are done for whole-group (WG) and other-only (OO) altruistic benefit for 
redistribution frequencies of 20, 30, and 40 generations. For all runs b = 20 
and c = 1.0. A vertical dashed line with arrows indicates corresponding points 
at generation 40 for the whole-group and other-only runs.
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In Figure 3-6 there are three pairs o f  runs each consisting o f  an other-only (OO) 
run and a whole-group (WG) run. For each run a total population o f 500 cooperators 
and 500 defectors is distributed randomly into 100 groups and then randomly 
redistributed periodically. Parameters are the same across runs except the number of 
generations between group reformation events varies among pairs. In this analytic 
model we allow fractional counts o f cooperators and defectors from generation to 
generation, but no do not use counts less than one in group reformation events. This 
tends to weed out residual fractions and because there is no mutation, the extremes of 
0 = 1 . 0  and Q = 0.0 act as attractors and intermediate values do not persist 
indefinitely.
The results in Figure 3-6 show typical individual runs done with the same initial 
seed for comparison. I also did 100 runs at each reformation frequency with the same 
parameters but different random number seeds. In all cases runs were done until either 
cooperator or defector saturation was reached. Table 3-2 shows the percentage o f runs 
reaching cooperator saturation for these parameter conditions as well as shorter and 
longer periods between group reformations. These results support the trends discussed 
above.
Table 3-2. Percentage of 100 Runs Ending in Cooperator Saturation. 
The same model parameters as for Figure 3-6 were used.
1
Reformation Frequency 
10 20 30 40 50
Whole-group 100% 100% 100% 66% 12% 12%
Other-only 0% 100% 65% 10% 8% 7%
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Again, the results shown here for strong altruism are in contrast to the commonly 
held belief that strong altruism cannot evolve in randomly formed groups (Hamilton 
1975; Wilson 1975a; Nunney 1985a; Wilson 1990; Maynard Smith 1998a; Nunney 
2000; Sober and W ilson 2000). In the next chapter (Fletcher and Zwick 2004c) I 
explore the issue o f strong altruism evolving in randomly-formed groups in more 
detail with an individual agent-based model and show that this general result does not 
depend on kin selection and even holds under fairly high levels o f migration between 
groups each generation. The evolution o f altruism via random associations may be one 
method by which new integrated units o f selection (Margulis 1993; Maynard Smith 
and Szathmary 1995; Michod 1999) at increased hierarchical levels originate.
Summary
By embodying non-zero-sumness, population structure (assortment), and heredity in 
their most basic forms, this NPD model offers a simple framework for understanding 
the paradoxical nature o f the evolution o f altruism, integrating such central concepts as 
Simpson’s paradox, Hamilton’s rule, and the Price covariance equation. It also 
suggests an alternative selection decomposition which is more intuitive in some 
situations and helps emphasizes the coupled nature o f within- and between-group 
selection acting over multiple generations. I show that a game-theoretic framework is 
also useful in understanding the similarities between weak and strong altruism 
undergoing selection. Finally, I contrast other-only (strong) and whole-group (weak) 
versions o f  the NPD model to highlight both their initial differences immediately after
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random group formation and their overall dynamical similarities. This also illustrates, 
in contrast to conventional wisdom, that strong altruism can evolve in periodically 
randomly formed groups that are multigenerational. In the next chapter I illustrate 
more fully the reasons that this conventional wisdom does not hold by starting with 
the original analytical models on which it is based (rather than the NPD model used 
here) as well as developing modifications to these models that explore, among other 
factors, the role o f kinship, stochasticity, and migration in the evolution o f altruism.
Recently, game-theoretic models have been demonstrated where cooperation 
increases even without reciprocity. In these cases social interactions are clumped by 
various mechanisms including the presence o f non-players (Hauert et al. 2002), the 
need for sufficiently similar arbitrary tags (Riolo, Cohen, and Axelrod 2001), and 
social institutions for conformity within groups (Bowles, Choi, and Hopfensitz 2003). 
In the context o f the model presented here, we would expect these results with their 
various cost, benefit, and population structure parameters also to conform to 
Ham ilton’s rule, although this kind o f analysis is not usually undertaken in such 
papers ((Bowles, Choi, and Hopfensitz 2003) is an exception although the whole- 
group version o f r is used for a model which is other-only). Recent models showing 
the evolution o f cooperation among non-kin (Aviles 2002; Aviles, Abbot, and Cutter 
2002) are also understandable in the framework presented here. Although this model 
could be interpreted as containing clonal cooperators and defectors, it is common in 
game-theoretic models o f the evolution o f cooperation (Maynard Smith 1982; Axelrod 
1984) to interpret these two strategies as representing social behaviors— which may be
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based on non kin-related, but heritable, genotypes. The evolution o f altruism does not 
actually require either reciprocity or kinship. What is essential is: 1) sufficiently non- 
zero-sum benefits for altruistic behaviors (where behaviors are heritable) and 2) 
sufficiently non-uniform interactions among these behaviors. As demonstrated here, 
the necessary combination o f population structure and non-zero-sumness is specified 
by Ham ilton’s rule.
This overall framework can help social science researchers who emphasize game- 
theoretic models to see their results in the context o f Ham ilton’s rule and multilevel 
selection, while also enabling biology researchers who focus on relatedness to 
recognize the inherent game-theoretic character o f their models.
I f  costs and benefits combine additively, and groups are form ed  randomly, 
then altruism cannot evolve. But i f  altruists tend to associate with altruists, 
and non-altruists with non-altruists, then altruism can evolve. This 
conclusion is agreed.
John Maynard Smith, in review o f Unto Others (1998a)
Chapter 4 
Strong Altruism Can Evolve in 
Randomly Formed Groups1
Introduction
Nearly three decades ago Hamilton (1975) and Wilson (1975a) independently 
developed models which were interpreted as showing that strong altruism (involving 
an absolute cost to altruists) cannot evolve in randomly formed groups. This 
conclusion is still generally accepted even among those who debate how best to define 
altruism and the mechanisms by which it evolves (Hamilton 1975; W ilson 1975a; 
Nunney 1985b; Wilson 1990; M aynard Smith 1998a; Nunney 2000; Sober and Wilson 
2000). Here I challenge this conclusion by exploring what happens when groups exist 
for more than one generation. Multigenerational groups are a central feature o f
1 This chapter is based on a paper published in the Journal of Theoretical Biology (Fletcher and Zwick 
2004c).
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Maynard Smith’s classic “haystack” model (1964; Wilson 1987), but the role of 
multiple generations within groups was not explored in Hamilton’s (1975) and 
W ilson’s (1975a) models. Although the initial conditions after random group 
formation favor non-altruists over altruists, paradoxically these conditions can switch 
to favor altruists after even one generation o f selection. Thus even though the overall 
proportion o f altruists decreases after one generation, it can increase even more after a 
second generation spent within groups.
Besides single-generation groups, these original analytic models rely on other 
simplifying assumptions such as an infinite population and no migration between 
groups. I begin by showing how strong altruism can evolve under the assumptions o f 
the original models, with the only modification being delayed reformation o f random 
groups. Multigenerational groups introduce additional issues such as interactions 
among related offspring, persistent homogeneous groups o f altruists, and exponential 
growth o f population size. I explore model modifications—preventing altruists from 
benefiting kin, precluding homogeneous groups from forming, and adding a 
population-level carrying capacity—that mitigate each o f these factors. I find that 
under all these modifications (imposed both separately and concurrently) strong 
altruism, although dampened, can still evolve in randomly formed multigenerational 
groups. I then transform the basic analytic model into an evolutionary simulation in 
which population size is finite and stable. In the simulation model random group 
formation from a finite population and migration between groups both reduce positive 
assortment and therefore dampen selection for altruism. On the other hand, increased
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stochasticity in benefit distribution and culling due to carrying capacity can enhance 
the likelihood that altruism will evolve compared to processes with minimum 
stochasticity.
Classifications of Altruism
Both the analytic and simulation models discussed here involve what Pepper (2000b) 
has termed an other-only altruistic trait because none o f the altruist’s benefits come 
back to itself, as opposed to whole-group traits (also called group-beneficial traits) 
where the benefit is divided among all group members including the altruist. Wilson 
(1979; 1990) previously classified altruistic traits in a related but different way as 
either strong  (involving an absolute cost to altruists) or weak (involving only a relative 
cost to altruists). Other-only altruistic traits are always strong while whole-group traits 
are strong if  the cost to an altruist is greater than its share o f the benefit it provides. 
Note that the same whole-group behavior involving the same sacrifice and provided 
benefit may be strong or weak depending on group size (Pepper 2000b).
In contrast to strong altruism, Wilson showed (1979; 1990) that weakly altruistic 
traits can increase when groups are randomly formed every generation. That is, for an 
infinite population where a binomial trait is randomly redistributed every generation, 
the resulting between-group component o f total variance can be enough for weak, but 
not for strong, altruism to evolve. Nevertheless in finite populations where fitness is 
relative the distinction between strong and weak altruism may be less important as
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both types are selected against within groups and require selection (or differential 
productivity) among groups in order to increase (Wilson 1979; 1990). In this paper I 
focus on other-only, strong altruism (the most restrictive situation) to address the 
random group models o f Hamilton and Wilson directly, but the consequences o f 
multigenerational groups and stochasticity also apply to weak, whole-group traits and 
therefore these traits can even more readily increase via randomly formed groups than 
was previously shown (Wilson 1979; 1990). A side-by-side comparison o f  the 
dynamics o f weak and strong altruism was given in Chapter 3.
Analytic Model
I focus on Ham ilton’s model (1975) because he developed a formal proof that altruism 
cannot evolve in single-generation randomly formed groups (W ilson’s model (1975a) 
is similar in all important aspects). In this model a haploid infinite population is 
randomly subdivided into groups o f  equal size, n. Group members interact for one 
generation, affecting each other’s fitness (offspring count), before the population is 
pooled and then again randomly assigned to new groups. In every generation each 
altruist behaves in a way that costs itself c offspring and provides a total benefit o f b 
offspring divided evenly among the other n- 1 group members. Each non-altruist 
receives its share o f benefits, but does not provide any benefit to others. Therefore, 
within every group non-altruists have more offspring than altruists, but groups with 
more altruists have more offspring per capita than groups with less. This is an example
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o f multilevel selection where here selection within groups opposes selection between 
groups.
Hamilton (1975) using Price’s covariance equation (1970) showed that under his 
model’s assumptions, between-group selection (due to the variance between groups in 
altruist frequency, q) must always be weaker than average within-group selection (due 
to the expected variance in the altruistic trait within groups) and therefore the overall 
frequency o f altruists, Q, must decrease in every generation. (Capital letters indicate 
whole population values; small letters indicate group values.) To illustrate this, I 
calculate AiQ for an infinite binomial distribution, where Ai indicates that the change 
occurs over one generation within groups, g =  1. The variable g  is the number o f 
generations spent within groups before each reformation event. (See Appendix C for 
model details.) Figure 4 -1(a) shows how Aj Q depends on the level o f benefit, b, 
provided by altruists for different starting Q values. (For convenience, all results 
reported in this paper use c = 1 such that benefit b is also the benefit to cost ratio.) The 
results shown in Figure 4 -1(a) are the same for any group size n. Note that as benefit 
increases, zero is an upper limit on Ai£>— hence the conclusion that strong altruism 
cannot increase under the assumptions o f this model for all values o f Q and n 
(Hamilton 1975; Wilson 1975a).
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Figure 4-1. Change in Altruist Frequency as a Function of Altruist Benefit.
(a) and (b) compare the effect of different starting Q values on A%Q after one 
(g = 1) and two (g = 2) generations spent within groups, respectively, where 
founding group size n = 4 (although in (a) the results are the same for all n). 
(c) compares the effect of different n for multigenerational groups (g = 2) 
when altruism is rare—here initial Q = 0.001. The cost c = 1 in all 
calculations.
Yet quite different results are obtained if  groups persist for even one additional 
generation (g = 2) before random mixing and the formation o f new groups. Figure 
4 -1(b) shows how the change in Q after two generations within groups, A20, depends
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on benefit values for different starting Q values. The only difference between Figure 
4 -1(a) and (b) is that the latter measures the change in altruist frequency after an 
additional generation spent within groups where the fitness functions are 
deterministically and recursively applied. In this case strong altruism can clearly 
increase (A2Q > 0) for sufficient values o f benefit. Figure 4 -1(c) shows that smaller 
groups give a larger increase in altruist frequency which is consistent with previous 
findings on the relationship between group size and the evolution o f  altruistic traits 
(Boyd and Richerson 1988; Aviles 1993). Additionally Figure 4-1 (c), for which Q  =
0.001, shows that strong altruism can increase due to multigenerational groups even 
when the altruistic trait is rare, although higher benefit levels are needed for A2Q > 0 
when Q is low.
Applying Hamilton’s Rule
We can also understand these results in terms o f Hamilton’s rule (1964) which states 
that the condition for an altruistic trait to increase in the next generation is:
r b > c ,  (4.1)
where r  is the “coefficient o f relatedness” or more generally the regression coefficient 
between the frequency o f the trait in recipients and actors (Hamilton 1972). Thus r is a 
measure o f positive assortment— the degree to which the benefits o f  altruists fall to 
other altruists. The value o f r differs for other-only and whole-group traits because in 
the latter case, but not the former, altruists are recipients o f their own actions (Pepper
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2000b). I use superscripts w  and o respectively for whole-group and other-only 
measures o f  r. For whole-group traits rw is the between-group variance in q over the 
total variance in the altruistic trait (Breden 1990; Frank 1995a). For an infinite 
binomial population o f randomly formed groups o f size n, the variance ratio rw = 1 / n 
(Pepper 2000b). Thus according to Ham ilton’s rule (Eq. 4.1) the trait increases after 
one generation if  b / n > c, but for whole-group traits this means that an altruist’s share 
o f its benefit must be greater than its cost— this is the definition o f  weak altruism so as 
Wilson (1979; 1990) noted only weak traits can increase after one generation.
For groups o f uniform size the r values are related by the following expression 
(Pepper 2000b):
Therefore r° = 0 for an initial random distribution where rw = 1 In . Obviously there 
are no positive values o f b and c that can satisfy Hamilton’s rule (Eq. 4.1) for an other- 
only (strong) altruistic trait when r = 0 and such traits must decrease. Note however, 
that any modifications to the model that make r° > 0 can yield an increase in Q, given 
a sufficient value o f b. Hamilton noted that any assortment o f altruists beyond that 
produced at random could allow altruism to increase (1975). Surprisingly, for many 
parameter settings r° increases above zero after one generation o f selection— even as 
the proportion o f altruists decreases. That is, this transient one-generation-long 
“population viscosity” o f the original models is enough (without any other 
mechanisms for creating positive assortment) to create conditions that favor altruism
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in the following generation. If  groups are randomly reformed after this single 
generation then this gain in positive assortment is destroyed before being used by 
selection; r° returns to zero and Q subsequently declines. On the other hand, additional 
generations within groups can take advantage o f this increased positive assortment so 
that strong altruism increases, as shown in Figure 4-1. (Whether altruism actually 
increases or not depends on parameters including Q, b, and n.)
Note that although Hamilton emphasized a ratio o f variances in his proof, in this 
other-only model the regression coefficient between actors and recipients, r°, is an 
easier to interpret measure o f the changing conditions affecting altruism as selection 
occurs. For instance, after one generation o f selection (starting with randomly formed 
groups), the between over total variance, rw, can decrease while r° increases. It is the 
increase in r° that accurately reflects whether altruism can increase in the next 
generation. For most parameter settings both measures increase after one generation, 
but the range o f parameters where rw decreases is greater than the range in which r° 
decreases. In general the r values can decrease when there is a combination o f low Q, 
low b, and high n.
According to Hamilton’s rule whether altruism increases in the second generation 
within groups depends on whether r° after the first generation is greater than c / b. O f 
course it is not enough for altruism to increase in the second generation for altruism to 
increase overall. The increases in subsequent generations within groups must make up 
for any losses in the initial generation(s). Figure 4-2(a) shows the expected dynamic 
change in Q values over successive generations when groups persist for one and two
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generations before random reformation and Figure 4-2(b) shows the concurrent 
changes in r°.
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Figure 4-2. Calculated Dynamics in Analytic Model Comparing g  and n.
Results for one and two generations spent within groups (g = 1, g = 2) for 
groups of two different sizes (n = 3; n = 10). (a) shows the dynamics in 
overall altruist frequency Q given different starting Q values and different 
sized groups, (b) shows the concurrent change in the regression coefficient 
between actors and recipients, r°. The critical r° value of c / b is also shown 
with a solid horizontal line. Here Q = 0.1, b = 10, and c = 1. Both r° and Q are 
calculated at the end of the indicated generation and after group reformation if 
it occurs, (a) and (b) use the same legend.
Altruist frequency Q decreases monotonically when groups are reformed every 
generation and r° = 0 before each round o f selection. On the other hand when groups
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exist for two generations, Q oscillates (and can ratchet upward). The every-other- 
generation saw-toothed peaks in Q correspond to similar (but offset) oscillating peaks 
in r° (Figure 4-2(b)). Here r° increases after a generation within groups and the 
critical c / b value is indicated with a solid horizontal line. Troughs on the other hand 
correspond to global mixing, new group formation, a decrease o f r° back to zero and a 
subsequent decrease in Q. In Figure 4-2 I also show a case with the same parameters 
except bigger group size (g = 2 ;n  = 10). Here, although Q can increases during the 
second generations within groups, it is not enough to make up for losses in the first 
generations. Note that when peaks in r° fail to reach the c / b value (after generation 21 
in Figure 4-2(b) for g  = 2; n = 10), as predicted by Hamilton’s rule, Q  can no longer 
increase and instead falls during both generations within groups (Figure 4-2(a)).
Analytic Model Modifications
Multiple generations within groups complicate the simple single-generation model in 
several ways: 1) kin interactions within groups become possible; 2) the contribution 
o f  homogeneous groups o f altruists increases— these groups uniquely retain their 
initial (maximal) level o f altruism; 3) the additive frequency-dependent fitness 
functions can now lead to exponential growth o f the population. Yet as I demonstrate 
below, while not inconsequential, none o f  these factors are essential to explain why 
strong altruism increases in randomly formed multigenerational groups— especially 
when altruism is initially rare. The following three paragraphs elaborate on each issue
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and describe modifications to the basic model to address them. I follow this with a 
summary o f the results produced by each modification.
No Kin Selection
In the original model groups are formed by randomly selecting individuals from an 
infinite population and therefore groups contain unrelated individuals. In a second 
generation within groups, when the benefits provided by an altruist are divided among 
other group members, some o f this benefit (in the form o f additional offspring) will 
fall to those with the same parent as the altruist. In general the proportion o f benefit 
falling to relatives (defined by common ancestry) in subsequent generations will 
depend on parameters n, b, and Q, but this proportion is bounded by 1 In  (Appendix 
D). This limit is approached for high b and Q, but when altruism is initially rare this 
proportion is much less significant. For example, for groups o f size 4, the maximum 
possible proportion o f benefit that could fall to relatives is 1 / n = 25%, but for Q = 0.1 
and b =  10 the observed proportion o f benefit given to relatives is actually 0.61% 
during the second generation within groups. For the same Q and b the proportion 
decreases with larger group size and more generations within groups. To eliminate kin 
selection I modify the model so that altruists only divide their benefit among non­
relatives (Appendix D).
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No Homogeneous Groups
In the infinite population o f this model, homogeneous groups o f altruists will be 
randomly created whenever Q > 0. These groups are unique in being the only group 
composition for which q cannot decrease with successive generations within groups. 
They are also the fastest growing groups as they contain no free-riding non-altruists. 
One might suspect that such homogeneous groups account for altruism being able to 
increase after multiple generations within groups. To check this I modify our model 
(Appendix D) such that immediately after group formation all homogeneous groups o f 
altruists have one altruist switched to a non-altruist. Note that this artificially decreases 
Q, making it even harder for altruism to evolve.
No Population Growth
Even with additive (linear) fitness functions, multiple generations within groups can 
cause a population to grow exponentially (Wilson 1987). To study the effect of stable 
population size I implement a global carrying capacity by scaling the offspring count 
o f all population members each generation by the inverse o f the expected overall 
growth rate during that generation (Appendix D). This holds the population size 
constant (albeit infinite) at every generation, but allows groups with more altruists to 
have relatively more offspring each generation than groups with less.
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Modification Results
Figure 4-3 compares the results for each o f these modifications with the unmodified 
model for two generations within groups, g  = 2 .1 also include results for the original 
model where g  = 1. For each o f the three modifications A2Q is dampened, but still 
positive given sufficient benefit. This is true even when all o f the modifications are 
imposed simultaneously. That is, in a model where no benefit is given to kin, 
homogeneous groups are always corrupted, and population size is held constant, 
strong altruism can still increase after two generations within groups.
g = 2; unmodified 
g = 2; no homogeneous groups 
g = 2; no population growth 
g = 2; no kin benefit 
g = 2; all 3 modifications 
g = 1; unmodified
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Figure 4-3. Calculated Altruist Frequency for Analytic Model Modifications. 
Shows altruist frequency (AgQ) after two (g = 2) generations within groups as 
a function of altruist benefit, b, for several modifications of the original 
binomial model including preventing homogeneous groups from forming, 
scaling the population size to its original size each generation, and distributing 
altruist benefit only to the non-relatives of an altruist. The results for the 
original model after one (g = 1) and two (g = 2) generations are also shown for 
comparison. The original Q = 0.25, n = 4, and c = 1 in all calculations.
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In contrast to the unmodified dynamic model shown in Figure 4-2 where altruism 
tends to evolve to Q = 1.0 or Q = 0.0 given enough generations, it does not necessarily 
evolve to saturation under all these modifications. Corrupting homogeneous groups for 
example necessarily keeps Q < 1.0. In the case o f a population-level carrying capacity, 
for n = 4, Q = 0.1, g  = 2, and b = 15, a stable limit cycle is reached in which Q 
oscillates every other generation between 0.616 and 0.636. (Yet as shown in the next 
section, when stochasticity is introduced populations tend to evolve to one extreme or 
the other in these models.)
Simulation Model
So far, like Hamilton, we have used the assumption o f an infinite population in order 
to calculate the expected distribution o f group compositions when individuals are 
randomly distributed. But infinity here has two special consequences. First it converts 
a seemingly stochastic process (random group formation) to a deterministic one— the 
expected value o f r° is produced by every group reformation event. For any fin ite  
population, group reformation events will produce r° values that fluctuate both above 
and below the average value. Second, the expected value o f r° is lower (i.e. less than 
zero) for groups formed randomly from a finite population (compared to an infinite 
one). This is because in the finite case where “sampling without replacement” is used 
we have a hypergeometric (rather than binomial) distribution. Once an individual o f a 
certain type is assigned to a random group, the probability o f assigning another
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individual o f that type is lower than in the first assignment. This results in the 
formation o f less homogeneous groups and more heterogeneous groups (than in the 
infinite binomial distribution) which decreases the overall assortment— thus on 
average r° is negative. Based on empirical calculations it appears that the expected 
negative value o f r° depends only on population size (not n or Q) and is r° = -1  / (N—
1) for equal-sized groups randomly formed from a finite population o f size N. (I have 
not yet found a proof o f this.) Particular random group formation events will result in 
r° values which fluctuate around this lower value.
In addition, a finite simulation model can incorporate the consequences o f other 
stochastic processes including the way altruistic benefit is distributed and the way 
individuals subject to a carrying capacity are eliminated. I now transform the analytic 
model above into a computer simulation o f a finite evolving population and the 
following features and options (see Appendix E for further details):
1. When reforming groups each individual is assigned at random to an 
unfilled group (rather than by using the expected distribution).
2. The benefit value used by each group, each generation and the distribution 
o f this benefit to other group members is done in one o f two ways:
i) Low stochasticity: the benefit level is the same for all groups during 
a simulation run and is divided as evenly as possible (in units o f 
whole offspring) with only any remainder distributed randomly 
among other group members.
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ii) High stochasticity: the benefit level used in a group is drawn from a
Poisson distribution in whole units where the given benefit value is 
the mean and each unit o f benefit is then distributed at random to 
other group members.
3. Population size is held constant each generation by a global carrying 
capacity in one o f  two ways:
i) Low stochasticity: group sizes are proportionally scaled back (as in 
the no-growth analytic model), but only whole organisms are 
removed proportionally with any remainder removed randomly (as 
below).
ii) High stochasticity: excess population offspring are removed at 
random (without regard to the altruistic trait or group membership).
The first options in 2. and 3. above minimize stochasticity while still preserving 
the simulation m odel’s integral organisms, whereas the second options introduce more 
stochasticity. Figure 4-4 compares the change in altruist frequency after 2 generations 
within groups, A2Q, for the no-population-growth run o f  the analytic model (from 
Figure 4-3), the simulation model with stochastic group formation but minimal other 
stochasticity, and each o f the more stochastic choices introduced separately, and then 
simultaneously. Each data point represents the average o f 1,000 runs done with 
different random number seeds. Note that strong altruism evolves less easily in the 
finite simulation with stochastic group formation (than in the comparable infinite 
analytic model). From this base, adding more stochasticity in benefit distribution has a
Chapter 4—Strong Altruism Can Evolve in Randomly Formed Groups 93
slight positive effect whereas adding more stochasticity in elimination due to carrying 
capacity has a strong positive effect. The latter case results in an even bigger increase 
in altruism than in the no population growth analytic model. Using both options 
simultaneously does even better.
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stochastic elimination added 
analytic model, no growth 
stochastic benefit added 
stochastic group formation
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Figure 4-4. Altruist Frequency for Different Levels of Stochasticity.
Shows change in altruist frequency for after two generations within groups 
(A2 0  as a function of altruist benefit, b, for several variations of the finite 
simulation model with no population growth. The base case is stochasticity in 
random group formation, but otherwise minimal noise. To this case I add high 
stochasticity in benefit distribution, high stochasticity in implementing 
carrying capacity, and both options simultaneously. Each data point is the 
average of 1,000 runs done with population size N  = 1,000. The other 
parameters for all runs are Q = 0.25, n = 4, and c = 1. The results for the 
infinite analytic model with no population growth using the same parameters 
are also shown for comparison.
These methods o f adding stochasticity are somewhat ad hoc and I do not imply 
that additional stochasticity will necessarily increase A2Q. In fact, the stochasticity in 
random group formation appears to dampen selection for altruism— A2Q is less than
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would be expected in an average hypergeometric distribution. The effect o f  a 
particular method o f introducing random noise will depend on its relative impact on 
within- and between-group selection. I do however show that it is possible for altruism 
to evolve even more easily in stochastic finite populations than it does in deterministic 
infinite models.
W e now explore the long-term behavior o f this simulation. Because here there is 
no mutation, empirically we observe that Q -  1.0 and Q  = 0.0 act as stable equilibrium 
points and intermediate values do not persist indefinitely. All runs were done until one 
o f these equilibrium points was reached and I use the percentage o f 1,000 runs 
reaching altruist saturation, Q = 1.0, as a measure o f how readily altruism evolves 
under the given conditions. For all runs and figures described in the rest o f this paper 
we use the high stochasticity option in implementing carrying capacity, but minimum 
stochasticity in benefit distribution. If  the results shown in Figure 4-4 apply generally, 
then these settings are more favorable to the evolution o f altruism than the comparable 
analytic model, but less favorable than if  we had used high stochasticity in both 
processes simultaneously. As was the case for the analytic model, Figure 4-5(a) shows 
that both higher starting Q and higher benefit values favor selection for altruism and 
Figure 4-5(b) shows that less altruistic benefit is required to evolve altruism for 
smaller group sizes.
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Figure 4-5. Percentage of Simulation Runs Reaching Altruist Saturation. 
Shown as a function of altruist benefit, b. (a) compares the effect of different 
starting Q values, where the number of generations spent within groups g = 2 
and initial group size n = 4. (b) compares the effect of different n where Q = 
0.1 and g = 2. The total population size N =  1,000 and cost c = 1 in all runs. 
1,000 runs were done for each unique set of parameters with different random 
number seeds. All runs were done until Q = 1.0 or Q = 0.0. Here the high 
stochasticity carrying capacity option and the low stochasticity benefit 
distribution are used.
We now investigate the effect o f  migration in our simulation model where the 
migration rate, m, specifies the probability that an individual will leave its group 
during each generation, moving to a randomly selected group (weighted 
proportionately by group size). The idea here is that larger, thriving groups are 
proportionately more attractive to migrants, but similar results obtain when migrants 
jo in  groups at random, independent o f group size. Figure 4-6 shows how the 
interaction between the number o f generations spent within groups and the migration
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rate influence selection for strong altruism. Predictably, migration lessens selection for 
altruism (Figure 4-6) by working to dampen the positive assortment, r°, between 
actors and recipients each generation, but for intermediate numbers o f  generations 
spent within groups, even at relatively high migration rates (i.e. 30%), strong altruism 
evolves to saturation in some runs.
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Figure 4-6. Migration and Percentage of Runs Reaching Altruist Saturation. 
Shows percentage of simulation runs reaching altruist saturation as a function 
of the number of generations spent within groups g. Compares the effect of 
different migration rates, m, where for all runs Q = 0.1, g = 2, b = 10, n = 4, N  
= 1,000, and c = 1. 1,000 runs were done for each unique set of parameters 
with different random number seeds. All runs were done until Q=  1.0 or Q = 
0. For m = 0.4 all runs resulted in Q = 0.0 (data not shown). High stochasticity 
carrying capacity and low stochasticity benefit distribution are used.
Figure 4-6 also shows that even without migration (m = 0.0) intermediate 
numbers o f generations within groups are most favorable to the evolution o f altruism. 
The advantage o f  an intermediate number o f generations is consistent with similar 
findings in haystack models (Wilson 1987) and models of biased sex ratios (Wilson 
and Colwell 1981). Note that in the simulations o f Figure 4-6 it is initially unlikely 
that any homogeneous groups o f altruists will form. With initial Q = 0.1 and n = 4 the 
probability o f forming homogeneous altruist groups is one in 10,000 and only 250
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groups are formed (N =  1,000, n = 4) at each group reformation. Yet, in the absence o f 
homogeneous groups strong altruism can still initially increase overall even as q 
declines in every group. This is because groups with a higher frequency o f altruists 
grow faster—population Q increasing while every group q decreases is an example of 
Simpson’s paradox (Simpson 1951; Sober and Wilson 1998). With more generations 
within groups Q must eventually decrease as the altruists are eliminated from every 
group. Altruism evolves most readily when the number of generations spent within 
groups takes full advantage o f the increase in Q due to Simpson’s paradox, but avoids 
the inevitable decline in Q.
Figure 4-7 illustrates this tension. Here representative individual runs are shown 
for 2 ,4 , and 10 generations within groups using the same parameters as Figure 4-6 
without migration (m = 0.0). To aid in comparison the same random number seed 
(same initial group distribution) is used in all three runs. For 10 generations within 
groups (g = 10), reformation clearly takes place well after peak Q values are reached 
and altruism eventually goes extinct. For g  = 4, reformation takes place near peak Q 
values and altruism rapidly evolves towards saturation— even though altruism always 
decreases in the first generation after reformation. (This is true for g  = 10 also, but 
harder to see as the rate o f decline after reformation matches the rate before.) On the 
other hand when groups are reformed every other generation (g = 2), the potential 
additional increase in Q  that would result from staying within groups longer is lost and 
altruism increases more gradually. Note that the initial increase in Q in these three 
runs takes place in the absence o f homogeneous groups. For g  = 2 and g  = 4 no such
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groups are formed until Q reaches about 0.3 (initial Q = 0.1) and in the case o f g  = 10 
homogeneous groups never formed. In contrast, in the infinite analytic model 
homogeneous groups are always initially present and more generations within groups 
can allow these fastest-growing groups to become more and more dominant, even if 
initially rare.
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Figure 4-7. Dynamics in Q for Individual Simulation Runs with Varying g. 
Shows altruist frequency Q for individual simulation runs of g  = 2, g = 4, and 
g  = 10 generations spent within groups. For all runs initial Q = 0.1, b = 10, n 
= 4, N =  1,000, and c = 1. To aid in comparison, all three runs were initiated 
with the same random number seed (same initial distribution into groups). 
High stochasticity carrying capacity and low stochasticity benefit distribution 
are used.
Conclusion
The main purpose o f this paper is to demonstrate that strong altruism can evolve in 
randomly formed groups and thereby challenge a presumed theoretic limitation on the 
evolution o f altruism. Although allowing groups to last more than one generation 
introduces new complications, I have demonstrated that kin selection, homogeneous 
groups, and population expansion are not essential to account for this phenomenon.
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The fundamental explanation is that, for many initial conditions, after even just one 
generation o f  selection in randomly formed groups, the assortment between altruists 
and their potential recipients increases (above the expected initial value for randomly 
formed groups) as measured by the regression coefficient, r°. The groups that are by 
chance initially dominated by altruists grow larger compared to other groups and even 
though the fraction o f altruists declines in these groups, the absolute number of 
altruists poised to benefit other altruists in a subsequent generation increases. On the 
other hand, the groups that are by chance dominated by non-altruists do not grow as 
large and  the relatively few altruists in these groups are eliminated or greatly 
diminished after one to several generations within groups. This also increases positive 
assortment as these non-altruists are stuck with each other and will receive less benefit 
from altruists than they did in the first generation. O f course the few non-altruists 
lucky enough to end up in altruist-dominated groups are the fittest individuals, but 
overall the conditions that favored non-altruists in the initial random distribution can 
switch to favor altruists in subsequent generations.
I emphasize again that even when groups are multigenerational, the vast majority 
o f the benefit provided by altruists will fall to non-relatives— especially when altruism 
is initially rare (Appendix D). Altruism evolves due to the positive assortment among 
heritable helping behaviors regardless o f whether there is a positive assortment among 
relatives by  descent. The regression coefficient used here, r°, measures the assortment, 
not genealogical relationship. This positive assortment can be viewed equivalently 
(Wade 1980; Queller 1985; 1992b; Frank 1998; Sober and W ilson 1998) as causing
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selection on the altruistic trait (allele) via inclusive fitness or as causing selection 
among groups that vary in their trait composition. While interactions among kin in 
nature no doubt often contribute to the positive assortment o f altruistic traits, kin 
interactions are not in themselves a requirement for altruism to evolve.
Whether strong altruism evolves in nature via mechanisms similar to those 
illustrated here will depend on the degree to which the assumptions o f  these models 
are representative o f natural conditions. For instance, in both the analytic and 
simulation models we saw that strong altruism can evolve even when population size 
is held constant by a global carrying capacity. In nature, in addition to population-level 
limits on growth there are often limits on group size. While not explored here, group- 
level limits will dampen between-group selection for altruism, so further investigation 
is needed to elucidate the relative import o f global vs. local levels o f population 
control in the evolution of altruism. A lack o f mutation is also unrealistic. I 
experimented with mutation in our models (data not shown), but in the simple binary 
genetics used here a mutation that switches behavioral types exerts pressure towards Q 
= 0.5 and thus favors altruism when Q is initially low. This is because the more 
common type experiences more mutations. Even if  this bias could be compensated for, 
low mutation rates are unlikely to alter our basic results, which are robust under fairly 
high levels o f migration among groups and even when homogeneous groups o f 
altruists are “mutated” to contain at least one non-altruist.
This model started with the original assumptions o f the random group models 
(Hamilton 1975; Wilson 1975a) and added the idea o f multigenerational groups from
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haystack models (Maynard Smith 1964; Wilson 1987). Just as W ilson (1987) created a 
simulation model to study a more realistic version o f Maynard Sm ith’s (1964) original 
haystack model, I have created a simulation model that adds finite population size, 
stochasticity, and mutigenerational groups to the original analytic random group 
models. Whereas W ilson’s (1987) haystack simulation corrected the “worst case” 
assumption made by Maynard Smith (1964) that groups would persist until altruism 
was eliminated in all mixed groups; here we correct an opposite “worst case” 
assumption made in random group models that groups only exist for a single 
generation. As demonstrated here and in the haystack simulations (Wilson 1987), an 
intermediate number o f  generations within groups is most favorable to the evolution of 
altruism.
Maynard Smith (1998a) in discussing different views on the evolution o f altruism 
recently echoed the original findings o f Hamilton (1975) and W ilson (1975a) and the 
current consensus opinion in the quote given at the beginning o f  this chapter. Many 
mechanisms which result in a positive assortment among self-sacrificing behaviors 
have been proposed including passive methods such as foraging in non-uniform 
resource distributions which can be depleted (Pepper and Smuts 2002), continuous 
population viscosity with periodic environmental disturbances (M itteldorf and Wilson 
2000a), the coevolution o f group joining and cooperative behaviors (Aviles 2002), and 
the presence o f non-participants (Hauert et al. 2002), as well as active methods such as 
kin recognition (Gamboa, Reeve, and Holmes 1991), conditional strategies based on 
past actions (Trivers 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981) or reputation (Nowak and
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Sigmund 1998; Panchanathan and Boyd 2003), policing (Frank 1995b; 2003), 
punishment o f non-altruists (Boyd and Richerson 1992; Fehr and Gachter 2002; Boyd 
et al. 2003), the coevolution o f cultural institutions that constrain individual behaviors 
(Bowles, Choi, and Hopfensitz 2003), and even recognition o f arbitrary tags (Riolo, 
Cohen, and Axelrod 2001). Here I have shown in both deterministic and stochastic 
models that when groups exist for more than one generation such specific or more 
complex mechanisms for creating positive assortment, although certainly important if  
present, are not needed— the positive assortment that develops between randomly 
created multigenerational groups can suffice for between-group selection to dominate 
within-group selection and thus for strong altruism to evolve.
The reciprocal altruism strategy can be selected fo r  the same reason as 
altruism towards kin: covariance between the performance o f  the behavior 
and the recipients frequency o f  the altruism allele.
David C. Queller, in Nature (1985)
Chapter 5 
Hamilton’s Rule Applied to 
Reciprocal Altruism1
Over two decades ago Axelrod and Hamilton (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 
1984) suggested two alternative mechanisms for the evolution o f cooperative 
(altruistic) traits: 1) when the benefits o f altruism fall to relatives, inclusive fitness 
(Hamilton 1964; 1970; 1972) is the likely mechanism; and 2) when benefits fall to 
non-relatives, reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971) is the likely mechanism. Around this 
same time researchers began to show that multilevel (group) selection theory (Wilson 
1975a; W ade 1978), a third alternative not emphasized by Axelrod and Hamilton, is 
mathematically equivalent (Wade 1980; Queller 1985; 1992b; 1992a; Frank 1998; 
Sober and W ilson 1998) to Hamilton’s inclusive fitness theory. This theory shows 
that Ham ilton’s coefficient o f relatedness can be treated as a measure o f assortment
1 This chapter is based on a paper accepted into the proceedings of the Congress on Evolutionary 
Computation and will be presented there in Portland, Oregon June 2004 (Fletcher and Zwick 2004b). It 
will also be submitted in an expanded form to a biology journal.
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among altruistic traits (or behaviors) rather than strictly as a measure o f kinship 
(Hamilton 1972) and that the differential productivity o f groups constitutes a group- 
level selection process (Price 1970). Other researchers have gone further in claiming 
that reciprocal altruism also can be unified with multilevel selection and inclusive 
fitness theories. Queller (1985) originally suggested that a generalization he developed 
o f  Hamilton’s rule could be applied to reciprocal altruism and more recently Sober and 
W ilson (1998) have claimed such a unification is possible, yet there has not been a 
clear demonstration o f how  to apply Queller’s equations to traditional reciprocal 
altmism models. In fact in a subsequent expansion o f his original result Queller 
(1992b; 1992a) does not mention its application to reciprocal altruism.
Here I take up this thread o f inquiry and demonstrate that Queller’s equations do 
indeed provide a foundation for the unification o f reciprocal altruism, inclusive fitness, 
and multilevel selection theories. I do this by using Hamilton’s inclusive fitness rule to 
predict whether a reciprocal altruism strategy will increase or not within a classic 
iterated prisoner’s dilemma (PD) model. This model is similar to those used by 
Axelrod and Hamilton in their original work. In this way I support the idea that, rather 
than relying on alternative mechanisms, these theories offer different ways o f 
understanding a common principle by which self-sacrificing traits can increase. This 
principle is that altruism can evolve if  there exists: 1) sufficient non-zero-sum benefits 
o f  cooperation such that on average the benefit provided to others by an altruist exceed 
the cost to the altruist, 2) sufficient positive assortment among heritable altruistic 
behaviors such that on average altruistic genotypes benefit more from these behaviors
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than average population members. The “sufficient” positive assortment and benefit to 
cost values necessary for altruism to increase are given by Queller’s generalization of 
Hamilton’s rule. This rule applies whether the source o f  positive assortment among 
altruistic behaviors is due to conditional strategies, higher interaction levels among 
relatives, or other causes o f population grouping (even among non-relatives).
Obstacles to Applying Hamilton’s Rule 
to Reciprocal Altruism
There are two major obstacles in unifying reciprocal altruism with inclusive fitness 
and multilevel selection theories— one stemming from the difference between 
genotype and phenotype and the other from non-additive fitness functions. The first 
obstacle is that by definition there is not a one-to-one relationship between behavior 
and genotype in reciprocal altruism models. In contrast, inclusive fitness and 
multilevel selection models most often assume that there is a cooperation or altruism 
“gene” (or some additive combination o f genetic determinants) and that the frequency 
o f the genetic trait is proportional to the frequency o f the cooperative or altruistic 
behavior. W ith reciprocal altruism models, however, behaviors are conditioned on 
environmental circumstances (e.g. the behaviors o f others) and are not generally 
proportional to genetic frequencies. For example, if  there is a trait such that 
cooperation is conditioned on what others did in previous encounters, then the 
frequency o f this trait does not directly predict the frequency with which an individual
Chapter 5—Hamilton's Rule Applied to Reciprocal Altruism 106
displays cooperative behaviors. For this one must know the previous behaviors o f 
those with whom the individual interacts.
Because the round-robin tournament structure used by Axelrod and Hamilton 
ensures no positive assortment among player types (ignoring the play against ones 
“shadow” self (Axelrod 1984)), it seems that altruism cannot evolve via either 
inclusive fitness or multilevel selection. Both Hamilton (1975) and Wilson (1975a) 
(working independently) have shown that strong altruism does not evolve when 
groups are formed randomly because there is not enough assortment in the altruistic 
trait. Recently, however, we showed that altruism can evolve in randomly formed 
groups if  these groups are multigenerational (Fletcher and Zwick 2004c, Chapter 4). 
Here I will demonstrate that altruism can also evolve in single generation groups 
(pairings) when behaviors are positively assorted— even in the absence o f assortment 
between the interacting genetic types.
The second obstacle to unification is that the fitness (or utility) values used in 
reciprocal altruism models are not necessarily additive and therefore are not 
decomposed into the familiar benefits and costs commonly employed in inclusive 
fitness and multilevel selection models. This non-additivity is true o f the most 
common payoff matrices used in iterated PD experiments (Figure 5-1), including those 
o f  Axelrod and Hamilton. I explain this further in the section on non-additivity.
Both o f these obstacles, as I demonstrate below, are effectively handled by 
Queller’s generalizations o f Hamilton’s rule. I begin by briefly reviewing the iterated 
PD experiments o f Axelrod and Hamilton as well as Hamilton’s rule and Queller’s
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contributions. I then demonstrate how Hamilton’s inclusive fitness rule can be applied 
to an additive PD experiment involving a conditional strategy, and then finally do the 
same when fitness payoffs are non-additive.
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game captures a fundamental problem o f social life—  
individually rational behavior may lead to a collectively irrational and deficient 
outcome. Figure 5-1 illustrates a typical 2-player PD payoff matrix (and the one used 
by Axelrod and Hamilton (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1984)). The game is 
symmetric and each player has a dominant strategy to defect (D). This mutual 
defection results in each player receiving a payoff o f 1, but if  they had both cooperated 
(C), they could have each received a payoff o f 3. In this game it is presumed that 
players choose their strategy simultaneously and there is no knowledge or guarantees 
about what the other player will do. The dilemma is that cooperation makes a player 
vulnerable to exploitation— in this case the exploiting defector gets 5 while the lone 
cooperator gets 0.
5-h ^ ocn •
O  <D C« X>
opponent’s behavior
C D
c 3 0
D 5 1
Figure 5-1. Typical PD Utility (or Fitness) Values for Actor.
Shows actor’s payoff given its own and opponents behaviors. Behaviors are 
either cooperate (C) or defect (D).
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An n-player version o f the PD in which cooperators contribute to the common 
good (also called whole-group altruism (Pepper 2000b)) models familiar social 
dilemmas such as the “tragedy o f the commons” (Hardin 1968) and the “free-rider 
problem” (McMillan 1979; Aviles 2002). Elsewhere I have demonstrated that an n- 
player PD with fixed strategies played across multiple groups captures fundamental 
features o f the evolution o f altruism via multilevel selection (or equivalently inclusive 
fitness) (Fletcher and Zwick 2000a; 2000b; 2001, Chapter 3). Here I will show that a 
2-player game with conditional strategies also fits into this broader framework.
Although in a PD situation it is individually rational to defect in single plays o f 
the game, Axelrod and Hamilton (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1984) showed 
that conditional cooperative strategies can do well overall when games are iterated. 
This combination o f iterated games and conditional play can create positive 
assortment among behaviors even when there is none among player types. In their 
experiments many different types o f players (submitted by researchers from many 
fields) competed in a round-robin tournament in which each submission played all 
others an average o f 200 times. The most successful strategy in Axelrod and 
Hamilton’s experiments was also one o f the simplest. Submitted by social scientist 
Anatol Rapoport, it was called Tit-For-Tat (TFT). TFT always cooperates with an 
opponent on the first move and then in all subsequent moves simply plays whatever 
the opponent did in the last game. Even though TFT never came out ahead in any 
single match o f 200 iterated games (Rapoport 1991; Sober and W ilson 1998), its 
overall score was superior as it was able to minimize exploitation by defecting
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strategies such as Always-Defect (ALLD), while taking advantage o f mutual 
cooperation when it met other “nice” strategies. When viewed as an evolutionary 
process where utility payoffs o f the PD are used to determine the number o f each 
player type in the next generation, Axelrod and Hamilton showed that both ALLD and 
TFT are Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS). That is, they cannot be invaded by 
individual mutations or migrants exhibiting a different strategy. Since these original 
experiments more than 20 years ago, much research has been done on the iterated PD 
(e.g. see Dugatkin 1997 for review).
Hamilton’s rule gives the condition necessary for an altruistic trait to increase in a 
subsequent generation and is deceptively simple (1964):
where b is the average benefit provided by an altmist and c is the average cost to the 
altruist. The complications lie in the meaning o f the r term which has been 
progressively generalized over the years. Originally thought o f as a simple measure of 
relatedness via descent (Hamilton 1964), Hamilton (after interacting with Price 
(1970)) broadened the meaning o f r to be a measure o f the interaction o f genetic types 
regardless o f relatedness:
Hamilton’s Rule
r b >  c (5.1)
 ^ = cov(G ^,G 0) 
var (Ga)
(5.2)
Chapter 5—Hamilton’s Rule Applied to Reciprocal Altruism 110
where Ga is the genotype or breeding value with respect to the altruistic trait for each 
potential actor and Go is the average genotype or breeding value o f  those that interact 
with the actor. After several examples o f Hamilton’s rule failing were reported in the 
literature (e.g. Karlin and Matessi 1983), Queller showed that these were due to 
phenotype/genotype differences and that it was the altruistic behaviors o f others and 
itself that determined whether the actor’s genotype increased, not the genotype of 
others. Queller generalized Hamilton’s r  term as follows (1985; 1992b; 1992a):
where P 0 is the average phenotypic value o f others interacting with the actor and PA is 
the average phenotypic value o f the actor.
Note that Eq. 5.3 is more general than Eq. 5.2. In the case o f no 
genotype/phenotype difference (P0 = G0 and GA = P a )  Eq. 5.3 reduces to Eq. 5.2. The 
absence o f any Go component in this most general interpretation o f Ham ilton’s r term 
by Eq. 5.3 is especially noteworthy because it challenges the selfish gene (Dawkins 
1976; 1982) view o f inclusive fitness in which genes encode altruistic behaviors only 
because these behaviors help other copies o f the genes residing in those receiving the 
altruism.
Based on the definition o f covariance, Eq. 5.3 can also be written as:
r _ c o \(G A,P0) 
co v(G A,PA)
(5.3)
(5.4)
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where the summation is over each individual in the population (each potential actor) 
and Pp is the average population phenotypic value. I use this equation to calculate r 
below. Note that here there is no mutation and the genetics are haploid, but Frank 
(1998) has expanded Queller’s equations to accommodate different degrees o f fidelity 
in transmission from one generation to the next.
Applying Hamilton’s Rule to Reciprocal Altruism
Here I provide a simple example o f applying Hamilton’s rule to reciprocal altruism 
using a population consisting o f two classic evolutionarily stable (ESS) types, TFT 
and ALLD. Because one o f the types (TFT) uses conditional behaviors we must 
measure genotypes and phenotypes separately. Figure 5-2 illustrates a general view of 
the PD in which an altruist provides a benefit value o f b to its opponent at a cost c to 
itself, wo is the base fitness value unrelated to the altruistic trait. The d  term is a 
deviation from additivity and is discussed in the next section; in this section d  — 0. 
Behaviors are either cooperate (C) which has a phenotypic (P) value o f  1 or defect (D) 
which has a phenotypic value o f 0. Note that the fitness values in Figure 5-2 depend 
only on the phenotype o f the actor (PA) and the opponent (Po), not on their genotypes. 
Since we will keep track o f the fraction of TFT players in the population, GP, we give 
the TFT type a genotypic (breeding) value o f 1 and ALLD a value o f 0.
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opponent’s behavior
C (P o = 1) 
contributes b
D (P o = 0) 
contributes 0
C ( P A = l)  
sacrifices c
wq + b -  c 
(+d)
Wo - c
D (PA = 0) 
sacrifices 0 wo + b Wo
Figure 5-2. PD Utility (or Fitness) Values Based on Individual Contribution. 
Shows PD utility (or fitness) values for the actor given its own and opponents 
behavior. The fitness (or utility) values for the actor are represented as the 
sum of additive contributions from the opponent and its own sacrifice. The w0 
term is an additive base fitness value uncorrelated with C and D behaviors. 
The d term is the deviation from additivity (addressed in next section).
In this population o f two types there will be three possible parings each with set 
values for Ga, P o, and Pa . Table 5-1 gives the values for each o f the player types when 
it is the potential actor (A) and its opponent (O) is either the same type or different. To 
calculate r using Eq. 5.4 the overall average behavior o f the actor (Pa) and opponents 
(Po) m ust be calculated based on the frequency o f each situation in Table 5-1.
Table 5-1. GA and Predicted PA, and P0 Values 
for Individual TFT and ALLD Players.
Actor (A) Opponent (0 ) Ga Pa Po
TFT TFT 1 1 1
TFT ALLD 1 Mi 0
ALLD TFT 0 0 Mi
ALLD ALLD 0 0 0
The value 1// in Table 5-1 represents the fact that when playing an ALLD player, 
TFT will cooperate once on the first play out o f i total plays in this pairing. To use Eq. 
5.4, we need additionally the values o f i, Gp, and Pp. W e take i and GP to be
Chapter 5—Hamilton’s Rule Applied to Reciprocal Altruism 113
parameters o f the model, but the overall fraction o f cooperate behaviors, Pp,  can be 
calculated from the frequencies if) with which different pairings occur:
p  f r r l i  + f w  t (5  5)
2 i
where the numerator o f Eq. 5.5 represents 2 i cooperate behaviors in all TFT-TFT 
pairings plus one cooperate behavior in all TFT-ALLD pairings.
I first provide a simple example o f using Eq. 5.4, Table 5-1, and Eq. 5.5 to 
calculate Hamilton’s r term for conditional strategies in an iterated PD, and then 
provide a more general case for an infinite population. For simplicity, first imagine a 
population with just 2 TFT players and 2 ALLD players where each player plays each 
o f the other players four times (z = 4) in an iterated PD game defined in terms o f b and 
c as in Figure 5-2 (with no deviation from additivity, d  = 0). For these 4 players there 
are 6 unique pairings and fr r=  1/6, f m  = 4/6, and f DD = 1/6. Substituting into Eq. 5.5 
gives an overall expected fraction o f cooperate behaviors o f PP = 1/4. GP = 1/2 for this 
situation (50% TFT type), GA = 1 for TFT, and GA = 0 for ALLD. Lastly we must 
calculate the average PA and P0 values based on the situation for each type o f actor.
As an actor a TFT player is paired once with the other TFT and once with each o f the 
two ALLDs. So using Table 5-1, for TFT the averages across the three pairings are PA 
-  (1 + Hi + \li)  / 3 = M2 and P 0 = (1 + 0 + 0) / 3 = 1/3. The averages for ALLD are PA 
= (0 + 0 + 0 ) /3  = 0 and Po  = (0 + Mi + 1//) / 3 = 1/6. We are now ready to substitute 
into Eq. 5.4 where the summations are over each player as the actor and the values are
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the same for each o f the two TFT players (listed first) and each o f the ALLD players 
(listed second):
Thus, with this degree o f assortment among the behaviors o f others and actors in this 
4-player population, according to Queller’s version o f Hamilton’s rule we would 
expect the TFT type to increase (gain more utility than the ALLD type) when b/c> 3.
I confirm this below, but first consider a more general case.
The expected frequency o f pairing types in general can be calculated from Gp and 
population size for various ways o f forming pairs (e.g. a binomial or hypergeometric 
distribution). The round-robin tournaments used by Axelrod and Hamilton are 
equivalent to the expectation for a hypergeometric distribution (sampling without 
replacement) if  one ignores the ad hoc modifications they used o f  having each player 
play a “shadow” self as well as an opponent playing randomly. For a round-robin 
tournament (hypergeometric distribution) o f large population size, the frequencies o f 
pair types approaches those o f a binomial distribution. Here for simplicity I will 
assume random pairings from an infinite population and therefore use a binomial 
distribution. In this c ase /77^  (Gp)2, fro  = 2G/>(1 - Gp), and f DD = 0  - Gp)2. We thus 
have Pp(i) and also from Table 5-1, GA, Pa(1), and Po(i)- Now using only GP and i as
(5.4 repeated)
_ 2(1 -1  / 2Xl/3 - 1 /4 )+  2(0 - 1 / 2Xl / 6 - 1 / 4) _ 1 
2(1 -1  / 2Xl/2  - 1  /4 )+  2(0 -1  /2 X 0 -1 /4 )  ~ 3
(5.6)
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parameters to this simple model, I can calculate r from Eq. 5.4 and use it in 
H amilton’s rule (Eq. 5.1) to predict whether TFT will increase or not.
In order to check the predictions o f Hamilton’s rule, I also calculate the fraction 
o f TFT in a subsequent generation, Gp, using the frequencies (J) o f pairings and the 
PD payoffs (utilities) for each player from Figure 5-2. This assumes that the number o f 
each player type in the new generation is proportional to the fitness (or utility) values 
gained in the previous generation. A generation is defined as one round o f pairings 
each with i games between paired players. Gp is then given by (derivation in 
Appendix F):
q  ’ = f n 2i(w0 + b - c  + d )  + f rD (iwQ -  c) ^
f n  2z'O 0 + b -  c + d)  + f j o  (2iw0 + b -  c) + f DD 2iw0
where for now d  = 0.
For the simple 4-player population example above where r = 1/3, we can confirm 
that a b/c ratio o f 3 is the balance point. Using b-2>,c  = \ , wo = l , d  = Q, and frr,frD , 
and foD values o f 1/6, 4/6, and 1/6 respectively (as above), Gp' = Gp = 0.5. If  b > 3 
while all other parameters are held constant (including c), then TFT will increase as 
predicted by Hamilton’s rule; if  b < 3 TFT will decrease.
Figure 5-3 shows the change in the fraction o f TFT in the infinite binomial 
population after one generation (or tournament), A Gp = Gp' -  Gp, as a function o f 
benefit level where cost and base fitness are held constant at c = 1 and wo = 1. 
Calculation results are shown for a few different starting Gp and i values. Note the 
general trends— A Gp is positive for higher initial Gp and more game iterations.
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Figure 5-3. Change in Fraction o f  TFT Players for Additive Payoffs.
Show s change in fraction o f  TFT players in population after one generation,
AGP, as a function o f  benefit level, b. Data is shown for indicated initial Gp 
and i. Cost c and base fitness w0 are both held constant at 1.
For our purposes, the main point is to notice that the precise value o f b needed to 
get an increase in TFT, A Gp > 0, is again given by Queller’s version o f Ham ilton’s 
rule. Rearranging Eq. 5.1 gives the condition for TFT to increase o f  b >  d r .  Table 5-2 
gives the d r  values for the five example set o f parameters used in Figure 5-3 (where 
cost is held at c = 1). Each d r  value in Table 5-2 precisely predicts the boundary 
condition for the benefit level needed for TFT to increase, i.e. A Gp > 0.
Table 5-2. Hamilton’s Rule M inimum b for AGP = 0 in Figure 5-3.
Gp i Minimum b = d r
0.1 1 2.6667
0.1 5 3.5000
0.3 2 4.3333
0.1 3 6.0000
0.1 2 11.0000
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These results from Figure 5-3 and Table 5-2 confirm that Queller’s version of 
Hamilton’s rule which utilizes the phenotypes o f  others can be used to predict whether 
a conditional reciprocal altruism strategy (e.g. TFT) will increase, whereas Hamilton’s 
version o f his rule which utilizes the genotypes o f  others does not give the correct 
prediction in this situation. Queller’s more general version predicts the necessary 
balance o f levels o f positive assortment in helping behaviors and the ratio o f benefits 
to costs necessary for a conditional trait to increase.
Hamilton’s Rule and Non-Additivity
The version o f Hamilton’s rule given in Eq. 5.1 relies on the assumption that fitness 
(utility) benefits and costs are additive and due to the independent effects o f individual 
behaviors. But note that it is not possible to pick positive values for wo, b, and c in 
Figure 5-2 that will sum to the values found in Axelrod and Hamilton’s classic version 
o f  the PD in Figure 5-1. This latter PD (Figure 5-1) is non-additive. One way to view 
non-additivity is as the presence o f  some positive or negative synergy for mutual 
action (where defection is considered non-action). As an example o f positive synergy, 
imagine a cooperative trait that involves hunting for one’s paired partner—when both 
hunt simultaneously the catch may exceed two times the individual result. Negative 
synergy can be seen in terms o f diminishing returns. In a different ecological context 
two hunters might interfere with each other or be exploiting the same limited 
resource— their total might then be less than the sum of individual efforts. The d  term
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in Figure 5-2 gives the deviation from additivity. Now we can use the values b = 4, c =
Again we can rely on Queller (1985; 1992b; 1992a) who also developed a version 
o f  Hamilton’s rule that accommodates a non-linear term. In this case the condition for 
an altruistic trait to increase is (1985; 1992b; 1992a):
Notice that the difference between rdev and r is that P0 is replaced by the interaction 
term PaP o in the numerator. This rdev term scales the amount o f deviation from 
additivity (d  in Eq. 5.8) for mutual cooperation (C-C interactions) by the proportion of 
an actor’s behaviors that take place in such mutually cooperative interactions.
Again, to verify Ham ilton’s rule in this reciprocal altruism model we will need to 
calculate GP' using the deviation in the payoff for mutual cooperation, which happens 
only in TFT-TFT pairings (see Eq. 5.7). Figure 5-4 shows the effect o f non-additive 
deviations on A Gp where parameters are set to resemble those in Axelrod and 
Hamilton’s iterated PD experiments, b = 4, c = 1, wo = 1, and i = 200. Again, when d -  
-1  this corresponds to the PD used in their experiments (Figure 5-1). There are again 
general trends such that A Gp is easier to make positive for higher initial Gp and higher
1 Note that a negative d value here implies that the classic PD (Figure 5-1) penalizes mutual 
cooperation—making it more difficult for cooperation to evolve than in an additive situation.
1, wo = 1, and d = — 1 to arrive at the familiar PD in Figure 5-1'.
(5.8)
where r is still given by Eq. 5.4 and rdev is given by:
(5.9)
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values o f d. Note also that TFT can gain in the population even when relatively rare, 
given the high number o f iterated interactions, / = 200. The more linear appearance o f 
the curves in Figure 5-4 (compared to Figure 5-3) is due to scale differences— here I 
start with much smaller Gp values and plot much smaller changes.
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* - G p  = 0.005 
Gp = 0.004 
-A—Gp = 0.003 
Gp = 0.002 
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Figure 5-4. Change in Fraction of TFT Players for Non-Additive Payoffs. 
Shows the change in the fraction of TFT players in a population after one 
generation, AGP, as a function of the deviation from additivity for mutual 
cooperation, d. Data is shown for indicated initial GP. Cost c and base fitness 
w0 are both held constant at 1, b = 4, and the number of iterated games i = 
200 .
To check the application o f Hamilton’s rule under these non-additive conditions 
we rearrange Eq. 5.8 to get the condition:
d  > (c -  rb) / rdev. (5.9)
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Table 5-3 shows the value o f (c -  rb) / rdev for the parameters used in Figure 5-4. For 
each set o f  parameters, these values precisely predict the threshold value o f  d  where 
A Gp becomes positive, thus, demonstrating that this version o f  H am ilton’s rule can be 
successfully applied to reciprocal altruism models, even when fitness values are non­
additive.
Table 5-3. Hamilton’s Rule Minimum d for AGP = 0 in Figure 5-4.
Gp Minimum d  = ( c - r b )  / rdev
0.005 -1.985
0.004 -1.735
0.003 -1.318
0.002 -0.485
0.001 2.015
Conclusion
I have demonstrated how reciprocal altruism can be analyzed using Ham ilton’s 
inclusive fitness rule. The key is to use general versions of Ham ilton’s rule appropriate 
to the situation under study. In reciprocal altruism with its conditional strategies and 
repeated interactions there can be a positive assortment among behaviors, even when 
there is no positive assortment among genetic types. Therefore these differences must 
be accommodated in the analysis. Similarly, when the fitness consequences o f 
individual behaviors are non-additive, this deviation must be accounted for. Queller 
(1985; 1992b; 1992a) has provided versions o f Hamilton’s rule that handle both of 
these situations.
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This example has been minimal with only two different types, a fixed number of 
interactions, and predictable fractions o f interacting pair types from an infinite 
binomial distribution. But these techniques can be used for more complicated 
situations if  one uses the actual frequency o f phenotypes and genotypes observed in all 
interactions.
This demonstration o f an underlying unity in mechanisms for the evolution o f 
altruism broadens the meaning o f both reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness. 
Fundamentally, the evolution o f altruism depends on the positive assortment o f social 
behaviors such that “nice” types help each other more than they help average 
population members. In this sense, altruism requires reciprocity in order to evolve 
whether based on conditional strategies or some other source o f positive assortment. 
The notion o f inclusive fitness must also be broadened beyond the selfish gene 
viewpoint (Dawkins 1976; 1982) when phenotype differs from genotype. For 
instance, if  one imagines a single Always-Cooperate (ALLC) individual interacting in 
a population where all remaining individuals are TFT, the fitness o f the ALLC player 
would be equal to the fitness o f a TFT player— not because it selfishly helps copies of 
its own genetic type (ALLC), but because it successfully exchanges cooperate 
behaviors with the TFT type. Axelrod and Hamilton emphasized that symbiotic 
interactions were an example o f cooperation between different species that could not 
be based on relatedness. In the above example one could view the ALLC and TFT 
types as different species. Cooperation across species is a clear demonstration that the 
“selfish-gene” o f kin-selection theory is only a special case o f  a much more general
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phenomenon. Although it sounds strange to say, inclusive fitness as captured by 
Hamilton’s rule can involve different species as well as non-relatives o f  the same 
species.
Reciprocal altruism is not fundamentally different from inclusive fitness or 
multilevel selection. As I have shown using Queller’s equations (1985; 1992b; 1992a), 
inclusive fitness can be generalized to encompass reciprocal altruism as a special case. 
As already noted, inclusive fitness and multilevel selection have been shown to be 
mathematically equivalent. It thus follows that all three theories offer different 
accounts o f the same phenomenon. In fact there are m any specific mechanisms by 
which altruism can evolve, including passive ones such as foraging in non-uniform 
resource distributions (Pepper and Smuts 2002), continuous population viscosity with 
periodic environmental disturbances (M itteldorf and Wilson 2000a), the coevolution 
o f group joining and cooperative behaviors (Aviles 2002), the presence o f non­
participants (Hauert et al. 2002), and multigenerational randomly-formed groups 
(Fletcher and Zwick 2004c), as well as active methods such as kin recognition 
(Gamboa, Reeve, and Holmes 1991), conditional behavior based on the reputations 
(Nowak and Sigmund 1998; Panchanathan and Boyd 2003) or past behaviors (Trivers 
1971; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1984; Dugatkin 1997) o f others, policing 
(Frank 1995b; 2003), punishment o f non-altruists (Boyd and Richerson 1992; Fehr 
and Gachter 2002; Boyd et al. 2003), the coevolution o f cultural institutions that 
constrain individual behaviors (Bowles, Choi, and Hopfensitz 2003), and even 
recognition o f arbitrary tags (Riolo, Cohen, and Axelrod 2001). W hat all these
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mechanisms have in common is: 1) sufficient non-zero-sum benefits o f cooperation, 
and 2) sufficient positive assortment among heritable altruistic behaviors.
-Hamilton '  
 
Be warned that i f  you wish, as I  do, to build a society in which individuals 
cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can 
expect little help from  biological nature.
Richard Dawkins, in the introduction to The Selfish Gene (1976)
The stupid way to be selfish is ... seeking happiness fo r  ourselves alone and 
in the process becoming more and more miserable. The intelligent way to be 
selfish is to work fo r  the welfare o f  others.
The Dalai Lama, in The Way to Freedom  (1994)
Chapter 6 
Summary and Discussion
In this final chapter I summarize the major findings o f this dissertation and discuss my 
results in the larger context o f how the evolution of altruism is understood in both 
biological and human terms.
Summary of Results
Fundamentals and Theory Unification
The major goal o f this dissertation is to help clarify the debate surrounding the 
evolution o f altruistic traits. Identifying the most fundamental elements o f the process 
allows us to see more clearly the similarities among the major theories on how 
altruism evolves. These theories include inclusive fitness with its emphasis on selfish
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genes and familial relationship, multilevel selection theory with its emphasis on 
between- and within-group selection, and reciprocal altruism with is emphasis on 
conditional strategies and memory. The fundamental requirements for altruism to 
evolve are:
1. Non-zero-sum fitness benefits for cooperation
2. Positive assortment among heritable cooperative behaviors
In the preceding chapters I demonstrate how each o f these theories embodies these 
fundamental requirements in two general ways: by showing how Ham ilton’s rule 
applies to each theory and by demonstrating that the PD is inherent in models o f each 
theory. I also highlight the way multilevel selection theory emphasizes the need for 
positive assortment in altruistic behaviors and the tension between levels o f selection. 
While these aspects are implicit in the other theories, the emphasis in inclusive fitness 
theory on relatedness per se (rather than groupings possibly due to relatedness) and 
reciprocal altruism theory’s lack o f  distinction between the assortment among genetic 
types vs. assortment among helping behaviors, both obscure what multilevel selection 
theory makes explicit.
The Generality of Hamilton’s Rule
The first demonstration o f unification is in the general applicability o f Ham ilton’s rule. 
In Chapters 3 and 5 I show that Hamilton’s rule {rb > c) from inclusive fitness theory 
can be successfully applied to models from the other two theories. The reason for the 
success o f Hamilton’s rule across these seemingly different explanations is that it
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embodies in its variables the two basic common requirements for selection o f altruistic 
traits listed above:
1. The b > c condition (even when r is maximal at 1) expresses the need for 
cooperative behaviors to produce non-zero-sum fitness advantages to the 
system as a whole.
2. Its r term captures the degree o f assortment among actors’ genes and the 
helping behaviors o f others.
Especially noteworthy is the demonstration in Chapter 5 that a general version o f 
H amilton’s rule developed by Queller applies to reciprocal altruism with the 
phenotype/genotype differences o f its conditional strategies. This demonstrates it is 
the phenotypic behaviors o f others that determine the fitness o f  an altruistic trait, not 
their genotypes. This thus challenges the selfish-gene notion that altruistic behaviors 
between individuals evolve via help given to other copies o f themselves in others. This 
broader view allows the same fundamental requirements for altruism to be applied to 
cooperation among non-relatives with different genes and even to cooperation across 
species in symbiotic mutualistic relationships.
The Generality of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
The second demonstration o f unification is the prisoner’s dilemma as a general model 
o f the conditions that must be overcome for altruism to evolve. In the context o f 
altruism, requirement #1 (non-zero-sumness) implies a PD situation and the NPD 
evolutionary model with multiple groups can encompasses requirement #2 (positive
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assortment) as well. Thus this game-theoretic model captures these fundamental 
features and the conditions for altruism to increase in our model are equivalent to 
Hamilton’s rule. This model enables me to demonstrate simple relationships between 
Hamilton’s rule, Simpson’s paradox, and the Price covariance equation.
In addition it highlights the fundamental similarities among these theories from a 
game-theoretic vantage point. While the PD has long been known as a model of 
reciprocal altruism, here I show for the first time that it is inherent in fitness functions 
for the other two theories as well. The PD defines the problem of altruism and 
Hamilton’s rule gives the necessary balance between the degree o f non-zero-sumness 
in the PD (b > c) and the degree o f assortment in behavioral interactions among PD 
players (r). Hamilton’s rule can thus be seen as defining the conditions for altruism to 
increase, the conditions for a Simpson’s paradox, or in game-theoretic terms, the 
conditions for cooperators to gain more utility than defectors in a NPD situation— that 
is, the conditions for overcoming a tragedy o f the commons or free-rider problem.
The Generality of Each Theory
Not only can the most general form o f Hamilton’s rule from inclusive fitness theory be 
applied to the other theories, but each o f the other theories in turn has universal 
aspects when considered in its most general form. For example, reciprocity is 
universally required for altruism to evolve in that the positive assortment requirement 
(#2 above) can be interpreted as a need for altruists to exchange more fitness benefits
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with each other than with average population members (whether or not this is 
mediated by conditional strategies or memory o f past actions).
Hierarchical structure in behavioral interactions is also universally required in that 
this positive assortment requirement #2 can additionally be seen in terms o f multilevel 
(or group) selection where (in the case o f whole-group altmism) r is a measure o f what 
proportion o f the variance in the trait is due to differences among groups (whether or 
not these groups are well-defined physical groups). For instance, we saw in the last 
chapter that conditional strategies can group behaviors even when there is no 
assortment in pairings or in the number o f interactions. Multilevel selection theory in 
its most general form includes both physically defined groups as well as grouped 
behavioral interactions. In addition, fitness at the group level can be measured in terms 
o f groups that bud new daughter groups or in terms o f the disproportionate 
contribution to a global population. In either case the more fit (faster growing) groups 
are those with a higher proportion o f altruists due to the non-zero-sum advantage (b > 
c) o f altruistic behavior #1. Yet at the same time non-altruists are more fit within every 
group. This tension between selection at different levels that is explicit in multilevel 
selection theory is also implicit in the others— that is, inclusive fitness theory and 
reciprocal altruism theory specify, respectively, the need for sufficient levels o f 
inclusive fitness or reciprocity among altruists (measurable with r) in order to 
overcome direct individual selection for selfish behavior.
The most general versions o f these theories may diverge from their original, and 
more narrowly conceived, assumptions. For example, well-defined physical groups in
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group selection theory or memory o f past actions in reciprocal altruism theory are not 
included in the more general form o f these theories. Again, in the m ost general form o f 
inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton’s rule) developed by Queller (1985; 1992b; 1992a), 
the original assumptions o f kinship and selfish genes that help other copies o f 
themselves are both absent. These more narrow assumptions therefore are not 
fundam entally necessary for altruism to evolve.
O f course when conditions do match the narrower assumptions, the original 
insights hold: kinship in viscous populations is important in producing positive 
assortment in behaviors and when there is a one-to-one mapping o f  genotype to 
phenotype genes may encode behaviors that help copies o f themselves in others. 
Likewise when conditional strategies are present that allow altruists to minimize their 
exploitation by non-altruists, this is an important factor in creating positive assortment 
among behaviors. And well-defined groups in direct competition for existence that 
vary in their proportion o f altruists clearly do experience selection at the group level. 
But if  the goal is to understand what is most fundamental, it is the m ost general forms 
o f these theories that help us see what is universally necessary for altruism to evolve. 
Factors that are not fundamentally necessary include: interactions among kin, selfish 
genes benefiting other copies o f themselves, physically distinct groups with physically 
distinct daughter groups, and cognition and memory about past interactions or 
reputations.
In the taxonomy o f species there is a long-standing tension between “splitters” 
and “lumpers” and this may be analogous to the tension between reductionists and
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holists in evolutionary theory. I imagine the “splitters” or reductionists would be 
uncomfortable with the paragraphs above. They might complain: W hat is he use o f 
group selection without well-defined groups or o f inclusive fitness when it no longer 
involves copies o f genes in others (kin)? It is indeed unfortunate when advances in our 
theoretical understanding are hampered by historical terminology. The multilevel 
selection movement o f the last three decades has never shed its group selection 
heritage; and instead o f having “Queller’s Rule” overthrowing the selfish gene 
viewpoint we have “Queller’s generalization o f Hamilton’s inclusive fitness rule”—  
regrettable and yet understandable.
I have tried to describe the most fundamental features o f selection for altruism 
with phrases not necessarily associated with any one o f the current theories, e.g. non- 
zero-sumness and positive assortment, while still illustrating how these fundamental 
features are embodied in current theories. Hopefully, in this w ay researchers most 
comfortable in a particular theory will have a better understanding o f  how their 
preferred theory relates to the others.
Other Major Findings
The game theoretic analysis o f Chapter 3 is also useful in teasing out the differences 
and similarities between strong and weak altruism. Namely, under the process o f 
natural selection (which relies on relative fitness values) this distinction (which relies 
on absolute fitness values) becomes less meaningful— the difference is a matter o f 
degree rather than a fundamental distinction about what is achievable by within- and
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between-group selection. Weakly altruistic traits are selected against within groups as 
are strongly altruistic traits, and Hamilton’s rule describes the necessary conditions for 
each to increase. While a priori absolute fitness values for weak altruism do not define 
a PD, under selection in a finite environment the actual resulting fitness values do 
define a PD— or equivalently strong altruism (i.e. if  the population is scaled or if 
fitness success is considered in terms o f fractional representation in the whole 
population). That is, if  fitness (utility) differences rather than absolute values are used, 
the game being played changes from a no-conflict (NC) game in which cooperation 
would be the individual dominant strategy to a PD in which defection is the individual 
dominant strategy. Thus this game theoretic analysis unifies weak vs. strong altruism 
in a more general framework that incorporates selection.
Historically, one place where the weak vs. strong distinction has been emphasized 
is in models involving randomly formed groups. Weak altruism is always whole-group 
and because in this case some o f the altruist’s benefits fall to itself, weak altruism 
initially increases more easily than strong. In fact when same-sized groups are 
randomly formed from an infinite population the initial amount o f assortment 
produced is never enough for strong altruism to increase, but can be enough for weak 
altruism to evolve. In chapter 4 I show that although for almost three decades this 
finding was thought to hold in general, it actually only applies to single-generation 
groups because the amount o f assortment can increase over subsequent generations. I 
demonstrate that strong altruism can indeed increase in multigenerational randomly 
formed groups even under various restrictions including most notably the absence o f
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kin selection. I also show that stochasticity in group formation, benefit distribution, 
and culling due to carrying capacity can influence whether altruism will increase 
overall.
Finally, in Chapter 3 I provide a unique analysis o f the Price covariance equation 
which both simplifies it and reveals its underlying assumptions. This allows me to 
develop an alternative selection decomposition that makes distinct and symmetric 
assumptions about the components o f selection. While many biologists assume the 
Price equation accurately partitions selection into within and between-group 
components, this symmetric decomposition makes clear that the Price equation is just 
one possible decomposition and that it is based primarily on an idealization o f the 
effect o f between-group selection. The alternative decomposition is based primarily on 
an idealization o f the effect o f within-group selection. The differences between the 
values given by the two approaches highlights the interaction effects between selection 
at different levels, which are not accounted for in either decomposition alone. In 
Chapter 3 I also show how these two decompositions relate to the basic NPD model—  
the average slope o f the fitness functions (b -  c) is a measure o f the between group 
component o f selection given by the Price equation and the intercept difference (c) is a 
measure o f the within-group component given by the alternative decomposition. The 
other components are correction terms for the assumptions made in each idealized 
decomposition.
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Discussion
In this section I discuss how the findings o f this dissertation fit into the larger context 
o f the debate on the evolution o f altruism. This includes unifying several points o f 
confusion or contention under a common theme o f causal explanations being offered 
at inappropriate hierarchical levels. I also touch on the question o f how common or 
rare altruism is and whether cooperation is as natural as competition when selection 
takes place in hierarchical biological (and social) systems. Finally, although this 
dissertation does not focus on human altruism, these discussions allow me to mention 
some ways in which these issues relate to cooperation among human beings.
Causal Explanations and Hierarchy
One o f the things that makes the evolution o f altruism fertile for contentious debate 
(and an interesting dissertation topic) is that it embodies several paradoxical features. 
We have already seen how the paradox o f the PD and Simpson’s paradox are 
intimately associated with selection for altruistic traits. Here I expand this theme by 
reviewing other confusing issues concerning the evolution o f altruism and discuss 
them in terms o f common problems in the study o f hierarchical systems. These 
additional issues include the sub-optimization problem, proximate vs. ultimate causes, 
the averaging fallacy, the PD, and the structure/function distinction. These various 
ways in which our understanding o f the evolution o f altruism is confused can be at 
least partially attributed to a common theme— explanations o f causation being offered 
at inappropriate hierarchical levels.
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W hile we can understand the temptation among scientists to reduce explanations 
to lower levels— after all, reductionist science has been phenomenally successful 
during the last century—more recently there has been an increased appreciation of 
phenomena that emerge in systems at higher levels (e.g. Kauffman 1993; Casti 1994; 
Zwick 2004). If  a process in a system depends on emergent properties, then 
explanations o f this process using only system elements at a level lower than the 
emergent property will never be satisfactory. For example, the selection for alleles 
which cause altruistic behaviors among individual organisms will never make sense 
only at the level o f genes because this increase depends on the non-zero-sum benefits 
o f  mutual cooperation and positive assortment o f phenotypic behaviors that do not 
exist at the gene level. Ignoring the combination o f non-zero-sum benefits and 
population group structure necessary for cooperation to evolve (by overpowering 
individual within-group selection) is equivalent to ignoring the dilemma in the 
prisoner’s dilemma, the problem  in the free-rider problem, or the tragedy in the 
tragedy o f the commons.
Averaging Fallacy
In the case o f selection for altruism, by averaging across groups, the existence o f 
groups are ignored even though clumped interactions account for selection o f the trait. 
As Sober and Wilson put it, this kind o f averaging has the effect o f “defining group 
selection out o f existence” (1998 p. 32). They refer to this as the “averaging fallacy” 
(1998 p. 31) , but as Lewontin points out, it is not just the error o f  assuming the
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probability o f  an average is the same as the average o f individual probabilities— it is a 
“metaphysical one about causal reality” (1998).
For instance, Dawkins (1982) claims that group selection is not needed to 
understand the evolution o f multicellularity because individual cells are better off 
being part o f an aggregate than they would be if  they were on their own— therefore 
individual selection (at the cell level) is enough to explain multicellularity. Maynard 
Smith and Szathmary make a similar claim in the quote used earlier in chapter 2:
“ . ..the evolution o f cooperation between the parts o f an individual is to be expected” 
(1995 p. 53). These assertions rely on a common misconception that individual 
(within-group) selection maximizes individual fitness. When the evolution o f altruism 
is understood in the context o f the PD, it is clear that this is not true.
One o f the contributions o f  this dissertation is to describe the evolution o f 
altruism in terms o f social dilemmas with which we all have direct experience. The 
preceding arguments are similar to one that states: “O f course citizens willingly pay 
their taxes because they would be worse off in the anarchy o f no government and no 
public services,” or “O f course countries do not over fish international waters because 
the consequences o f over fishing affect them.” While it may well be true that 
conditions under anarchy or unregulated fishing would be worse for all, it is also true 
that each person is better off individually to not pay taxes (while hopefully everybody 
else does), or each country is better o ff over fishing (while hopefully all other 
countries show restraint). In the absence o f a higher level o f organization or control
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(e.g. tax collection enforcement or enforceable fishing treaties) this does in fact lead to 
mutual defection or a tragedy o f the commons.
The same holds in the case o f multicellularity— each cell is more fit by not 
contributing to the collective good, while other cells do. Only with a higher level o f 
selection where groups o f cells that cooperate effectively with each other out-compete 
cell groups locked in an NPD, can the expected mutual defection be overcome and 
these cells end up in a situation with higher individual cell fitness. M inimally this 
selection may be driven by random differences between groups o f cells, but may also 
be enhanced by higher-level mechanisms that penalize defection and thus change the 
payoffs (fitness) values at lower levels. Michod has rightly recognized this tension 
between levels and noted the need o f higher levels to evolve mechanisms that suppress 
lower-level competition— he has especially emphasized this in the origins o f 
multicellularity (Michod 1996; 1997; Michod and Roze 2000b; 2001). Only by 
overcoming the drive towards mutual defection (through this kind o f suppression) can 
higher levels stabilize.
Defection Suppression
This tension can also be seen as a sub-optimization problem familiar in all hierarchical 
systems. Sub-optimization refers both to the fact that optimization o f each subsystem 
results in sub-optimization at the whole-system level and conversely that optimization 
at the higher level results in sub-optimization at the subsystem level (Zwick 2004).
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There is a natural tradeoff between optimization (selection) at the different 
hierarchical levels.
The development o f suppression mechanisms and their subsequent refinement 
allows selection at higher levels to be more effective (Frank 1995b; 2003). For 
instance, the process o f fairly allotting alleles (via crossover and meiosis) to sex cells 
is so central to reproduction in higher animals and plants that it is often taken for 
granted, yet if  genes were actually free to behave selfishly we would not expect this 
process to be so egalitarian— genes that caused more copies o f themselves in new cells 
would be more individually fit. The fact that suppression o f this lower level 
competition is so integral to sexual reproduction is an example o f what Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy has called “progressive systematization” in which each successive level of 
hierarchy requires mechanisms for stabilizing lower levels (von Bertalanffy 1968). 
This is also related to Martin Zwick’s (1978) idea of a limited number o f hierarchical 
levels “after which the hierarchy often becomes consolidated in a stable and coherent 
whole (which may become a base unit for still higher levels).” Sober and W ilson offer 
a similar idea in the context o f multilevel selection where initially between-group 
selection may be in strong opposition to within-group selection, but over successive 
generations this tension may become less pronounced as within-group selection favors 
less individually costly ways to accomplish the group-level functionality, while 
between-group selection favors mechanisms that more effectively suppress within- 
group selection (Sober and Wilson 1998). In the same vein, Robert W right (2000) has 
proposed the idea that the development o f hierarchy itself is driven by the non-zero-
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sum advantages available for mutual cooperation at lower levels, but he does not 
emphasize the need to overcome the tragedy o f the commons (o f mutual defection) 
and in fact does not support the idea of group-level selection (see W ilson 2000 for 
review).
W hen lower level competition is suppressed very efficiently it does not draw our 
attention. For instance, returning to multicellularity, we think o f different cell lines 
(skin, liver, heart, etc.) as naturally cooperating to make a well functioning animal, but 
when suppression mechanisms fail the ever-present selection pressures at lower levels 
reveal themselves. This is the case with cancer in which fast growing individual cell 
lines are individually more fit at the expense o f the common good for all cells in being 
part o f a healthy body.
Hamilton’s Rule and Hierarchy
One o f the problems with the simplicity o f Hamilton’s rule and the inclusive fitness 
point o f view is that it obscures the tension and interdependence between these whole- 
system  vs. subsystem  levels o f causation. That is, the r term captures the population 
structure without emphasizing the required grouped interactions in a whole-system 
context. Again, partly this is historical in that the r  term started as a measure o f 
kinship, yet even when thought o f strictly in terms o f kin selection, r  works because 
the grouped interactions o f  relatives (subsystem) are contrasted against the 
background o f a population o f non-relatives (whole-system) (Hamilton 1964). If  you 
have instead a single unstructured population (one well-mixed group) that is highly
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related (say 99.9% clonal cooperators), cooperation will steadily decline to extinction 
as the 0.1% o f defectors steadily increase to saturation. The r  term is zero in a well- 
mixed population (even composed o f  relatives) because it measures how clumped or 
grouped interactions are compared to the average, or how much altruists benefit other 
altmists compared to what they give average population members. If  behavioral 
interactions are not grouped (no assortment) then altruism will not evolve even where 
relatedness is very high.
Although the r term o f Hamilton’s rule captures the assortment or group structure 
o f interactions, the interpretation o f inclusive fitness (caused by differences between 
groups) as being equivalent to within-group individual fitness (caused by differences 
within groups) obscures this hierarchical tension. Hamilton’s rule asks a question: Is 
there enough group structure for altruism to evolve given a certain benefit to cost 
ratio? But it does not emphasize that the answer involves opposing vectors o f 
causation. Multilevel selection theory on the other hand makes this tension explicit by 
emphasizing each component o f selection, as in the Price covariance equation or the 
alternative decomposition presented in Chapter 3.
Proximate vs. Ultimate Causation
This dissertation uses a strict evolutionary biology definition o f altruism—behaviors 
that cause an organism to have relatively less fitness (offspring) while causing others 
they interact with to have relatively more are altruistic. Yet, this definition does not 
match our common use o f the term which involves physiological or emotional factors.
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For instance, if  it brings some one emotional pleasure to cooperate with another (even 
if  there are fitness costs) would we call this behavior altruistic? In their book Unto 
Others Sober and Wilson (1998) separate phenotypic traits and their fitness 
consequences from the proximate mechanisms within an individual that may lead to 
the behavior. This is similar, respectively, to the Aristotelian distinction between fin a l 
cause and efficient cause.
Presumably natural selection maximizes fitness (final cause) by constructing 
proximate mechanisms (efficient causes) for every selected behavioral trait, but 
whether it is initiated by nerve reflex, hormonal cascade, or a memory o f pleasure is 
not directly relevant to the fitness consequences (assuming the proximate mechanisms 
are equally efficient in eliciting the behavior). If  the behavioral trait with fitness 
consequences (final cause) is to forage for food when biochemical energy stores are 
low, the exact mechanism that triggers this behavior (an uncomfortable sensation of 
hunger or fond memories o f food) is o f no consequence. In the same way, if  an 
altruistic behavior lowers individual within-group fitness while raising the fitness of 
other group members, whether the proximate mechanism is a pleasurable emotion or 
nerve mediated reflex, the fitness consequence for the behavior is the same.
This distinction is also related to the function vs. structure distinction that is 
common to hierarchical systems (Zwick 2004). Each system can be seen as a whole 
with its own properties that interface with the external environment. For instance, an 
organism interacting with its environment has a particular fitness. A system can also 
be viewed as a collection o f interacting subsystems. The subsystems and their
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interactions account for the way the system as a whole interacts with its environment, 
but it is not usually necessary to understand these lower level interactions to describe 
the higher level ones. For instance, organisms may contain subsystems such as 
nervous, circulatory, pulmonary, hormonal, and genetic, but Darwin (1859) was able 
to describe the process of natural selection in which individual organisms interact with 
their larger environment (including other organisms) without relying on the workings 
o f these subsystems to describe this process. Focusing on structural detail often 
obfuscates the prominence o f function when examining behavioral traits. This is 
related to the genotype/phenotype distinction. Selection among individuals can only 
act on functional phenotypes and where the trait in question is altruism towards others, 
only the external consequences o f this altruism are relevant to fitness measures, not 
their structural (genetic) underpinnings. Again, this is what Queller’s version of 
Hamilton’s rule illustrates— altruistic traits gain from the phenotypic behaviors o f 
those they interact with, not their underlying genotypic basis.
Emotions as Proximate Mechanisms
One the other hand, the existence o f proximate mechanisms in organisms leads us to 
ask: what ultimate (final) behaviors are being selected for? For instance, recognizing 
the proximate mechanism o f hunger in animals (including ourselves) helps us 
appreciate the historic selective pressures for behaviors such as food foraging and 
consumption o f high caloric foods. Similarly, there is a growing body o f evidence for 
proximate mechanisms in humans and other primates that support the idea that traits
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for self-sacrificing, altruistic behaviors have been selected for. In a recent study 
capuchin monkeys were trained to perform a simple task for which they were 
rewarded with a piece o f cucumber. This all worked fine (perform task— get 
cucumber) until a test subject was placed next to another capuchin m onkey receiving a 
more desirable grape for performing the same task. In this situation many test subjects 
threw down their cucumber and had a temper tantrum (Brosnan and de Waal 2003).
Similarly, in studies o f human cooperation involving small groups playing “public 
goods” games (equivalent to an NPD) subjects reported experiencing the proximate 
mechanism o f emotional anger towards defectors in the game to such an extent that it 
motivated them to give up some o f their own financial rewards in order to punish the 
defectors— even though these defectors were anonymous an unlikely to be 
encountered by the punisher in the future (Fehr and Gachter 2002) (also see Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2003 for review). These studies suggests both that we (and other animals) 
may have evolved to be more concerned with relative than absolute fitness (why give 
up money in your pocket or a perfectly good cucumber?) and that we are willing to 
make altruistic sacrifices to help discourage cheating in others.
Finally there is also new physiological evidence for proximate emotional 
mechanisms in humans. Areas o f the brain associated with pleasure have been shown 
to “light up” (increased blood flow) on functional CAT scans when subjects act (or 
reason about acting) altruistically in games involving cooperation and defection and 
brain areas associated with anger light up more when subjects are subjected to the 
selfish behaviors o f  others (Greene et al. 2001; Sanfey et al. 2003).
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Are the Conditions that Produce Altruism Rare?
The textbook viewpoint o f the last few decades is that group selection (although 
theoretically possible) requires special circumstances that are rarely seen in nature and 
therefore altruism (except among close relatives) must also be rare (Maynard Smith 
1964; Williams 1966; Nunney 1985b; Maynard Smith 1998a). This dissertation 
supports a reassessment o f this traditional view in several ways. As discussed above, 
understanding the underlying PD nature o f the evolution o f altruism (illustrated in 
Chapter 3) helps to avoid misidentifying situations that require self-sacrificing traits as 
due to individual within-group selection. In addition, we have seen how the common 
view that altruism must be defined in absolute terms does not make sense under 
selection (Chapter 3) and that even when defined this way, strong altruism can evolve 
via randomly generated associations, rather than requiring special circumstances or 
additional organismic capabilities as previously believed (Chapters 3 and 4).
The answer to this question o f altruism rareness o f course also depends on how . 
realistically these models and parameter values map onto natural situations. Yet 
Hamilton’s rule helps us see that there is a possible tradeoff. If  the positive assortment 
o f interactions is less than we have assumed, then this can be compensated for with a 
greater benefit to cost ratio. And while it may seem excessive to have benefit values 
several times higher than costs, it is actually easy to imagine such situations if  one 
considers the benefits involved in, for instance, division o f labor and economy o f 
scale. For example, the chances that a prairie dog sentinel (Sherman 1977) giving a
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warning call is actually captured by a predator may be very small, but the act of 
warning others may reduce their chances o f being caught many fold. Or as another 
example, altruistic Pseudomonas bacteria (Rainey and Rainey 2003) that exude a 
sticky polymer reproduce slightly less often than bacteria that do not make this 
substance, but the benefit to other bacteria in being held close to the air/liquid 
interface by the polymer allows them to reproduce much faster  than they would 
otherwise (stuck in the anoxic liquid). Finally, the slime mold cells (Strassmann, Zhu, 
and Queller 2000) that make up a spore stalk may not survive anyway as 
environmental conditions deteriorate and so give up relatively little fitness, but they 
may increase the chances o f  survival (and subsequent offspring production) o f other 
cells in the spore body from almost zero to substantial.
Another important point about benefit levels is that none o f the examples used in 
this dissertation embody the non-linear benefits we normally associate with the 
synergy o f collective cooperation and these non-linearities can contribute to the more 
common occurrence o f altruism. The only model that deviates from additivity is the 
traditional PD payoff values used in Chapter 5, which actually have a negative 
deviation for mutual cooperation. The b > c non-zero-sum requirement implies a 
certain kind o f synergy—more benefit is produced than what it costs, but these 
additive models assume that each additional cooperator contributes an equal amount to 
the fitness o f others. So synergy in the different sense o f non-linearity is not invoked.
For example, imagine a food-sharing trait where an altruistic hunter consumes 
energy and risks injury that on average amounts to one rabbit’s worth o f calories in
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order to catch 4 rabbits. The hunter then gives these rabbits to its group or tribe where 
they are divided evenly among all tribe members. Here the b/c ratio is 4. The additive 
models presented here assume that if  the tribe contains 3 such altruistic hunters that 
they would collectively produce 12 rabbits at a cost o f 3— still a b/c ratio o f 4. But 
what if  4 hunters expending their efforts collectively are enough to bring home a 
buffalo! Now the ratio o f benefit to cost jumps dramatically and makes this altruistic 
hunting trait more likely to evolve, but still only via the positive assortment of 
altmists— now it just requires less positive assortment (r) because the b/c value is 
higher. Note that if  we assume the buffalo is shared equally among group members 
and we put ourselves in the position the fourth hunter, we might mistakenly believe 
this hunter joins the hunt for purely selfish reasons— a slab o f buffalo is better than its 
share o f the 12 rabbits. But remembering that fitness is a relative process we see that 
the other, say, 10 members o f the tribe that stay in camp and do not hunt are even 
more fit— they get their share o f the buffalo without paying the one rabbit’s worth of 
cost. This is similar to the example involving neighbors with millions o f  dollars 
discussed in Chapter 3.
The point here is that the models used in this dissertation which show how 
altruism can evolve have done so without using a known and strong mechanism that 
promotes cooperation. It is easy to imagine in nature (and society) many non-linear 
synergies for collective action— in acquiring food, shelter, protection from predators, 
raising o f young, etc. This kind o f non-linear benefit while not modeled here and not
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typical o f other evolutionary models, may be very important in determining the actual 
level o f self-sacrificing cooperation in hierarchical natural (and social) systems.
Is Nice Necessary?
The goal here is not to propose a Pollyannaish view o f nature in which cooperation 
dominates, but rather to emphasize that competition is only half the picture. One 
would expect that selfish behaviors would increase when there is less higher-level 
competition (and less selection for suppression o f local competition discussed earlier), 
whereas increased levels o f altruistic behavior would require more strife at higher 
levels. For a biological system to effectively compete in natural selection it must 
engender some level o f cooperation and sub-optimization among its parts 
(subsystems), while at the same time selective processes at lower levels will select for 
more local optimization. Those systems with more cooperative, self-sacrificing parts 
are likely to be more fit than systems with more selfish parts.
At the level o f an individual cell cooperation among cell organelles including 
genes will be selected for; at the level o f individual organisms, those with cooperating 
parts (e.g. cells) have a selective advantage; and at the level o f groups o f individuals in 
competition, cooperation and altruism among individuals within groups is selected for. 
Steven Gould has even suggested that as species either go extinct or fill new biological 
niches, there m ay be species-level selection (Gould 2002). In this sense natural 
selection is a kind o f fracta l process that can be taking place simultaneously on 
multiple hierarchical levels. Paradoxically, selection for selfish individual fitness at
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any particular level may be opposed by selection for altruism by the selective 
pressures at a higher level. In this since altruism and selfishness are linked in a kind of 
ying-yang  relationship o f mutual dependence that allows natural selection to bootstrap 
cooperation up the hierarchical structure o f life via competition at yet a higher level.
In addition to increasing our understanding o f how selection and hierarchy 
interact in biological systems for the sake o f scientific understanding, establishing a 
more balanced view o f the role both cooperation and selfishness play in biological 
evolution may provide more balanced metaphors borrowed from biology about the 
natural tensions between self-interest and the common good. D arwin’s view o f natural 
selection that emphasized competition between organisms has been used to justify 
everything from genocide and eugenics to laissez fa ire  capitalism. This dark view is 
echoed by Dawkins’ quote at the beginning o f this chapter, but may be based on an 
incomplete picture o f nature— and therefore support an oversimplified view o f society. 
For example, political rhetoric both in support o f smaller or bigger government rarely 
acknowledges the natural tensions between market forces encompassing individual 
choices and government’s role in protecting the common good. As the 
environmentalist David Orr has said: “The market is how we say T ;  government is 
how we say ‘w e’” (Orr 2004). While both forces are important in society, it is the 
same averaging fallacy (discussed above) to believe that competition in free markets 
alone will maximize individual utility or lead towards the common good. One o f the 
roles o f  government is in fact to help solve the PD situations that market or market­
like individual actions cannot solve.
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Conversely, it may also be true that social and environmental conditions have 
influenced our scientific understanding towards one that emphasizes the selfish half o f 
the equation. As Gould put it: “We all have a tendency to spin universal theories from 
a limited domain o f surrounding circumstances” (1988 p. 16). For instance, Daniel 
Todes (1987) has argued that both the abundance o f the tropics in which Darwin did 
much o f his research, and the more crowded conditions o f London and England that 
influenced Malthus (1798) (from whom Darwin drew influence), help account for the 
emphasis on direct competition, whereas the under populated and harsh environmental 
conditions o f  Russia led many there, most famously Petr Kropotkin (Kropotkin 1902), 
to question both Malthus and Darwin’s emphasis on competition. They instead 
emphasized the need for— and the ubiquity o f—cooperation or “mutual aid” in 
confronting the “struggle for existence” especially where the more formidable 
opponent was bleak environmental conditions rather than other organisms. In game- 
theoretic terms this latter idea is referred to as a “game against nature,” which is the 
subject o f “decision theory,” when distinguished from game theory (Luce and Raiffa 
1985).
Studies o f mutual cooperation in humans have emphasized this mutual aid side 
rather than direct competition in situations where mutual defection may spell disaster 
for all. For example, James Scott’s study o f subsistence peasant farmers found that 
mutual help in minimizing risks from crop failure were more prominent than 
maximizing individual benefit through direct competition (1976). Similarly 
cooperative systems have been documented in the sharing o f a limited and vital
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resource such as fresh water on the island o f Bali (Lansing 1994). Interestingly when 
mutual defection brings mutual elimination, this may be thought o f in game-theoretic 
terms as an n-player game o f chicken (Oosterhout 1996), rather than a PD. In two- 
player chicken it is individually more fit to cooperate if  the other player defects and 
there is no dominant strategy. In the n-player case it can be fitter to cooperate when 
most players are defecting. When levels o f  cooperation rise to levels sufficient enough 
to avoid disaster, the game again becomes an NPD. This produces a stable equilibrium 
point that is intermediate between total defection and total cooperation (even in the 
absence o f  group-level selection). For instance, Gretchen Oosterhout (1996) has 
shown that a fishery can be modeled as a NPD (tragedy of the commons) or n-player 
Chicken depending on the severity o f the consequences o f over-fishing. While an NPD 
captures altruistic cooperation, depending on the circumstances cooperation may be 
self-serving. Only by distinguishing between these situations (i.e. determining if  the 
fitness functions describe a PD or game of chicken) can their underlying selection 
forces be assessed. Witnessing seemingly cooperative behaviors by themselves is not 
enough to decide without knowing the fitness consequences.
Future Studies
Although I have many research ideas that I have not had time to pursue, here I just 
mention a few direct extensions to topics covered in this dissertation.
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• The discussion o f chicken above highlights that there are other games 
besides the PD in the study o f cooperation. While the PD captures 
altruism, other game-theoretic frameworks such as decision theory and 
coalition theory could be used to assess the boundaries beyond the strict 
definition o f altruistic behavior. This may be important in investigating 
absence/persistence boundaries under harsh conditions as touched on 
above.
• In Chapter 5 I used Queller’s version o f Hamilton’s rule to analyze a 
reciprocal altruism situation, but only two alternative types (TFT and 
ALLD) were used. One goal is to develop a way to apply H am ilton’s rule 
to three or more types involving conditional strategies.
•  While I have argued that Queller’s equations challenge the selfish-gene 
viewpoint and could apply to symbiotic relationships across species, I 
would like to develop a model explicitly involving different species and 
show that this version o f Hamilton’s rule can indeed predict when 
symbiotic cooperation will increase.
• In the analysis o f the Price equation and development o f an alternative 
decomposition in Chapter 3 , 1 noted that neither decomposition gives an 
accurate picture o f  the interaction effects between within-group and 
between-group selection. It seems as if  a more accurate decomposition lies 
between the two and it may be possible to find some general way o f 
averaging them to arrive at a better decomposition.
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• All o f the models used here could be made more realistic both ecologically 
(e.g. more flexible population structures and environmental factors such as 
food resources) and evolutionarily (e.g. mutation, sexual reproduction, 
polygenetic traits).
•  One o f  the problems o f talking about non-linear synergies for cooperation 
as I did in this chapter is that by definition they are not decomposable to 
independent effects o f individual participants. Yet, only using linear 
fitness functions is very unrealistic and does not capture much o f what we 
mean by the benefits o f mutual cooperation. It would be nice to develop 
models that encompass non-linear synergies in order to investigate how 
such fitness relationships influence the evolution o f cooperative behaviors.
• Although I only touched on it in this concluding chapter, I am very 
interested in the way metaphors derived from our understanding o f nature 
influence our understanding o f society. It would be interesting to think 
about the best way o f presenting this more complex picture o f coupled 
competition and cooperation in nature to a general audience.
Part o f the appeal in pursuing the research behind this dissertation lies in the fact 
that the evolution o f altruism is so controversial. This debate o f course has historical 
and social roots, but I believe it is also fueled by a lack o f common understanding as 
to what is in dispute, as well as at times rather emotional support o f particular 
viewpoints. It is my hope that this dissertation can provide a helpful framework for 
understanding the most fundamental conditions necessary for altruism to evolve and
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that this will increase the level o f  useful discussion among those that come from 
different traditions or find a particular theory more appealing. Only by conducting this 
debate from a common foundation can we hope to form testable hypothesis that are 
capable o f  influencing the thinking o f all, and thereby advance our common 
understanding o f how evolutionary processes shape our natural world. I look forward 
to being part o f this discussion in the future.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Hamilton’s Rule Derivation
Here I derive Hamilton’s rule starting with the basic NPD fitness functions and the 
condition that the fraction o f cooperators in the population increases.
Starting with Q' > Q we get:
A_ A_
N ' N '
By the fitness equations 3.3 and 3.4:
A + ' Z alqih  ^ A
N + E aA$> + E si (<?ib + c) N
Cross multiplying and isolating c/b on the right side yields:
c
NQ S b '
We cancel N  and expand terms to give:
Y ^ a j g j - I A Q - A Q  ^ c
A { l - Q )  b '
and then:
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Y s W  - 2Q 'L n# i - Q 2Y / ii y c
A - 2 A Q  + AQ b '
This we rewrite as:
- 2 Q q t + Q 2) ^ c 
A - 2 A Q  + N Q 2 b ’
which gives:
Y nMi-Q)2
_________ N _________
A ( \ - Q ) 2 + S ( 0 - Q f  b ’
N
or:
varb(q,) ^ c 
var,(Q) b
This is Ham ilton’s rule for a whole-group trait where r is the between-group over total 
variance:
rb > c.
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Appendix B: Price Equation Derivations
Here I show how the Price Covariance equation can be interpreted in terms o f
idealized Q'  and how this relates to our NPD fitness functions.
Starting with the Price between-group term,
c o v O ^ )
E(W,)
where iv, is the growth rate o f a group, By definition we get:
AQ  = E{wiqi) E j wJEj q , )
E(wt) E(w,)
This can be written as
 e .
_ N _1  
N
Canceling UN  and using the definition o f w, we get:
^ b AT ^
which gives
A & = 0 ‘ -G
where
AT
Now given A g = Q' -  Q and AQ = AQb + AQW, it follows that AQw = Q'
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Appendix B—Price Equation Derivations 173
Starting with
N '
from above we expand n /  to get
0 * _ ZbA(1+w«vfr)]
N '
or
0 * I k O  + WcnA,)] _ A*
N ' N ' '
where A * is the idealized A ’ given by the Price between-group component o f  selection. 
That is, the Price equation’s idealization about the new number o f altruists in the 
population is given by adding the existing number in each group, a,-, to the amount 
each receives based on the average fitness line in the NPD model (Figure 3-1).
Appendix C: Random Group Analytic Model
Here I describe Hamilton’s original model with recursion added to accommodate 
multiple generations within groups. If  a$, ss, and ng are respectively the number of 
altruists, non-altruists (selfish individuals), and total individuals in a group after g  
generations spent within groups, then:
In Hamilton’s model g  is always one, but in our model I vary g  by using these 
equations recursively— inputting the results from one generation into the calculations 
for the next. Note that when first formed all groups are size n, but after reproduction 
group sizes vary. (Terms without g  subscripts indicate initial values, i.e. n is «0.)
The overall number o f  altruists, A g, and individuals, jVg, in the population after g  
generation within groups is then the number contributed (after g  generations) by 
groups o f every possible original composition (a = 0 to n) times the number o f such 
groups expected in a random binomial distribution. If  Y  is the total number o f groups, 
then the expected count o f  groups with a initial altruists out o f  n group members is:
(C .l)
v V i - 1;
(C.2)
(C.3)
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h(a) = Y
r n \
\ a d
Qa( i - Q ) (« -« ) (C.4)
The total population values after g  generations spent within groups are then given by:
/i
A g = Y * h ® a g( f )  and (C.5)
/=o
1=0
where ag(f) is the ag value from Eq. C .l given the particular starting a value specified 
by the index i and similarly for ng(i). Although Y  is infinite, it cancels in the 
calculation o f Qg = Ag / Ng and A%Q = Qg -  Q.
Appendix D: Random Group Analytic Model 
Modifications
Here I describe modifications to the analytic model such that altruists do not give 
benefit to kin, homogeneous groups are disallowed, and the population size is kept 
constant.
No Benefit to Kin
The modified fitness functions for when altruists only give to non-relatives are 
implemented by substituting the size of altmist kin groups, k, for the minus-one term 
in Eqs. C. 1 and C.2. The minus-one term subtracted the altruist from the number o f its 
beneficiaries; here we subtract the altruist’s kin (those having a common ancestor) as 
well. A preceding superscript k  is used to designate fitness calculations that subtract k  
instead o f one from a group’s altruist count and group size:
V 1 - A 1*« =V
hs = sV i
^ ka - k  ^
1 + b g
Vi “■**-i
(D .l)
1 +  6 -
a \g-1
V  -  A i  1
(D.2)
where the size o f  a kin group o f altruists in generation g  is given by:
g gk -1
a .
(D.3)
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This is the size o f the kin group in the last generation times an altruist’s clutch size for 
this generation. The initial k  value ko= \ (altruists are only related to themselves). 
Shifting benefit from kin to non-kin in this way does not affect the total group size and 
Eq. C.3 works for calculating ng.
Note that in the unmodified model the average proportion o f a group that is 
related to an altruist, kg / ngi can never be above 1 / n and therefore the proportion o f an 
altm ist’s benefit that falls to kin (kg -  1)/ (ng -  1) is also bounded by 1 In.  To see this 
note that kg / ng will be largest within homogeneous groups o f  altruists compared to 
mixed groups. In such groups (given our convention that c -  1) kg is multiplied by b 
each generation and total group size also increases with b. Therefore the proportion kg 
/ ng remains at its original value o f 1 / n. In all other groups this proportion falls with 
successive generations. Only when Q is high (so that homogeneous altruist groups are 
common) or when b is high (so homogeneous altruist groups grow proportionally 
bigger than other groups) is this limit approached.
No Homogeneous Groups
In an infinite population there will always be some homogeneous groups whenever Q 
> 0. For this modification, each time groups are randomly formed we eliminate 
homogeneous groups by simply converting all groups where the altruist number a = n 
to groups where a = n -  1. In this way all homogeneous groups o f altruists have one 
member switched to a non-altruist. Because non-altruists always increase faster than 
altruists, groups become more non-homogeneous with each successive generation.
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Note that this modification causes Q to decrease, but this effect is small when Q is 
small.
No Population Growth
The global carrying capacity is implemented by scaling back all offspring numbers 
each generation by Ng-i / Ng where Ng is first calculated without scaling. We use a 
preceding asterisk to denote values calculated with scaling. For instance, the number 
o f altruists in a group after g  generations with scaling is,
(D.4)
and similarly for group size *nu, where scaling is imposed at each recursion
♦ * * 
(generation). Whole population values with scaling A g and N g then sum over ag and
ng instead o f ag and ng respectively in Eqs. C.5 and C.6 and Qg = A g / N g.
Appendix E: Random Groups Computer Simulation 
Model
For each run o f the model, individuals (N  = 1,000) are initially randomly distributed 
into groups o f size n using a random number generator to assign individuals to unfilled 
groups. The proportion o f altruists and non-altruists is determined by the starting Q 
value. The sequential steps o f the simulation are then:
1. In each group the new number o f altruists and non-altruists (to the closest 
whole individual) are determined (using either the low or high stochasticity 
method described in the text).
2. Individuals are eliminated (using either the low or high stochasticity 
method described in the text) until the original population size N  is 
reached.
3. I f  g  generations have passed within groups since the last group 
reformation, all individuals are randomly assigned to new groups o f size n\ 
otherwise if  the migration rate, m, is greater than zero, m N  individuals are 
chosen at random from the whole population and moved to new random 
locations in the population array which is ordered by groups—  
consequently larger groups are proportionately more likely to send out and 
receive migrants.
Appendix E—Random Group Computer Simulation Model 180
These steps are repeated until an equilibrium at Q = 0.0 or Q  = 1.0 is reached. For runs 
where n = 6, TV was 1,002 instead o f 1,000 and initial Q = 0.0998 instead o f 0.1000 to 
allow an even distribution into groups.
Appendix F: Derivation of Gp 'for Conditional 
Strategies in TFT I ALLD Population
Here I derive a formula for the frequency o f  TFT players in the next generation (GP') 
based on the fitness (utility) values gained in the previous generation. These values are 
calculated using the PD payoff values o f Figure 5-2, the frequencies o f each type of 
pairing, and the number o f iterations played. Figure 5-2 is repeated here for reference.
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The idea is to calculate a numerator that represents the total fitness (offsping) for TFT
players. This is their fitness in TFT-TFT (77) and TFT-ALLD (TD) pairings scaled by
the frequency o f each type o f  pairings. In the TD case the TFT plays C on the first
move and gets the sucker’s payoff, but for the next (i -  1) moves TFT plays D as does
its opponent. The denominator is the total o f all payoffs for each pairing (77, TD, DD
scaled by frr, fro , and f DD respectively) over i iterations.
q  • = _________ fr r  2 i(wo + b - c  + d )  + f m (w0 - c  + ( i ~  l)w 0)__________
p frr  2 i(w0 + b - c  + d)  + f rD(w0 - c  + 2 (/ - 1  )w0 + w0 + b) + f DD 2 iw0
This can be reduced to:
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G f n 2 i(W° + b ~ c + d ) + f r pO o  ~c)
f i r 2i(w 0 + b - c  + d )  + f m (2iw0 + b - c )  + f DD2iw0
which is Eq. 5.7.
